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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When a state’s court of last resort renders an opinion that abridges, 
ignores, and renders meaningless an express provision of that state’s 
constitution, then that court shall have itself effectuated an amendment to its 
constitution erroneously and without the approval and longstanding support 
of the electors of that state.1  This is what the Supreme Court of Florida did 
in 2012 in the case of Telli v. Broward County,2 which held that counties 
should be allowed “to govern themselves, including [enacting] term limits 
[for] their officials, in accordance with their home rule authority.”3  It is 
being interpreted to opine that charter counties may impose term limits 
through their charters on any and all county officers—including the 
Constitution’s County Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution, which includes the office of the 
Tax Collector.4  This recent Supreme Court of Florida opinion receded 
from—that is, determined that the Court would no longer abide by—its 
previous opinion in Cook v. City of Jacksonville (Cook II),5 issued ten years 
prior, which expressly and unambiguously held that charter counties could 
not limit the terms of the Constitution’s five County Officers enumerated in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution.6 
                                                            
1. See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
2. 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
3. Id. at 513 (emphasis added). 
4. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
5. 823 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 2002). 
6. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook v. 
City of Jacksonville (Cook II), 823 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 2002); City of Jacksonville v. Cook 
(Cook I), 765 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook 
v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 
2002). 
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The decision in Telli, which is supported by scarce legal analysis, is 
in direct conflict with the Florida Constitution.7  Telli represents a 
fundamental misunderstanding of charter counties’ home rule power—as 
limited by the Florida Constitution—and also a misunderstanding of the 
status of the five County Officers created and established by article VIII, 
section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution.8 
Another article has been published regarding this case in 2013 by 
Daniel S. Weinger, titled Stare Decisis Takes Another Blow in Telli v. 
Broward County.9  We would like to note that we agree with Mr. Weinger’s 
position regarding the past precedent leading up to Telli, and his discussion 
of stare decisis.10  We do, however, respectfully disagree with his discussion 
of operative language of the Constitutional provisions pertaining to “County 
Officers” and “County Commissioners”—discussed more fully below.11  
Furthermore, we note that Mr. Weinger’s article did not address several 
important issues with the case.12 
Florida is divided into sixty-seven county political subdivisions, each 
served by one general purpose government entity—Board of County 
Commissioners—and five specific purpose one-officer entities, the 
Constitution’s County Officers:  Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser, 
Supervisor of Elections, and Clerk of Circuit Court.13  All county 
governments have home rule power under the Florida Constitution, 
regardless of whether they take form as a charter county government form of 
home rule, or non-charter county government form of home rule.14  Home 
rule—ever since 1968—is vested inherently in each county.15  However, the 
Constitution still provides limitations on county home rule.16  There are two 
                                                            
7. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506, 512–13; Daniel S. 
Weinger, Stare Decisis Takes Another Blow in Telli v. Broward County, 42 STETSON L. REV. 
859, 859–60 (2013). 
8. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506, 512–13; Weinger, 
supra note 7, at 859, 868–69. 
9. Weinger, supra note 7, at 859, 868–73. 
10. Id. at 860–68. 
11. See infra text accompanying note 119.  Interestingly enough, Mr. Weinger 
served as co-appellate counsel for the Board of County Commissioners challenging the term 
limit provision in the Telli case.  Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505–06; Weinger, supra note 7, at 859. 
12. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505–13; Weinger, supra note 7, at 868–73. 
13. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), (c)–(d), (f)–(g) (noting unless one or more 
offices in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) is abolished under applicable constitutional 
authority).  Although much of this article will focus on duties and provisions of the Tax 
Collector, the broader implications are applicable to all five of the Constitution’s County 
Officers.  Id.  See infra Parts II.C., III.A.–B. 
14. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), (f)–(g). 
15. See id. § 1(a). 
16. See id. § 1(f)–(g). 
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categories of such limitations, which include those limits on non-charter 
counties’ home rule in article VIII, section 1, subsection (f), and those limits 
on charter counties’ home rule in article VIII, section 1, subsection (g).17 
The Constitution’s five County Officers18—as created by and 
established under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida 
Constitution—have been imbued with sovereignty and maintain a status of 
independence from the county government, the Board of County 
Commissioners.19  These officers maintain sovereign plenary power to carry 
out important state work assigned to them by general law to be performed 
and carried out at the county level and to exercise reasonable discretion in 
carrying out that work, not inconsistent with the express duties.20  These 
officers are not subject to regulation or interference by the local county 
government—the Board of County Commissioners.21  Therefore, any charter 
provisions pertaining to the Constitution’s five County Officers will not be 
enforceable, save for a provision establishing a different manner for their 
selection—but being selected in a different manner does not change their 
status as the Constitution’s County Officers.22 
                                                            
17. Id. 
18. Id. § 1(d).  It is important to understand the terms that we have chosen to 
describe the five County Officers listed in, and created by, article VIII, section 1, subsection 
(d) of the Florida Constitution.  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  Throughout this article, we 
refer to these officers as the “Constitution’s County Officers.”  Id.  This is because they are 
created by the Constitution.  Id.  Some cases have referred to them as “Constitutional County 
Officers,” “Constitutionally-authorized County Officers,” or some other related title.  See, 
e.g., Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418–19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. 
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 
2012).  We believe referring to these officers as either “Constitutional” or “Constitutionally-
authorized” is misleading.  See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418–19.  
These titles have been used by the courts to distinguish the five article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d), county officers from a charter-created officer to whom the duties of the article 
VIII, section 1, subsection (d) County Officer have been transferred, and which may retain the 
same name and responsibilities.  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  For a more detailed discussion 
of the abolition of an article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) officer and the transfer of his or her 
duties, resulting in a charter officer, see infra Part II.C.  However, if a charter county follows 
the correct procedures laid out in the Constitution under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) 
to abolish a Constitution-created “County Office” and transfers its duties to a charter-created 
office, then the resulting charter office is also constitutional.  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see 
infra Part II.C.  To avoid confusion, we refer to the article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) 
“County Officers,” as created by the Constitution, as the “Constitution’s County Officers” or 
“Constitution County Officer,” and to any charter-created office carrying out the same duties 
after abolition and transfer as the “charter’s county officer.”  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see 
infra Parts II–V. 
19. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e). 
20. See id. § 1(f). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. § 1(d). 
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A charter county may abolish one or more of the Constitution’s five 
County Offices and transfer the duties performed by that office to a charter 
office—either charter-elected or charter-appointed.23  For example, in the 
Miami-Dade, Broward, and Volusia county political subdivisions, the 
Constitution’s County Tax Collector—even though it may be referred to by 
the same name under the charter—no longer exists.24  The charter’s 
appointed Tax Collector now exists in its place in these counties, and this 
charter office may be regulated to its fullest extent by the local government, 
not inconsistent with the state duties established under Chapter 197 of the 
Florida Statutes,25 and other applicable general law.26 
The recent Supreme Court of Florida decision in Telli is in direct 
contradiction with the above-summarized provisions of the Florida 
Constitution.27  First, it fails to acknowledge the important limitations placed 
on counties’ home rule power under the Constitution.28  Second, it 
undermines completely the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers 
by holding that charter counties may term limit any and all county officers 
through their charters—even the Constitution’s County Officers—when 
those offices have not been first abolished under the county charter.29 
Accordingly, the lower court decision from the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal in the case should have been affirmed, but on different grounds:  
(1) because charter counties have broad authority over their Board of County 
Commissioners and any of their charter-elected or charter-appointed officers 
under their charters, including the authority to set term limits on the charters’ 
officers—including County Commissioners—and; (2) because counties do 
not have the authority to regulate or interfere with the Constitution’s five 
County Officers and thus do not have the power to term limit any one of the 
Constitution’s County Officers whose office has not been abolished and 
duties transferred to a charter-created office.30  Regardless of what the 
                                                            
23. Id. 
24. DADE COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER art. IX, § 9.01(A) (2012); BROWARD 
COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 3.06(a) (2010); VOLUSIA COUNTY CHARTER art.VI, § 601.1(1)(a) 
(2002); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
25. FLA. STAT. § 197.332(2) (2014); see also DADE COUNTY HOME RULE 
CHARTER art. IX, § 9.01; BROWARD COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 3.06; VOLUSIA COUNTY 
CHARTER art.VI, § 601.1. 
26. Weinger, supra note 7, at 862–63. 
27. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g), with Telli v. Broward Cnty., 
94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
28. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 507; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g). 
29. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g). 
30. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Snipes v. 
Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward 
Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012). 
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Supreme Court of Florida held in the Telli opinion, county charter term limits 
are not effective as to the Constitution’s County Officers.31 
The following sections of this article will explore the preceding 
analysis in depth.32  Part II will include important background on county 
governance under the Florida Constitution, including the development of the 
county home rule in Florida, the difference between charter and non-charter 
county governance, and the status that our Florida Constitution gives to the 
five Constitution County Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d), as well as the relationship between charter and non-charter 
counties and the Constitution’s County Officers in each of their respective 
counties.33  Part III will include an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court of 
Florida decision in Telli, and how that decision misinterprets county home 
rule and ignores the status of the Constitution’s County Officers.34  Part IV 
includes a discussion of some possible pathways of review.35 
II. BACKGROUND ON COUNTY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE FLORIDA 
CONSTITUTION 
The Florida Constitution provides that the state shall be divided into 
political subdivisions called counties.36  The Constitution leaves it up to the 
Florida Legislature to determine the number and boundaries of such 
counties.37  Currently, there are sixty-seven counties in Florida.38 
The Constitution also establishes that there shall be one county 
government in each county political subdivision and provides that such 
county governments exercise home rule power, either in the form of a non-
charter county government39 or charter county government.40  However, the 
Constitution also provides that there shall be six more distinct government 
entities that shall be integral to that county’s political subdivision.41  These 
include one collegial, general purpose entity in the form of the Board of 
                                                            
31. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
32. See infra Parts II–IV. 
33. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); infra Part II. 
34. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; infra Part III. 
35. See infra Part IV. 
36. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) (“The state shall be divided by law into 
political subdivisions called counties.”). 
37. Id. (“Counties may be created, abolished or changed by law, with 
provision for payment or apportionment of the public debt.”). 
38. See FLA. STAT. ch. 7 (2014). 
39. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (f). 
40. Id. § 1(g). 
41. Id. § 1(d)–(e). 
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County Commissioners42 and each of the five distinct one-officer, special 
purpose entities, which include:  Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser, 
Supervisor of Elections, and Clerk of Court.43  These five, one-officer, 
special purpose entities are created by the Florida Constitution—labeled 
“County Officers”—and exist in every county political subdivision in 
Florida; even in counties that have adopted charters, unless any charter 
county has by charter provision abolished such an office and transferred its 
duties to either a charter-elected or charter-appointed office.44 
A. 1968 Constitution and the Shift in Counties’ Home Rule 
“Home rule” generally refers to the “allocati[on] [of] a measure of 
autonomy to a local government.”45  In other words, a local government that 
has home rule power governs its own local affairs and does not have to seek 
legislative authority for what it does.46  Prior to the 1968 Constitution, 
counties in Florida derived home rule authority only as directly granted from 
the Florida Legislature “through [the] passage of local bills,”47 and did not 
have any independent or inherent powers of self-government.48  This 
previous form of home rule in Florida was commonly referred to as Dillon’s 
Rule.49  Based on the increasing population and growth needs of the people 
                                                            
42. Id. § 1(e). 
43. Id. § 1(d). 
44. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  There are certain limited ways, provided by 
the Constitution, in which a charter county government may alter or abolish one or more of 
these six county government entities, which will be discussed in Part II.C.1–3.  See discussion 
infra Part II.C.1–3. 
45. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (10th ed. 2014).  The verbatim definition 
in Black’s Law Dictionary is “[a] state legislative provision or action allocating a measure of 
autonomy to a local government, conditional on its acceptance of certain terms.”  Id.  This 
definition is somewhat misleading because, as discussed infra, in Florida, home rule power is 
allocated under the State’s constitution, and therefore, is not an allocation of power from the 
legislature, but an inherent power based on the consent of the people to be governed.  See 
discussion infra Part III.A. 
46. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f)–(g); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 45, at 850. 
47. C. Wayne Alford & John H. Wolf, Comment, Constitutional Revision:  
County Home Rule in Florida—The Need for Expansion, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 282, 282–83 
(1966). 
48. Mark J. Wolff, Home Rule in Florida:  A Critical Appraisal, 19 STETSON 
L. REV. 853, 859 (1990). 
49. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 169, 221 (1983) (discussing Dillon’s Rule, under which “local government[s 
only] consisted of delegated or enumerated powers,” and thus characterizing “local 
governments as creatures of the state legislature”). 
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of Florida,50 and the increasing demands that the passage of local bills were 
placing on the Legislature,51 the people of Florida passed the 1968 
Constitution which includes express provisions addressing the home rule 
power of county political subdivisions.52  The fundamental force of these 
provisions of the 1968 Constitution meant that counties in Florida have 
inherent governing power and no longer have to request a specific law from 
the Florida Legislature to justify or authorize local county action.53  Broad as 
this power may be, the Constitution still limits this inherent power with 
different limitations for non-charter home rule and charter county home 
rule.54 
B. The Difference Between Charter Counties and Non-Charter 
Counties Under the Florida Constitution 
All sixty-seven county political subdivisions in Florida possess home 
rule power inherently, regardless of whether they have a charter or not.55  
Under the 1968 Constitution, non-charter counties possess “such power of 
self-government as is provided by general56 or special law57 . . . [and] [t]he 
[B]oard of [C]ounty [C]ommissioners . . . may enact . . . county ordinances 
not inconsistent with general or special law.”58  Relatedly, charter county 
                                                            
50. See Wolff, supra note 48, at 854 (“It is a practical response to persistent 
increases in demand for fundamental services such as water, sewage, transportation, zoning, 
and police and fire protection, precipitated by steadily increasing populations . . . .”). 
51. See, e.g., Alford & Wolf, supra note 47, at 283 (stating that “[i]n 1965, the 
Florida Legislature passed 1186 special and local bills,” dwarfing the number of general bills 
it passed, at a mere 586). 
52. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f), (g). 
53. See Wolff, supra note 48, at 861–62. 
54. Id. at 881; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f), (g). 
55. Wolff, supra note 48, at 880. 
56. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155, 1157 
(Fla. 1989).  A general law is one that “operates universally throughout the state, uniformly 
upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within a permissible 
classification.”  Id. (citing State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla. 1934) (en 
banc)). 
57. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(g).  The Constitution defines a “special law” as a 
special or local law.  Id. 
“[A] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons 
or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when 
classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is 
one relating to, or designed to, operate only in a specifically indicated part of the 
State, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification 
is not permissible or the classification is illegal.” 
City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 148 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Landis, 163 So. at 240 
(emphasis omitted)). 
58. FLA. CONST. art VIII, § 1(f). 
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governments possess “all powers of local self-government not inconsistent 
with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors,” and 
the Board of County Commissioners “may enact county ordinances not 
inconsistent with general law.”59 
Fundamentally, all counties—whether charter or non-charter—
possess inherent home rule power, and the only fundamental difference 
between the home rule power of charter counties and non-charter counties is 
the limitations placed upon them.60  For all counties in Florida, home rule 
power is limited by both general law enactments of the Florida Legislature 
and the provisions of the Florida Constitution; but in non-charter counties, 
home rule is also limited further by special law enactments of the Florida 
Legislature.61 
The Florida Legislature has provided broad powers of local self-
governance to all counties through general law by enacting the provisions of 
chapter 125 of the Florida Statutes.62  Essentially, chapter 125 of the Florida 
Statutes operates as a quasi-default charter for non-charter counties, but is 
used in practice by charter counties as well.63  The provisions that exist for 
non-charter counties under chapter 125 are very broad and non-restrictive.64 
In essence, under current law, there are several things that counties 
can accomplish under the charter county government structure that either 
cannot be accomplished, or can only be accomplished indirectly, under non-
charter county government structure.65  Examples include: 
 
1) Citizen recall enabling voters of the county to vote to 
remove members of the Board of County Commissioners;66 
2) Citizen initiatives to vote on proposed ordinances;67 
                                                            
59. Id. § 1(g) (emphasis added).  This distinction between powers of self-
government and local self-government has not been defined.  See id.  However, we would 
argue that it means that non-charter home rule is limited to self-government, and charter home 
rule has a further limitation in that it is limited to local self-government.  Id.  Therefore, a 
charter cannot write anything that is not truly local in nature.  Id. 
60. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f)–(g). 
61. Id. § 1(g); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 850; see also FLA. 
STAT. ch. 125 (2014).  Those special law enactments passed by the Florida Legislature will 
only apply to charter counties if the voters in the county also pass it by referendum.  FLA. 
CONST. art. III, § 10.  “Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of local 
self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the 
electors.”  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g) (emphasis added). 
62. See FLA. STAT. ch. 125. 
63. See id. 
64. See id.; 081-7 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 24 (1981). 
65. See FLA. STAT. ch. 125. 
66. See id. § 100.361(1). 
67. See id. § 125.66(4)(b)(1). 
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3) Non-partisan elections of the Board of County 
Commissioners;68 
4) Term limits for the Board of County Commissioners;69 
5) Change in the length of terms for the Board of County 
Commissioners;70 
6) Change in the districts represented by each County 
Commissioner, including at-large districts;71 
7) County ordinances to prevail in the event of conflict 
with and over municipal ordinances on the same subject;72 
8) Exclusive power in the county over community 
redevelopment authorities with tax increment financing;73 
9) County authority to levy a municipal public service tax 
outside of a city in the county;74 
10) Levy of a communication service tax at a higher rate;75 
11) Abolish any of the State Constitution’s County 
Officers—Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser, Supervisor 
of Elections, and Clerk of Court—and then transfer the duties to 
a charter-created office in order to put them under the control of 
the Board of County Commissioners;76 and/or 
                                                            
68. See 00-02 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 6 (2000). 
69. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).  This 
is in line with the holding of Telli, and an interpretation of article VIII, section 1, subsection 
(e) of the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.  
However, the holding of Telli, with respect to term limits of the Constitution’s five County 
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution, is 
erroneous and in contradiction to the provisions and structure of the Florida Constitution.  See 
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.  For full discussion of this issue, see 
infra Part III.B. 
70. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (“Except when otherwise provided by 
county charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners 
composed of five or seven members serving staggered terms of four years.”) (emphasis 
added). 
71. See FLA. STAT. § 124.01(4). 
72. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f) (For non-charter county governments “an 
ordinance in conflict with a municipal ordinance shall not be effective within the municipality 
to the extent of such conflict.”); id. § 1(g) (For charter county governments:  “The charter 
shall provide which shall prevail in the event of conflict between county and municipal 
ordinances.”). 
73. See FLA. STAT. § 163.410. 
74. See id. § 166.231(1)(c). 
75. See id. § 202.19(1). 
76. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); infra Part II.C.2. 
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12) Have special acts of the Legislature to be inapplicable 
within the county unless approved by referendum.77 
C. Status of the Constitution’s “County Officers” (art. VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d)) 
In Amos v. Mathews,78 a Supreme Court of Florida decision rendered 
prior to the 1968 Constitution, the Court described the division of power and 
duties of state and local officers as such: 
 
It is fundamentally true that all local powers must have 
their origin in a grant by the state which is the fountain and source 
of authority. . . .  [I]t is therefore the spirit of the Constitution, that 
the performance of state functions shall be confided to state 
officers; the performance of county functions of purely local 
concern shall be confided to county officers.  Save as is otherwise 
clearly contemplated by the Constitution, there can be no 
compromise with that principle, the origin of which is more 
ancient than the Constitution itself.79 
 
As noted above, prior to 1968, any and all county officers had the 
power to govern local affairs only to the extent that home rule power was 
granted to them by the Legislature.80 
However, that power structure changed as a result of the 1968 
Constitution, which vested in non-charter counties such powers of self-
governing by general or special law, and in charter counties “all powers of 
local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law 
approved by vote of the electors.”81  In essence, this change “denotes a broad 
empowerment of local authorities to . . . rule[] in matters of genuine local 
concern,” and “shift[ed] [to] locus of decision-making power back to those 
in the best position to assess those needs, freeing the state legislature to 
concentrate on the issues that have a genuine statewide impact.”82 
                                                            
77. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g) (“Counties 
operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not 
inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors.”) 
(emphasis added). 
78. 126 So. 308 (Fla. 1930). 
79. Id. at 320. 
80. See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 27; Louis C. Deal, Constitutional 
Home Rule of Unchartered Counties—Fantasy or Fact?, 56 FLA. B. J. 469, 469 (1982); Wolff, 
supra note 48, at 859–60. 
81. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g). 
82. Wolff, supra note 48, at 854 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the division of state and local powers under the 1968 
Constitution allows for local regulation of purely local officers, and state 
regulation of state officers.83  The Constitution’s County Officers listed in 
and created only by article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), hold an 
independent status in our state and Constitution.84  They are not local officers 
with purely local duties as defined in Amos, but rather they are the state 
Constitution’s sovereign County Officers with plenary power to implement 
important state duties under state law and state rule on the local level.85 
Although the five officers listed in article VIII, section 1, subsection 
(d) are labeled County Officers, they are the Constitution’s County Officers 
in and for each county political subdivision and they hold a constitutional 
sovereign status.86  This sovereign status is of special consequence and 
benefit to Floridians because of the important state work that these 
Constitution County Officers perform on the county level, which is an 
overriding State interest and—notwithstanding dicta in court and Attorney 
General opinions—is not county business.87  The sovereign status of these 
officers is well explained in Demings v. Orange County Citizens Review 
Board88 as follows: 
 
[U]nder Florida’s [C]onstitution, certain responsibilities of local 
governance are separately entrusted to independent constitutional 
officers who, at least in non-charter counties [who have not 
abolished the Constitution’s County Officers], are not accountable 
to the county’s governing board, but derive their power directly 
                                                            
83. Amos, 126 So. at 320; Deal, supra note 80, at 469; Wolff, supra note 48, 
at 859–60; see also FLA CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
84. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
85. See id. § 1(g); Amos, 126 So. at 308, 320.  The best example of state 
duties performed by the tax collectors is property tax collection.  See FLA. STAT. § 197.603 
(2014) (“The Legislature finds that the state has a strong interest in ensuring due process and 
public confidence in a uniform, fair, efficient, and accountable collection of property taxes by 
county tax collectors. . . . The Legislature intends that the property tax collection authorized 
by this chapter under [section] 9(a), [a]rt. VII of the State Constitution be free from the 
influence or the appearance of influence of the local governments that levy property taxes and 
receive property tax revenues.” (emphasis added)).  Other state duties include:  Title, tag, and 
driver’s license services, sale of hunting and fishing licenses, collection of other taxes on the 
local level, including those levied by state agencies.  FLA. STAT. §§ 320.03, 322.135, 
379.352(4). 
86. Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
87. Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
88. 15 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
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from the state.  These officers are independently accountable to the 
electorate unless otherwise provided by law.89 
 
In this context, the term local governance refers to the important 
state duties performed locally by the Constitution’s County Officers elected 
in each county’s political subdivision.90  The sovereign independence of the 
Constitution’s County Officers is important and is set up by our Constitution 
to eliminate even the appearance—much less the reality—of local influence 
on the important state work performed by these officers on the county 
level.91  The independence and election of the Constitution’s County Officers 
maintains service and accountability only to the electorate in the local county 
political subdivision and not to the interests of the local general purpose 
collegial governing body that would benefit from exercising undue influence 
and political control over these offices to the detriment of the people and to 
the detriment of the people’s interest in due process, unfettered even, by the 
appearance of influence by those who tax and spend.92 
The Constitution’s five County Officers have been imbued with 
sovereignty.93  Sovereignty refers to the supreme political authority of an 
independent state;94 or, in other words, a state’s “authority and . . . right to 
govern itself.”95  In the United States, the fifty individual states have retained 
all of their common law sovereign powers, save those that were relinquished 
to the federal government.96  In Florida, state officers are imbued with a 
                                                            
89. Id. at 606 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
90. See id. 
91. See FLA. STAT. § 197.603. 
The Legislature finds that the state has a strong interest in ensuring due process and 
public confidence in a uniform, fair, efficient, and accountable collection of 
property taxes by county tax collectors.  Therefore, tax collections shall be 
supervised by the Department of Revenue pursuant to [section] 195.002(1).  The 
Legislature intends that the property tax collection authorized by this chapter under 
[section] 9(a), [article] VII of the State Constitution be free from the influence or 
the appearance of influence of the local governments that levy property taxes and 
receive property tax revenues. 
Id. 
92. See id.; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606; John B. Anderson et al., Presidential 
Elections—The Right to Vote and Access to the Ballot, 29 NOVA L. REV. 571, 580–81 (2005). 
93. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 610–11. 
94. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (10th ed. 2014) (“The supreme political 
authority of an independent state.”). 
95. Sovereignty Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/sovereignty (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (“[A] country’s independent 
authority and the right to govern itself.”). 
96. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n, 
2009) (“[T]he State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they 
before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.”); 
Anderson et al., supra note 92, at 580–81. 
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portion of state sovereignty.97  Similarly, the state Constitution’s County 
Officers, including the County Tax Collectors, are also imbued with state 
sovereignty.98  The Supreme Court of Florida has described the relationship 
between the state and its officers as such: 
 
“The term office implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign 
power to, and possession of it by, the person filling the office; a 
public office being an agency for the state, and the person whose 
duty it is to perform the agency being a public officer.  The term 
embraces the idea of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties, and 
has respect to a permanent public trust to be exercised [on] behalf 
of government, and not to a merely transient, occasional, or 
incidental employment.  A person, in the service of the 
government, who derives his position from a duly and legally 
authorized election or appointment, whose duties are continuous in 
their nature, and defined by rules prescribed by government, and 
not by contract, consisting of the exercise of important public 
powers, trusts, or duties, as a part of the regular administration of 
the government, the place and the duties remaining, though the 
incumbent dies or is changed, . . . is a public officer . . . every 
office, in the constitutional meaning of the term, impl[ies] an 
authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power, either in 
making, executing, or administering the laws.”99 
 
Therefore, the Constitution’s five County Officers have been imbued 
with the sovereign authority of the state and, as such, shall carry out their 
duties on behalf of the people of the State of Florida, free from local 
influence and interference.100 
1. No Charter Regulation of, or Interference with, the Florida 
Constitution’s Five Independent County Officers 
Because of the sovereign independence of the Constitution’s article 
VIII, section 1, subsection (d) County Officers, and the important public 
policy reasons for maintaining such independence, the general purpose 
collegial local county government—made up of the Board of County 
Commissioners—cannot regulate or interfere with a Constitution’s County 
                                                            
97. State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 22 So. 721, 723 (Fla. 1897). 
98. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722.  This state 
sovereignty is also abolished when the Constitution’s County Office is abolished by a county 
charter.  See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part 
II.C.2. 
99. Clyatt, 22 So. at 723 (emphasis added). 
100. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722. 
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Officer in any way, even in a charter county.101  The Constitution does state 
one very limited way in which a county charter can regulate the 
Constitution’s County Officers.102  Under the Constitution, article VIII, 
section 1, subsection (d), Officers are to be “elected by the electors of each 
county;” in other words, this is the default manner in which Constitution 
County Officers are chosen.103  Alternatively, the Constitution also states that 
“when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of the 
electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner 
therein specified.”104  This limited exception would allow a charter county—
under its charter or by special act approved by the voters in the county—to 
change the manner or method in which the Constitution’s County Officers 
are chosen.105  An example is that one or more of these five Constitution 
County Officers could be chosen by the majority of the local Board of 
County Commissioners.106  However, this exception is limited expressly, in 
that, even if a charter county changes the manner in which the Constitution’s 
County Officers are chosen, they still remain the Constitution’s County 
Officers, with plenary power and sovereign authority, and therefore shall not 
be subject to the control of the county government.107 
2. In Order to Have Charter Regulation and Control, the Constitution’s 
County Office Must Be Abolished, and Its Duties Transferred to a Charter’s 
County Office, Either Charter-Appointed or Charter-Elected 
The Constitution also allows a charter county—through its charter, 
or through a special act approved by the charter county voters—to abolish 
completely one or more of the Constitution’s article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d) County Officers, and transfer the duties of that office to a 
charter-created office.108  At that point, the Constitution’s office, which was 
                                                            
101. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722; 081-7 Fla. Op. 
Att’y Gen. 21 (1981) (stating that County Officers retain their status as constitutional County 
Officers unless abolished by charter). 
 102. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. (emphasis added). 
105. Id. 
106. Id.; see also In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 313 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla. 
1975). 
107. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 313 So. 
2d at 720–21. 
108. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see also In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 
313 So. 2d. at 720 (“There shall be elected by the electors of each county, for terms of four 
years, a sheriff, a tax collector, [a property appraiser], a supervisor of elections, and a clerk of 
the circuit court; except, when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of 
the electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner therein 
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abolished, is no longer the Constitution’s County Office—even though the 
new county charter office may use the same name—and therefore no longer 
enjoys the same independence and plenary power of a sovereign office to 
carry out the important state duties delegated by the Legislature with 
insulation from influence of the local government.109  The office is thus 
transformed into a non-sovereign charter county office—either elected or 
appointed—and is open to complete regulation and control by the county 
government.110 
It is important to note though, that abolition of one or more of the 
Constitution’s five County Offices and the transfer of each office’s duties to 
a charter-created office are not by any means mandatory for counties that 
possess charters.111  Rather, it is an option that can be exercised.112  This 
concept was well explained by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Demings, 
when it stated:  “In charter counties, the electorate has an option of either 
maintaining these independent constitutional offices or abolishing them and 
transferring their responsibilities to the board of the charter county or to local 
offices created by the charter.”113  Thus, as long as the Constitution’s County 
Office is maintained in a charter county and has not been abolished and its 
duties transferred—using express language of abolition and transfer—the 
county government is without the power to regulate the office, except to the 
                                                                                                                                            
specified, or any county office may be abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by 
general law are transferred to another office.”) (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1(d)). 
109. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens 
Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
110. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Dade Cnty. v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822, 
823–24 (Fla. 1963) (holding that “although it may be bad government,” Dade County had the 
power to regulate its charter sheriff under the provisions of its county home rule charter); State 
ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So. 2d 312, 316 (Fla. 1961) (stating that charter tax assessor 
retained all the same duties as a constitutional tax assessor under the charter, the only 
difference was that “his political life and death depend upon the county commissioners”); 
Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.  Additionally, section 125.63 of the Florida Statutes also indicates 
that before proposing a charter, a charter commission be formed which “shall conduct a 
comprehensive study of the operation of county government and of the ways in which the 
conduct of county government might be improved or reorganized.”  FLA. STAT. § 125.63 
(2014).  While there is no similar specific requirement for adoption of proposed charter 
amendments, this provision does indicate to us that charter governments should only make 
changes upon a finding that such changes will actually improve the conduct and operation of 
state and county government on the county level.  See id. 
111. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
112. See id. 
113. Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606 (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1(d). 
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limited extent of dictating the manner in which the Constitution’s County 
Officer will be chosen.114 
It is helpful to understand the terminology used in this discussion 
and related case law.  The Constitution is the organic base jurisdictional 
authority created by the people.115  Any officer created by it—for example, 
Governor, Legislator, or the Tax Collector—is the Constitution’s officer.116  
It is a Constitution office, not a charter office.117  If, in a county charter, the 
Constitution’s County Office of Tax Collector, Sheriff, Property Appraiser, 
Supervisor of Elections, or Clerk of Court is abolished, and its duties 
transferred to a charter-elected or charter-appointed office, then the 
Constitution’s office is gone and the replacement office is the charter’s 
office.118  If the Constitution’s substantive procedural requirements are 
followed, then the charter’s office was created constitutionally, but 
nonetheless is no longer the Constitution’s County Officer—and thus, no 
longer enjoys the independence and plenary power of a state sovereign 
officer.119 
3. Charter Counties Have Broader Power to Regulate Its County 
Commissioners 
Unlike the provisions pertaining to the Constitution’s five County 
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), the provisions 
pertaining to County Commissioners in article VIII, section 1, subsection (e), 
are open to broader regulation through county charters.120  Although the two 
provisions both contain the same operative language, “‘[e]xcept when 
otherwise provided by county charter,’” the placement of that language is 
important.121  In section 1, subsection (d), the operative language appears 
                                                            
114. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see also Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. 
115. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
116. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
117. See id.; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. 
118. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. 
119. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. 
120. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e). 
Commissioners.  Except when otherwise provided by county charter, the governing 
body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners composed of five or 
seven members serving staggered terms of four years.  After each decennial census 
the board of county commissioners shall divide the county into districts of 
contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable.  One commissioner 
residing in each district shall be elected as provided by law. 
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added). 
121. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e); Weinger, supra note 7, at 869 (quoting 
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(d)–(e)).  One author, in a recently published article, argued that there 
is no distinction between the levels of regulation by county charters of Constitution County 
Officers and County Commissioners because the two Florida constitutional provisions contain 
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after the language enumerating the Constitution’s five different County 
Officers and their method of election and terms, and before the two specific 
alteration provisions, discussed above in subsections (a) and (b).122  In 
section 1, subsection (e), the operative language is placed at the beginning of 
the entire provision, signaling a broader power to regulate, because any of 
the provisions that follow may be altered by a county charter.123  This 
wording is in stark contrast to section 1, subsection (d), where the placement 
of the operative language indicates that only certain specific and limited 
alterations can be made by a county charter.124 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TELLI V. BROWARD COUNTY 
A. County Home Rule 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Telli held that charter counties had 
the power to term limit—or disqualify—any and all county officers.125  This 
holding was founded upon the Court’s finding that its prior decision of City 
of Jacksonville v. Cook (Cook I)126, “undermines the ability of counties to 
govern themselves as that broad authority has been granted to them by home 
rule power through the Florida Constitution.”127 
Many court opinions and law review articles repeatedly refer to 
counties’ home rule power under the 1968 Constitution as a grant of power, 
but it is more properly characterized as an inherent, but limited power.128  In 
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County,129 the Fourth District described the 
origin of county home rule power.130  First, the court stated that: 
 
[C]harter counties . . . derive their sovereign powers from the state 
through [a]rticle VIII, [s]ection 1(g) [which states]:  “Counties 
operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-
                                                                                                                                            
the exact same language “‘except[] when [otherwise] provided by county charter.’”  Weinger, 
supra note 7, at 869.  However, this argument is incomplete as it failed to analyze placement 
of the phrase.  See Weinger, supra note 7, at 869–70. 
122. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a)–(b), (d). 
123. Id. § 1(e). 
124. Id. § 1(d). 
125. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
126.  765 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, 
Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 
86 (Fla. 2002). 
127. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505; Cook I, 765 So. 2d at 293. 
128. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g); e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 
431 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
129. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
130. Id. at 609. 
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government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law 
approved by the vote of the electors.  The governing body of a 
county operating under a charter may enact county ordinances not 
inconsistent with general law.”131 
 
The Court then went on to state that “[t]hrough this provision, the 
people of Florida have vested broad home rule powers in charter counties 
such as Broward County,” and that the counties possess all the powers of 
self-government unless preempted by state general law, and that the power is 
also limited by the Florida Constitution.132  The Second District echoed these 
limitations on county home rule power in Pinellas County v. City of Largo.133 
In one case predating the 1968 Constitution, the Supreme Court of 
Florida—in describing the power of the Legislature under the Florida 
Constitution—stated that “it should further be borne in mind that our State 
Constitution is not a grant of power to the Legislature, but is a limitation 
voluntarily imposed by the people themselves upon their inherent lawmaking 
power.”134  Prior to the 1968 Constitution, counties only derived home rule 
authority as directly granted from the Florida Legislature, and did not have 
any independent powers of government.135  As such, the pre-1968 home rule 
power is more properly referred to as a grant of home rule power, while the 
post-1968 home rule is more properly referred to as an inherent power of 
self-governance, limited by the Florida Constitution and general law.136 
Therefore, charter counties can exercise all the powers of local self-
governance, as long as such exercises are not inconsistent with the Florida 
Constitution, or general law as passed by the Florida Legislature.137 
                                                            
131. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g)). 
132. Id.; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g). 
133. 964 So. 2d 847, 853–54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
134. Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 315 (Fla. 1930) (emphasis added). 
135. Wolff, supra note 48, at 860; see also FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, § 
27. 
136. Compare FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III § 27, with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 
1(g).  State constitutions themselves are seen as “limitations on the inherent sovereign power 
of states created by the people of that state.”  Mitchell W. Berger & Candice D. Tobin, 
Election 2000:  The Law of Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA L. REV. 647, 691 (2002).  A 
constitutional scheme such as that which exists in Florida, under which there is “‘a direct 
constitutional devolution of substantive home rule powers [to a county] dependent only upon 
the adoption of a home rule charter,’” is more properly characterized as a limitation upon 
inherent power, rather than a grant of power.  Williams, supra note 49, at 222. 
137. Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted 
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 
(Fla. 2012). 
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B. Supreme Court of Florida Decision 
Oddly enough, the Supreme Court of Florida based its decision in 
Telli on the fact that it agreed with Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II.138  
However, Justice Anstead’s statement regarding county home rule power 
does not support the Court’s conclusion: 
 
I cannot agree with the majority that the Florida 
Constitution prohibits charter counties from enacting term 
limits for county officers.  To the contrary, the constitution 
explicitly grants broad authority to charter counties over 
charter officers, and, consistent with that grant, imposes no 
restrictions on a county’s authority to regulate those 
officers.139 
 
With the exception of calling county home rule power a grant, 
Justice Anstead’s statement is correct.140  Charter counties have full authority 
to regulate charter officers.141  Several cases have held so.142 
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Snipes v. Telli143—the lower 
court decision preceding Telli—alluded to this conclusion in its well-
reasoned distinction between the Constitution’s County Officers, listed in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and County Commissioners, listed in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (e).144  However, the Supreme Court of 
Florida in Telli completely steamrolled this distinction, paying little attention 
or granting any lip service at all to the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 
analysis, simply noting that it was unworkable without much more 
discussion.145  Accordingly, we must disagree firmly, but respectfully, with 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion, as the distinction and holding of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal in Snipes—which is well thought-out and 
supported—correctly reflects the status of the Constitution’s County 
Officers, as opposed to a local charter’s county officers, namely County 
                                                            
138. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); see 
also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 95–96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
139. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
140. See id. 
141. See Dade Cnty. v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822, 823–24 (Fla. 1963). 
142. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; Demings v. 
Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 611 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
143. 67 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. 
Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012). 
144. Id. at 417–19; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 1(d)–(e). 
145. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); see 
also Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417–19; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–96. 
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Commissioners, and logically aligns the procedural and substantive history 
leading up to the Court’s previous decision in Cook II.146 
1. The Telli Decision is in Direct Contradiction to the Provisions of 
Article VIII, Section 1, Subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution 
As the constitutional provision currently stands, charter counties can 
take no action to interfere with any of the Constitution’s County Officers 
under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), except as discussed above that a 
county may choose a different manner in which such officers will be 
chosen.147  This provision simply means that a charter county may use a 
different procedure for choosing the Constitution’s County Officers.148  
However, the option exists whereby the electors of the county may—either 
by charter or special law—abolish the Constitution’s County Office when all 
of the duties are transferred to another charter-created office, the charter’s 
office.149  The county could then regulate the charter-created office however 
it so pleases, as stated above by Justice Anstead because it is that charter’s 
office, and not the Constitution’s Office.150  However, until such time as the 
Constitution’s County Office is abolished and all of its duties transferred, a 
charter county cannot interfere with the Constitution’s County Office and 
therefore, any provisions in the county charter pertaining to the 
Constitution’s County Officer would be unenforceable.151 
The Cook II and Telli opinions—and their predecessors—analyze 
and argue extensively over whether or not article VI, section 4, subsection 
(b)152—which establishes that certain offices under the Constitution are term 
                                                            
146. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417–19. 
147. 081-7 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 21 (1981); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
 148. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
149. Id. 
150. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also supra Part 
III.B. 
151. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
152. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b). 
 Section 4. Disqualifications.— 
. . . . 
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to 
any of the following offices: 
(1) Florida representative, 
(2) Florida senator, 
(3) Florida Lieutenant governor, 
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet, 
(5) U.S. Representative from Florida, or 
(6) U.S. Senator from Florida 
if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will 
have served—or, but for resignation, would have served—in 
that office for eight consecutive years. 
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limited—expressly establishes that all other offices within the Constitution 
may not be term limited, by virtue of not being included in the article VI, 
section 4, subsection (b) list.153  However, article VI, section 4, subsection 
(b) is actually a moot point on this issue.154  Even assuming that this 
provision did not exist in the Florida Constitution, or assuming that its 
adverse implication does not apply to article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) 
officers, a term limit provision within a county charter could not be 
enforceable against any one of the Constitution’s article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d) County Officers if that office has not been abolished and its 
duties transferred to a charter office, simply based on the fact that county 
charters cannot regulate or interfere with the Constitution’s County 
Officers.155 
A contrary holding, such as that established in Telli, completely 
undermines the distinction in the Florida Constitution between the 
Constitution’s County Officers and a charter-created officer—the charter’s 
office—that performs the same duties previously carried out by the 
Constitution’s County Officers.156  The holding also completely undermines 
and breaks down the status of the Constitution’s County Officers as officers 
who perform important state work locally, and, because imbued with 
sovereignty, are shielded from undue influence and control of the county, 
and only accountable to the electorate.157 
Placing term limits on any of the five Constitution County Officers 
would be an interference with, and control over the Constitution’s County 
Officer, in direct derogation of the Constitution.158  Although the Second 
District Court of Appeal in Pinellas County v. Eight is Enough in 
Pinellas159—one of the lower court consolidated cases preceding Cook II—
found that the charter term limit at issue in that case would not affect the 
status, duties, or responsibilities of the Constitution’s County Officers,160 a 
term limit would actually affect the status of the Constitution’s County 
                                                                                                                                            
Id. 
153. Id.; Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512–513 (Fla 2012) (per 
curium); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90, 94–95; Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 416–17 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), 
aff’d per curium, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012); Cook I, 765 So. 2d 289, 290, 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 
(Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002). 
154. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b). 
155. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); supra Part II.C.2. 
156. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13. 
157. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13. 
158. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512. 
159. 775 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted, 786 So. 2d 1188 
(Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002). 
160. Id. at 319; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2002). 
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Officers, who enjoy sovereign authority and plenary power, separate from 
the control of the county governing board.161  Allowing charter counties to 
term limit the Constitution’s County Officers, gives the charter county’s 
governing board a source of leverage and control over the Constitution’s 
County Officers.162  For example, if a charter county’s governing board does 
not agree with the actions of an incumbent Tax Collector, the charter 
county’s governing board might attempt to pass a term limit provision in the 
county’s charter, which would prohibit the incumbent Tax Collector from 
being able to run for reelection the following term and remain in office.163  
Additionally, the governing board might be able to maintain leverage over 
the Constitution’s County Tax Collector by simply threatening to pass a 
charter term limit if the Constitution’s County Tax Collector does not take 
actions in its favor.164  This kind of interference and control is exactly what 
was intended to be avoided by having the Constitution’s County Officers 
maintain an independence and sovereignty separate from any possible 
influence or control of the local county governing body.165 
Furthermore, the holding in Cook II also renders the language in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) that “‘any county office may be 
abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by general law are 
transferred to another office,’” as mere surplusage.166  If counties, under their 
charters, had full authority to regulate and control the Constitution’s County 
Officers, there would be no need for the language regarding abolition and 
transfer.167  Although charter counties have the power to impose term limits 
on county officers once they have become the charter’s officers, and no 
longer the Constitution’s sovereign County Officers, it is improper to 
conclude, as Justice Anstead did, that this procedure can be side-stepped: 
 
I can find no legal justification for concluding that charter counties 
should not be allowed to ask their citizens to vote on eligibility 
requirements of local elected officials, including term-limits, since 
they could abolish the offices completely or decide to select the 
officers in any manner of their choosing.168 
 
                                                            
161. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
162. See id. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2002) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 
1(d)). 
 167. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90. 
168. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 1(d). 
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Allowing charter counties to term limit the Constitution’s County 
Officers before their offices have been abolished and transferred to a 
charter’s office is an illegal means of achieving a result that would be legal 
under different means, and allowing such regulation and control will upset 
the balance of power struck by the Constitution.169  In a word, the Telli 
decision is alarming in ignoring base provisions of the Florida 
Constitution.170 
a. Additional Critiques of Reliance on Justice Anstead’s Dissent in 
Cook II 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Telli based its holding on its 
agreement with Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II.171  Part of Justice 
Anstead’s reason for finding that article VI, section 4, subsection (b) did not 
prohibit charter counties from implementing term limits on any and all of its 
county officers—the Constitution’s County Officers and County 
Commissioners—was that the offices in that section for which term limits are 
listed expressly are offices of statewide importance.172  As such, he 
concluded that the provision should have no bearing whatsoever on local 
officers.173  However, this statement fails to acknowledge the distinction 
between the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers listed in and 
created by article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and that of other local 
officers who perform exclusively local duties—namely County 
Commissioners—and the fact that the work that the Constitution’s five 
County Officers perform is in fact work of statewide importance 
implemented and carried out on the county level.174 
Additionally, this distinction also undermines Justice Anstead’s 
second reason for finding that article VI, section 4, subsection (b) cannot 
prohibit the implementation of term limits in charter counties for all county 
officers whether it be the Constitution’s County Officers, the charter’s 
                                                            
169. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
170. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 
513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
 171. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., 
dissenting). 
172. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b). 
173. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b). 
174. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla. 
4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 
2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012). 
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county officers, or County Commissioners.175  Justice Anstead noted that 
“there is no wording in article VI, section 4, [subsection] (b)—or anywhere 
else in the Florida Constitution or the Florida Statutes—that indicates that the 
named officers in article VI, section 4, [subsection] (b) are subject to term 
limits to the exclusion of all other government officers, state or local, in the 
State of Florida.”176  However, there is also no wording in article VI, section 
4, subsection (b) to indicate that the specific disqualifications and election 
provisions should apply exclusively to those offices of specific statewide 
importance.177  In fact, sections 6 and 7 of article VI contain wording 
indicating that the provisions in those sections expressly apply only to 
municipal or district elections and statewide elections, respectively.178  This 
wording is evidence that the Constitution drafters know how to write 
provisions expressly applicable to only certain offices and or elections, and if 
they so intended for article VI, section 4, subsection (b) to apply only to 
offices of statewide importance as defined by Justice Anstead, they would 
have expressly noted that restriction.179 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion in Telli, and its 
reliance on Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II, fails to acknowledge and 
undermines the Constitution’s specific distinction that exists between the 
Constitution’s five County Officers listed in article VIII, section 1, 
subsection (d), and the County Commissioners listed in article VIII, section 
1, subsection (e).180  The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal made a 
                                                            
 175. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b)(1)–(6); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418. 
176. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b). 
177. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 
512 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
178. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6–7. 
 Section 6.  Municipal and district elections.—Registration 
and elections in municipalities shall, and in other governmental entities 
created by statute may, be provided by law. 
 Section 7.  Campaign spending limits and funding of 
campaigns for elective state-wide office.—It is the policy of this state to 
provide for state-wide elections in which all qualified candidates may 
compete effectively.  A method of public financing for campaigns for 
state-wide office shall be established by law.  Spending limits shall be 
established for such campaigns for candidates who use public funds in 
their campaigns.  The legislature shall provide funding for this 
provision.  General law implementing this paragraph shall be at least as 
protective of effective competition by a candidate who uses public funds 
as the general law in effect on January 1, 1998. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 179. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4(b)(1)–(6). 
 180. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Cook II, 823 
So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
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detailed analysis of these two sets of offices in the lower court decision of 
Snipes.181  First, the court noted that the structure of the two sets of offices is 
distinctly different under article VIII, section 1 of the Florida Constitution, 
specifically with regards to changes to be made by a county charter.182  The 
court noted that “[t]he section 1, [subsection] (d) officers are established with 
precise language . . . .  [The section] establishe[d] that a county government 
shall have certain named officers, and grants the county limited powers to 
change the manner of electing those officers, or to abolish an office 
altogether and transfer its duties to another county office.”183  In contrast, 
“the section 1, [subsection] (e) commissioners are described as a default 
option when a county charter does not provide otherwise.”184  Section 1, 
subsection (d) requires each county to have the five Constitution County 
Officers, and is followed by language that authorizes a limited way in which 
a county by charter may abolish the Constitution’s County Office and 
transfer its duties to a charter-created office, the charter’s office.185  
Conversely, section 1, subsection (e) does not require that the composition of 
the Board of County Commissioners be set up in the way enumerated in the 
Constitution; it is simply a default.186  By beginning section 1, subsection (e) 
with the words “‘[e]xcept when otherwise provided by county charter, . . . .’ 
[t]he language of the Constitution expressly cedes power to a county charter 
when it comes to the creation of a county’s collegial governing body.”187 
Additionally, the court went on to discuss the practicality of the 
Constitution preferring statewide uniformity for section 1, subsection (d) 
officers.188  This practicality argument is further bolstered by the fact that the 
Constitution’s five County Officers perform important statewide work on the 
county level, which is intended to be free of interference or influence of the 
                                                            
181. Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 417–19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g 
granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 
3d 504 (Fla. 2012); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e). 
 182. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
183. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  
184. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e). 
185. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417. 
186. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); see also Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417. 
187. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 1(e)). 
188. Id. at 418 (“Persons traveling and doing business between counties should 
deal with a common set of section 1, [subsection] (d) county officers, i.e., sheriff, tax 
collector, property appraiser, supervisor of elections, clerk of the circuit court, and should not 
be forced to navigate byzantine bureaucracies to accomplish similar tasks.  Likewise, 
legislators seeking to regulate section 1, [subsection] (d) county officers should not be forced 
to take a variety of different titles and job descriptions into account in order to achieve a single 
legislative objective.”); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
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local county governing board.189  Conversely, the court notes that “these 
reasons for statewide uniformity are less applicable to the county’s 
[collegial] governing body,” whose duties “need not be kept uniform by the 
Constitution, but may rather be fashioned to suit the particular wants and 
needs of the voters of the county they serve.”190  The difference in status in 
the Florida Constitution between these two groups of officers “reflects the 
common sense conclusion that, as a matter of policy, the balance of state and 
local interests favors statewide uniformity for the [Constitution’s five County 
Officers], and local flexibility for the [governing Board of County 
Commissioners].”191 
The precise language in article VIII, section 1, subsection (e), 
“[e]xcept when otherwise provided by county charter,” represents the shift in 
power and authority that resulted from the 1968 Constitution denoting broad 
county home rule powers.192  Accordingly, prior to this change, even County 
Commissioners were considered constitution officers,193 the election and 
qualifications of whom could not be changed.194  However, this consideration 
is no longer true under the 1968 Constitution in charter counties that have 
established the form of its governing Board of County Commissioners under 
its charter, rather than utilizing the fallback option listed in article VIII, 
section 1, subsection (e).195  Once a charter county decides to establish and to 
regulate its governing board under its charter, the County Commissioners are 
local charter county officers, who—as Justice Anstead pointed out in his 
dissent in Cook II—the charter county has the power and authority to 
regulate.196  It is under this distinction and analysis that the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Snipes held that the holding of Cook II did not extend to 
County Commissioners, and that charter term limits for those offices are 
permissible under the Florida Constitution.197 
                                                            
189. See supra Part II.C. 
190. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e). 
191. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).  
 192. Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added), with FLA. 
CONST., art. VIII, § 1(e) (amended 1973). 
193. State v. Walton Cnty., 112 So. 630, 632 (Fla. 1927) (“[T]he board of 
county commissioners of each county are constitutional officers, and under the terms of the 
Constitution their powers and duties shall be fixed and prescribed by the Legislature.”). 
194. See Wilson v. Newell, 223 So. 2d 734, 735 n.2 (Fla. 1969) (quoting FLA. 
CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, § 5 (1943)). 
195. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (e), (g). 
196. Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 95–96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting); see 
also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e), (g). 
197. Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted 
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 
(Fla. 2012); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (e); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95. 
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However, the Supreme Court of Florida in its review of the Fourth 
District Court of Appeal’s decision failed to even analyze this distinction.198  
In its decision, the Court simply recapped the two lower court consolidated 
decisions and its previous decision in Cook II, then simply noted that it no 
longer agreed with its previous decision, and would recede from it because it 
now agreed with Justice Anstead’s dissent.199  Rather than analyzing 
specifically why the distinction drawn by the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
was erroneous, the Court simply noted that it was unworkable and “would 
undermine the ability to predict what offices may be included within the 
scope of [Cook II’s] prohibition on term-limits and would result in apparent 
inconsistencies between county officials.”200  However, we firmly and 
respectfully disagree with the Court’s hasty, careless, unreasoned, and 
alarming conclusion about the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding.201  
Based on the procedural and substantive history of the previous decisions 
involved in the Cook II case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding is 
clear and logically aligns the past precedent.202 
As correctly noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the 
holding of Cook II only expressly applied to the Constitution’s five County 
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d).203  The first 
case that Cook II reviewed was Cook I.204  This case was a challenge by the 
Clerk of Court for Duval County to a City of Jacksonville charter term limit 
provision.205  The second case was Eight is Enough in Pinellas.206  This case 
                                                            
198. See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512–13 (Fla. 2012) (per 
curiam); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 419. 
199. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 
(Arnstead, J., dissenting). 
200. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; Snipes, 67 
So. 3d at 419. 
201. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 419. 
202. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 87–90; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416, 419. 
203. Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook II, 
823 So. 2d at 94–95. 
204. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 87; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416; see also Cook I, 765 
So. 2d 289, 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook v. City of 
Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002). 
205. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 88; Cook I, 765 So. 2d at 290.  The challenge was 
to the City of Jacksonville Charter, rather than a county charter because under the Florida 
Constitution, the City of Jacksonville currently operates “in the place of any or all county . . . 
government[].”  FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) n.1; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 88.  This section also 
contains a similar provision as article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), regarding abolition of the 
Constitution’s County Officers, which states:  “No county office shall be abolished or 
consolidated with another office without making provision for the performance of all state 
duties now or hereafter prescribed by law to be performed by such county officer.”  Compare 
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) n.1, with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).  Contrary to the belief of 
many—Duval County is not a charter county.  See FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 6 n. 1.  There is no 
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began with a resident of the county seeking declaratory judgment that a 
charter provision implementing term limits for the Constitution’s five County 
Officers as well as the County Commissioners was invalid.207  The trial court 
found the provisions valid and, thereafter, the Constitution’s five County 
Officers intervened as plaintiffs.208  The trial court upheld the provision and 
the resident, the Constitution County Officers, and the county itself, 
appealed.209  The Second District affirmed the trial court.210  “The incumbent 
[C]lerk of . . . [C]ourt, [T]ax [C]ollector, and [S]heriff petitioned [the 
Supreme Court of Florida] for review, but the [B]oard of [C]ounty 
[C]ommissioners did not.”211  The Fourth District in Snipes correctly noted 
that the failure of the County Commissioners to petition for review of the 
Second District’s decision was significant “because it had the effect of 
removing that office from the holding of [Cook II].”212  Interestingly enough, 
the Supreme Court of Florida conveniently failed to include this fact in its 
opinion in Telli.213 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida in Cook II could not have 
been more clear and express about the fact that it was only reviewing the 
validity of term limit provisions on the Constitution’s five County Officers 
enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d).214  The Court phrased 
the issue in the case as such from the very outset of the opinion.215  Given the 
foregoing analysis, we would firmly and respectfully disagree with the 
careless and irresponsible conclusion of the Court in Telli, that unworkable 
                                                                                                                                            
Duval County government.  See id.  There is no consolidated government, and if and when the 
electors of Duval County vote in, or have an election to approve a county charter, the city of 
Jacksonville, by operation of law, will no longer act in operation and in place of the county 
government.  See id. 
206. Pinellas Cnty. v. Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So. 2d 317, 317 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted, 786 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 
86 (Fla. 2002). 
207. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 510 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
208. Id. at 510–11; Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So. 2d at 318. 
209. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 510–11. 
210. Id. at 511. 
211. Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted 
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 
(Fla. 2012). 
212. Id.; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 94–95 (Fla. 2002). 
213. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506–13. 
214. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90–91; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 1(d). 
215. Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90. 
The issue we address in these consolidated cases is whether a charter 
county may in its charter impose a “term limit” provision upon those county officer 
positions which are authorized by article VIII, section 1, [subsection] (d), Florida 
Constitution, where the charter county through its charter has not abolished those 
county officer positions. 
Id. 
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confusion will result as to which officers the Cook II decision would 
apply.216 
This is not to say that even under Cook II, charter counties have no 
power whatsoever to term limit its officers.217  Charter counties still have the 
ability to abolish any of the Constitution’s five County Officers listed in 
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and transfer the duties to a separate 
charter-created office, which it could then term limit in the same manner that 
it can term limit its charter governing board and any other charter officers.218  
The officers would then be the charter’s non-sovereign county officers, and 
no longer the Constitution’s sovereign County Officers.219  This distinction 
was also made in Cook II, as the issue posed specifically addressed the 
section 1, subsection (d), County Officers, “where the charter county through 
its charter has not abolished those county officer positions.”220  The Court in 
Cook II held that term limits could only be imposed on constitutional—that 
is, not-yet-abolished—County Officers through an amendment to the 
Constitution.221 
IV. PATHWAYS TO REVIEW:  WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE?222 
While the pathway for review in attempting to correct the Telli 
decision is rather limited and bleak, there are some methods available by 
which one could attempt to get the decision revisited and hopefully 
overturned by the Supreme Court of Florida.223  It is important to note that a 
state’s supreme court is the final and ultimate arbiter on issues of state law.224  
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida is the final arbiter of the state 
constitutional law issues involved in Telli, and the trial courts and district 
courts of appeal are bound to follow the Telli decision until such time as it is 
overruled by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court.225  However, this 
does not mean that one could not argue a case on the same issue back up to 
the Supreme Court of Florida, on the premise that the Telli decision was 
                                                            
216. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95. 
217. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90. 
218. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e), (g); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90, 94–95. 
219. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95. 
220. Id. at 90 (emphasis added). 
221. Id. at 94–95. 
222. This list of pathways to review is by no means all-inclusive. 
223. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a); Telli v. Broward 
Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
224. E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406, 
1413 (11th Cir. 1997). 
225. See Nielson, 116 F.3d at 1413; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
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decided erroneously and in direct derogation of the Florida Constitution.226  
There are several different options for getting the issue back to the Supreme 
Court of Florida.227 
A. Constitutional Amendment 
One option would be for a constitutional amendment to be passed 
which would clarify the status of the Constitution’s County Officers, and 
make it explicit that no actions could be taken to interfere with—including 
placing term limits on—the Constitution’s County Officers, until and unless 
their offices have been abolished and duties transferred to a charter-created 
office.228  The Florida Constitution sets out several different ways to propose 
and pass amendments to the Florida Constitution.229  However, we believe 
that a constitutional amendment is unnecessary.  The Florida Constitution 
does not need to be amended in this situation; its plain language simply 
needs to be followed.230  We believe that the limited powers and authority of 
charter counties to regulate or control the Constitution’s County Officers is 
clear from the plain language of the Florida Constitution as it stands.231 
B. Review of District Court of Appeal Decision 
The second option for getting back to the Supreme Court of Florida 
would be through review of a district court of appeal decision.232  Under this 
option, one would have to bring a case in a Florida circuit court.233  As noted 
above, the Florida circuit courts are bound by Supreme Court precedence, 
and so any circuit court would be bound to rule that charter term limits for 
any or all of the Constitution’s County Officers are constitutionally 
permissible based on Telli.234  However, an appeal could then be taken and 
heard by a district court of appeal.235  The district court of appeal would also 
be bound to follow Telli, and therefore would affirm the trial court’s 
                                                            
226. See Weinger, supra note 7, at 868–71; see also Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
227. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii), 
(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
228. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), (g). 
229. FLA. CONST. art. XI. 
230. See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g). 
231. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). 
232. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). 
233. Id. § 4(b)(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). 
234. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 
(Fla. 2012) (per curiam). 
235. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1) (“District courts of appeal shall have 
jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or 
orders of trial courts . . . .”). 
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judgment.236  The party could then petition the Supreme Court of Florida for 
review; however, the case would fall into the category of cases for which the 
Supreme Court of Florida only has discretionary review,237 so there is no 
guarantee that the Court would hear the case.238  It could just as easily decide 
not to, based on the fact that it has just recently issued the Telli opinion.239 
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Florida would have discretion to 
review the case if a district court of appeal certifies a question to be of great 
public importance that it has passed upon.240  The Supreme Court of Florida 
could also immediately hear a review of the trial court judgment—of which 
appeal is pending—if a district court of appeal certifies the case “to be of 
great public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper 
administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to require 
immediate resolution by the [S]upreme [C]ourt.”241 
C. Writ of Quo Warranto 
A writ of quo warranto is “used to test the right of a person either to 
hold an office . . . or to exercise some right or privilege.”242  Under the 
Florida Statutes, a person who claims the right to hold public office may 
bring a petition for writ of quo warranto if the Attorney General refuses to 
bring the petition.243  The Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction to hear 
petitions for writs of quo warranto, challenging the right of a person to hold 
state office.244  The Supreme Court of Florida has previously held that the 
title state officer under this provision “contemplates possession or use[] of a 
certain portion of sovereignty for the benefit of the people.”245  Because the 
Constitution’s County Officers are sovereign officers, they are also subject to 
                                                            
236. See id.; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
237. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).  Under this option, the Supreme Court of 
Florida could review the District Court’s decision based on the fact that it “expressly 
construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of 
constitutional or state officers.”  Id.  Because of the constitutional issues involved in the case, 
conflict between more than one district is not necessary for discretionary Supreme Court 
review.  See id. 
238. See id. 
239. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. 
240. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4). 
241. Id. § 3(b)(5). 
242. Tracy Raffles Gunn, Original Proceedings in Florida’s Appellate Courts, 
32 STETSON L. REV. 347, 354 (2003). 
243. FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2014). 
244. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8) (The Supreme Court of Florida “[m]ay issue 
writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers and state agencies.”). 
245. Ex parte Smith, 118 So. 306, 307 (Fla. 1928). 
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a writ of quo warranto from the Supreme Court of Florida.246  Therefore, this 
would be a viable method for getting this issue back to the Supreme Court of 
Florida directly, but one would have to wait for several things to occur 
before bringing such a petition.247 
First, a charter county would have to pass a charter term limit 
applicable to one or more of the Constitution’s County Officers.248  Second, 
an incumbent Constitution County Officer would have to be denied the 
ability to run in the next election following the passage of the charter term 
limit.249  Third, and related, a new Constitution County Officer would be 
elected and would take office.250  At this point, the incumbent Constitution 
County Officer—who was denied the ability to run for office again—would 
have the right to petition the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of quo 
warranto, challenging the newly-elected Constitution County Officer’s right 
to hold that office.251  The incumbent Constitution County Officer would 
have a claim to that office because had the charter term limit provision not 
been enacted—in derogation of the Florida Constitution—he or she would 
have been able to run again, and possibly would have been reelected.252  
However, the Supreme Court of Florida’s jurisdiction for hearing a petition 
for a writ of quo warranto is discretionary as well, so again, there is no 
guarantee that the Court would hear the petition.253 
Similarly, because a writ of quo warranto can also be used to 
challenge an exercise of authority derived from a public office,254 the writ 
could also possibly be used to challenge the authority of a charter review 
committee to consider and propose charter term limits for the Constitution’s 
County Officers.255  However, the jurisdiction for this particular writ would 
fall in the circuit court,256 the decision of which would then have to be 
appealed up to a Florida district court of appeal—just like any other case—
and would not be guaranteed review by the Supreme Court of Florida.257 
                                                            
246. See id. 
247. See id. 
248. See, e.g., Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505–06 (Fla. 2012) (per 
curiam). 
249. Id. at 506. 
250. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 74 So. 3d at 506. 
251. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8); FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2014); see also Ex 
parte Smith, 118 So. at 307. 
252. See Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting). 
253. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8). 
254. See Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1338–39 (Fla. 1989). 
255. See Weinger, supra note 7, at 868. 
256. See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(c)(3). 
257. See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(3), 4(b)(3); supra Parts II–IV. 
43
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
34 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Fourth District Court of 
Appeal’s decision and reasoning in Snipes should have been affirmed in 
Telli.258  Under the Florida Constitution, charter counties have broad 
authority to regulate their County Commissioners fully, and therefore, the 
authority exists to set term limits for them within the county charter.259  
Conversely, there is only very limited and specific authority for counties to 
regulate the Constitution’s five County Officers under their charters.260  That 
is, specifically, a county may only establish a different manner in which 
these officers shall be chosen under the county charter; and as long as a 
charter county has not abolished the Constitution’s County Office and 
transferred its duties to a charter-created office—the charter’s office—it 
remains the Constitution’s County Officer’s, and charter counties possess no 
more power than non-charter counties to regulate them.261  This point of law 
means that charter counties possess no more power than non-charter counties 
to set term limits for the Constitution’s five County Officers.262 
The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Telli failed to take into 
account the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers, completely 
abridging the distinction drawn by the Constitution between a Constitution’s 
County Officer and a charter’s county officer, and therefore, illegally and 
without authority or jurisdiction, has effectuated an amendment to the 
Florida Constitution, which it does not possess the power to effectuate.263  
Only the people of Florida can effectuate an amendment to the Florida 
Constitution through an amendment election vote.264  The Telli opinion 
unconstitutionally abridges the rights of both incumbent holders of the 
Constitution’s County Offices and of the voters who may wish to vote for 
those incumbent Constitution County Officers.265  For this reason, the 
opinion is untenable, disconcerting, not judicially cognizant, devoid of 
constitutional integrity, and, if enforced, precipitates needlessly an 
                                                            
258. See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); 
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. 
Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012); 
Weinger, supra note 7, at 860, 870. 
259. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e), (g). 
260. Id. § 1(g). 
261. See id. § 1(e)–(g). 
262. See id. § 1(f)–(g). 
263. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Weinger, supra 
note 7, at 869–70. 
264. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b), (e). 
265. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Weinger, supra 
note 7, at 868–70. 
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unnervingly serious constitutional problem, which must be solved.266  There 
is a dire need for the issue to make its way back to the Supreme Court of 
Florida for reconsideration of the constitutional implications of the Telli 
decision.  If not revisited, there will soon be officers elected and sworn into 
sovereign state office in derogation of the Florida Constitution.  If the issue 
does in fact make its way back to the discretionary jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of Florida, one would hope that the Court would exercise its 
discretion in favor of hearing the issue, if only to correct the dire 
constitutional issues placed before it; and then, also to correct a careless and 
unsupported opinion that is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s well-earned 
respect as one of the best state supreme courts in the United States of 
America. 
 
                                                            
 266. See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Florida Legislature enacted a statute providing counsel to children 
in certain categories in dependency cases, and also passed a statute removing 
the nexus requirement to prove grounds for termination of parental rights.1   
Both laws are a substantial departure from prior practice and contain serious 
flaws, which are discussed in this survey.2  The Supreme Court of Florida ruled 
on one case during the past year, interpreting Florida’s speedy trial rule in 
juvenile delinquency cases.3  Intermediate appellate courts remained active both 
in the delinquency area and in the dependency field.4  This survey reviews and 
analyzes the new laws and the significant reported opinions in these areas.5 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. 
 This survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.  
The author thanks Law Review Subscriptions Editor, Richard Nelson, for his help in the 
preparation of this survey. 
1. FLA.  STAT. §§ 39.01305, .806(1)(f), (h) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f), (h) 
(2013). 
2. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01305, .806(1)(f), (h) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806 
(2013); infra Part VII. 
3. State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
4. E.g., Weiand v. State, 129 So. 3d 434, 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
5. See infra Parts I–V. 
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/5
38 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
II. DEPENDENCY 
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Juvenile Rules of 
Civil Procedure provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard at multiple 
points in the dependency proceeding, including sections of chapter 39 that 
provide that, unless parental rights have been terminated, parents must be 
notified of all proceedings and hearings involving the child.6  Despite the clear 
language of chapter 39 and the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Second District 
Court of Appeal was obligated to reverse in In re J.B. v. Department of 
Children & Family Services7 because the trial court failed to give the parents 
adequate notice and an opportunity to prepare for a permanency hearing.8  The 
appeal involved a dependency proceeding in which the parents did not comply 
with the case plan, and a scheduled judicial review was set.9  Before the hearing, 
the Department, according to the appellate court, “apparently abandoned the 
goal of reunification and decided to seek a permanent guardianship.”10  Because 
the hearing was noticed as a judicial review and not a permanency hearing, the 
parents knew nothing about the change in plans.11  In fact, “[f]orty-three pages 
into the transcript—[according to the appellate court]—the Department first 
explained that it actually wanted an order at the conclusion of [the] hearing 
establishing a permanent guardianship and a termination of supervision.”12  
Over the objections of the child’s father’s attorney, the trial court proceeded 
with the matter, apparently not seeming to understand the impact of its ruling.13 
 The appellate court reversed.14 
In dependency proceedings in Florida, by statute, the parties are:  The 
parents, the Department of Children and Families, the Guardian Ad Litem 
(“GAL”) Program or a representative of the GAL Program if appointed, the 
child, and the petitioner, whether the Department or someone else.15  Chapter 39 
                                                 
6. FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1) (2014); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.045(h); FLA. R. JUV. P. 
8.225(f)(1) (providing notice).  When these rules do not require specific notice, all parties will be 
given reasonable notice of any hearings.  FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1). 
7. 130 So. 3d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
8. In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 754, 757; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1); FLA. R. 
JUV. P. 8.225(f)(1). 
9. In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 754. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 754–55. 
12. Id. at 755. 
13. Id. at 755–56. 
14. In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 757. 
15. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2014).  For a discussion of the roles of the parties in 
Florida see Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in 
Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida:  The Issue Updated, 35 
NOVA L. REV. 305, 323–32 (2011). 
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also recognizes that in child welfare proceedings in Florida, a participant may 
also be involved in the case.16  A participant is defined as a non-party who 
receives notice of hearing and “includ[es] the actual custodian of the child, the 
foster parents, . . . the legal custodian of the child, identified prospective 
parents, and any other person whose participation may be in the best interest of 
the child.”17  A mother of five children in D.C. v. J.M.18 filed a writ of certiorari 
in the appellate court to quash a pre-trial order on the foster parent’s motion to 
intervene.19  The trial court’s order provided that, in addition to the other 
parties, the foster parent’s attorney would have the right to unfettered review of 
all court files in the case.20  The mother, the GAL Program, and the attorney ad 
litem for one of the half siblings all objected and joined in the writ.21  They 
claimed an invasion of privacy rights by the third party foster parent.22  
Recognizing that chapter 39 does not allow foster parents to receive every 
record in a confidential dependency case and that the order departed from an 
essential constitutional requirement, the appellate court granted the writ and 
quashed the trial court order.23 
In any dependency proceeding, of course, the petitioner must prove the 
allegations contained in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.24  In 
H.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services,25 a father appealed from an 
order adjudicating the children dependent based upon a finding of abuse, in that 
there were bruises on one of his children’s left side as well as a purple loop 
mark.26  The case arose when the children’s mother, who was separated from the 
father, noticed the mark after the children returned from the father’s care.27  
“The [court’s] expert, . . . a nurse practitioner with the University of Miami’s 
Child Protection [Unit],28 testified that,” in her opinion, the “injury 
‘represent[ed] child physical abuse.’”29  The problem was that there was no 
                                                 
16. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50). 
17. Id. 
18. 133 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
19. Id. at 1081. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2014); D.C., 133 So. 3d at 1081–82. 
24. FLA. STAT. § 39.507(1)(b). 
25. 141 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
26. Id. at 243. 
27. Id. at 244. 
28. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.303(1)(e).  The Child Protection Units are 
operated by the State’s Health Department to medically evaluate possible child abuse and neglect. 
 See FLA. STAT. § 39.303(1). 
29. H.C., 141 So. 3d at 244. 
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evidence of who did it.30  As the appellate court explained, “the record is 
completely devoid of any evidence that the [f]ather caused [the child’s] 
injuries.”31  Thus, the court of appeals found that the petitioner, “the 
Department, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
[f]ather” probably was the person who inflicted the injuries, and, on that basis, it 
reversed.32 
An issue which regularly arises in the dependency context in Florida is 
whether the neglect or abuse of one child is sufficient, in and of itself, to prove 
that a parent’s other children are also dependent.33  The case law, going back 
twenty years, requires that there must be a nexus between the injuries to one 
child, or other neglect of that child, and proof that the other children are 
dependent.34  This was the issue in W.R. v. Department of Children & 
Families,35 a case in which “[a] father appeal[ed] [from] an order [declaring] his 
. . . children dependent.”36  The appellate court affirmed as to one child, but 
reversed as to the other.37   The finding by the trial court as to the second child 
was based upon “one incident where the father struck the child,” but there was 
no evidence of harm.38  There was not even a bruise.39  Relying on the body of 
prior case law, the appellate court explained that, “[t]he trial court failed to 
make any finding [with] regard[] to the risk of imminent abuse,” and failed to 
show there was “a nexus between the parent’s abuse of the one child and the 
risk of abuse of [the other] child.”40  Significantly, the Florida Legislature 
statutorily removed the nexus requirement during the 2014 Legislative 
Session.41  Whether the removal is constitutional is described in Part VII, 
Legislative Changes.42 
                                                 
30. Id. at 245. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. E.g., R.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So. 2d 1189, 
1193 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). 
34. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 
1991); W.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 137 So. 3d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2014); C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re S.M.), 997 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
35. 137 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
36. Id. at 1079. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. W.R., 137 So. 3d at 1079–80. 
41. Compare FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f) (2014), with FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f) 
(2013). 
42. See infra Part VII. 
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As noted earlier, foster parents can be participants in dependency 
proceedings.43  As the recipients of children who are in the state-operated foster 
care system, foster parents are required to comply with licensing regulations.44  
In Sanders v. Department of Children & Families,45 foster parents appealed 
from a decision of the Department of Children and Families revoking their 
foster care license on the basis of a hearing officer’s recommendation.46  The 
case arose from the foster parents’ employment of corporal punishment on a 
foster child in their house.47  Admitting that they struck the child, causing a 
bruise visible several days later, the foster parents on appeal claimed that the 
action of the Department interfered with their religious curriculum or teachings 
in violation of Florida law.48  The appellate court affirmed the decision of the 
Department.49  It held that Florida law does not deprive “the Department of the 
authority to prohibit corporal punishment,” and that appellants’ claim of 
invasion of their religious rights must fail because they should not have entered 
into the contract if they believed that the contract violated their constitutional 
rights.50 
During the course of a dependency proceeding, often after adjudication 
and the disposition, a parent may make a motion for reunification.51  When the 
parent does so, the court shall hold a hearing in which the “parent [is obligated 
to] demonstrate that the safety, [welfare], and physical, mental, and emotional 
health of the [parent’s] child” will not suffer from endangerment by the 
change.52  In a rather simple case on appeal, A.M. v. Department of Children & 
Families,53 a mother appealed from a trial court’s denial of a motion for 
reunification.54  Apparently, there was no evidence in the record that the mother, 
through counsel, actually moved for reunification.55  Nor was there an order 
                                                 
43. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (2014); see also supra notes 15–17 and accompanying 
text. 
44. Sanders v. Dep’t Children & Families, 118 So. 3d 899, 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013); see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b). 
45. 118 So. 3d 899 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
46. Id. at 900. 
47. Id. 
48. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b). 
49. Sanders, 118 So. 3d at 901; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b). 
50. Sanders, 118 So. 3d at 901; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b). 
51. FLA. STAT. § 39.621(9). 
52. Id. 
53. 118 So. 3d 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
54. Id. at 998. 
55. Id. 
50
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deciding the motion for reunification in the record.56  For these simple reasons, 
the appellate court upheld the decision below.57 
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
The issue of the failure of parents to appear at termination of parental 
rights proceedings has come up in appellate court on numerous occasions in 
Florida.58  Under Florida law, it is possible for a court to enter a consent to the 
termination of parental rights.59  However, while the Florida statute governing 
the failure to appear may be grounds for termination of parental rights,60 the 
question remains as to the circumstances underlying the failure to appear, 
including the possibility that the parent appeared on one of several days in the 
proceeding.61  In C.S. v. Department of Children & Families,62 the mother and 
father appealed from a judgment terminating their parental rights on the basis of 
the entry of a consent when they failed to appear.63  The appellate court 
affirmed, finding that the court did not rule solely on the basis of the failure to 
appear, but also on the facts of the case.64  The appellate court also noted that 
“[t]he trial court found the mother’s excuse for [not appearing] not to be 
credible.”65  However, there was a very strong dissent by Judge Warner.66  
Apparently, “the parents appeared on the first two days of the adjudicatory 
hearing and failed to appear on the third day, [which was] scheduled three 
months later.”67  Relying on case law holding that a consent should not be 
entered where a parent does not appear at part of the hearing, Judge Warner 
would have granted the appeal on that ground.68 
                                                 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 998–99. 
58. See J.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 9 So. 3d 34, 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009); Michael J. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, 38 NOVA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2013) 
[hereinafter Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, 
37 NOVA L. REV. 333, 342–46 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law]. 
59. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2014); see also J.M., 9 So. 3d at 36. 
60. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d). 
61. See Nickerson v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 718 So. 2d 373, 373–74 (Fla. 
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
62. 124 So. 3d 978 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 
135 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2014). 
63. Id. at 979. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 980. 
66. Id. (Warner, J., dissenting). 
67. C.S., 124 So. 3d at 980 (Warner, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. 
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Florida provides for termination of parental rights on numerous 
grounds—abuse, neglect, and abandonment.69  Abandonment, as defined in the 
Florida Statutes, is a situation where the parent “has made no significant 
contribution to the child’s care and maintenance.”70  It includes a lack of 
frequent contact with the child where marginal efforts or token visits are not 
enough.71  In S.L. v. Department of Children and Families,72 a mother appealed 
from an adjudication terminating her parental rights on grounds of continuing 
abuse, neglect, or abandonment.73  The appellate court affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, finding that the trial court erred in basing the termination on 
abandonment.74  Looking at the facts, the appellate court held that the mother 
had at least twenty-six visits over a one-year period with her children, and that 
record contained “testimony indicat[ing] there may have been other visits . . . 
not memorialized in . . . Department records.”75  There was also evidence of 
telephone communications and provision of clothing, shoes, snacks, food, and 
other gifts.76  In a second case, J.E. v. Department of Children and Families,77 
the appellate court affirmed a finding of abandonment by the father by clear and 
convincing evidence.78  The court found that he failed to demonstrate financial 
ability to support the children or the capacity to do so, having last paid support 
three months prior to the trial.79  In addition, his visitation was infrequent and 
irregular, causing the child not to see her father as a parent.80  Finally, the court 
affirmed because the parent failed to substantially comply with the case plan, a 
separate ground for termination of parental rights.81  The problem with the 
Florida Statute, as evidenced by the two cases described above, is that the 
language in the law is imprecise, containing no timeframes or other specific 
elements in the test of abandonment.82 
Termination of parental rights in Florida, as in other jurisdictions, 
requires first, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for 
                                                 
69. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1) (2014). 
70. Id. § 39.01(1). 
71. Id. 
72. 120 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
73. Id. at 76. 
74. Id. at 77. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. 126 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
78. Id. at 428. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 430; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1) (2014). 
82. See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e); S.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 120 So. 
3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam); J.E., 126 So. 3d at 428. 
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termination exist83 and second, that termination is in the manifest best interests 
of the child.84  Third, in Florida, termination must be the least restrictive 
alternative.85  In the case K.D. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In 
re Z.C. II),86 parents appealed a final judgment terminating parental rights to 
twin sons.87  The case had previously been on appeal.88  In the first decision, the 
appellate court held that since the trial court elected not to terminate parental 
rights, it could not immediately place the children in a permanent 
guardianship.89  Thus, the case went back to the trial court on questions of the 
least alternative means and manifest best interest.90  What brought the case back 
to the appellate court was the question of whether the trial court was obligated 
to consider new circumstances in determining whether termination was in the 
best interest of the children.91  Reviewing the facts of the case, the appellate 
court reversed and remanded again, finding that it could not say for certain that 
the trial court would not have decided that the circumstances warranted an 
adjudication of dependency instead of termination of parental rights as a matter 
of best interests of the child.92 
Finally, in A.J. v. Department of Children & Families,93 the appellate 
court reversed as to the failure of the trial court to make proper findings as to 
the grounds for termination of parental rights.94  Specifically, the appellate court 
found that there was no substantial evidence of significant harm to the sons, and 
was further “troubled by the court’s finding[] that the parents could not provide 
the children with necessities, [as] [t]here was no testimony establishing the 
parents’ financial situation and . . . no evidence that [they] could not . . . provide 
for their children.”95  In fact, the trial court denied the mother’s attorney the 
right to shed light on another issue—the children’s referral to therapy by their 
mother—on grounds that the question was irrelevant.96  The trial court further 
                                                 
83. FLA. STAT. § 39.809(1); see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D)(f) (2014). 
84. FLA. STAT. § 39.810; see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D)(m-1). 
85. Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 
1991); K.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Z.C. II), 132 So. 3d 877, 879 (Fla. 2d 
Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.6012(3)(d). 
86. 132 So. 3d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
87. Id. at 878. 
88. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. K.D. (In re Z.C. I), 88 So. 3d 977, 979 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (en banc). 
89. Id. at 988–89. 
90. Id. at 989. 
91. In re Z.C. II, 132 So. 3d at 879. 
92. Id. at 879–80. 
93. 126 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).  This was a 2012 
case that was reported in 2013. 
94. Id. at 1215. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 1214. 
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compounded its errors by relying on “hearsay accounts regarding one of the 
young[] boys and one of the father’s daughters acting out sexually.”97 
IV. STATUS OFFENSES—CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES 
Chapter 984, entitled “Children and Families in Need of Services,” 
deals with status offenders.98  A “child in need of services” concerns children 
who have committed an act, which if committed by an adult would not be a 
crime.99  Under Florida law, this includes children who persistently run away, 
are “habitually truant from school,” and who “persistently disobey[] the 
reasonable and lawful demands of [their] parents.”100  This statute begins with 
the following statement of purpose: 
To provide judicial and other procedures to assure due 
process through which children and other interested parties are 
assured fair hearings by a respectful and respected court or other 
tribunal[s] and the recognition, protection, and enforcement of their 
constitutional and other legal rights, while ensuring that public safety 
interests and the authority and dignity of the courts are adequately 
protected.101 
It appears clear from the Second District Court of Appeal ruling in 
Moyers v. State102 that the trial court failed to comply with the enabling 
language of the statute.103  In that case, a father “appeal[ed] two orders finding 
him in indirect criminal contempt for failing to comply with truancy orders” that 
obligated him to ensure that his daughter attended school.104  According to the 
appellate court, there was no evidence presented at the first of two hearings 
regarding an order to show cause, and that the evidence presented at the second 
hearing showed only that the father’s daughter had been absent or departed from 
school on several days.105  In fact, according to the appellate court, what the 
evidence did show was that the child’s medical condition caused her not to 
attend school for several days.106  There was no evidence of the father’s willful 
                                                 
97. Id. 
98. See FLA. STAT. § 984.01 (2014). 
99. See id. § 984.03(9). 
100. Id. § 984.03(9)(a)–(c). 
101. Id. § 984.01(1)(a). 
102. 127 So. 3d 827 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
103. Id. at 828; see also FLA. STAT. § 984.01(1)(a). 
104. Moyers, 127 So. 3d at 827–28. 
105. Id. at 828. 
106. Id. 
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failure to assure the child’s attendance.107  Rather, according to the appellate 
court, “[t]he truancy . . . judge improperly acted as the judge and the prosecutor, 
and the evidence was insufficient to establish Mr. Moyers’ willful 
noncompliance with the truancy court’s order[].”108  Seeing “the truancy judge’s 
improper role in the proceedings as prosecut[or], and because” there was no 
evidence to support the finding, the appellate court reversed.109  In so doing, it 
recognized that it had previously ruled in exactly the same fashion in a prior 
case involving the same trial judge.110 
An important question of the proximity of the status offense to a 
delinquency offense arose recently in M.J. v. State.111  In that case, a juvenile 
appealed from an adjudication of delinquency.112  The claim was that the trial 
court had denied the juvenile’s “motion to suppress his confession . . . from 
what [was] claim[ed] [to be] an illegal detention for loitering and prowling.”113  
Under the facts of the case, the court determined that the motion should have 
been suppressed because the reasonable stop of the juvenile by the police was 
for truancy, and thus, there was no “probable cause to arrest the juvenile for 
loitering and prowling.”114  According to the appellate court, during mid-day 
hours, a deputy sheriff noticed a juvenile “in front of a house in a high crime 
area.”115  The officer knew from prior dealings that the juvenile should have 
been in school.116  When the officer made a U-turn in his vehicle, the juvenile 
ran away, and the officer subsequently found the juvenile “lying along the 
concrete wall inside the porch” of the house.117  The officer then read the 
juvenile his Miranda rights and subsequently the juvenile confessed to a 
burglary.118  The appeals court found that the police officer saw the juvenile and 
“suspected him of being a truant, not . . . committing a crime.”119  Thus, there 
was no probable cause for the arrest for loitering and prowling.120 
                                                 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Moyers, 127 So. 3d at 828. 
110. Id. (referencing Sockwell v. State, 123 So. 3d 585, 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2012)). 
111. 121 So. 3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 
3d 528 (Fla. 2014). 
112. Id. at 1153. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. M.J., 121 So. 3d at 1153. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 1155. 
120. Id. 
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V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
The issue before the Supreme Court of Florida during this survey year 
was the question of proper interpretation of the speedy trial rule in delinquency 
cases.121  The specific issue in State v. S.A.122 was how to compute what is 
referred to as the speedy trial rule’s recapture window.123  The issue arose from 
a conflict in two of the district courts of appeal.124  In S.A., the appellate issue 
arose when the juvenile “filed a notice of expiration of speedy trial and a motion 
seeking discharge under the speedy trial rule.”125  The motion required 
application of the trial rule’s recapture window found in the Florida Rules of 
Juvenile Procedure.126  The recapture rule says that “[n]o later than [five] days 
from the date of the filing of [the] motion for discharge, the court [is obligated 
to] hold a hearing on the motion.”127  Then, “unless the court finds that one of 
the reasons set forth in subdivision (d) [of the rule] exists . . . the respondent 
[must] be brought to trial within [ten] days” and if not, and “through no fault of 
the respondent, the respondent [is] . . . discharged.”128  The specific technical 
question was whether the rule provides for one fifteen-day time period based 
upon the five- and ten-day provisions, or whether the calculation of the 
recapture window is based upon two separate, but interrelated time periods of 
five and ten days.129  Analyzing the legislative history—and over a dissent and 
two concurrences—the plurality ruling was “that the recapture window is 
comprised of two separate time periods.”130 
The Supreme Court of the United States’ rulings in Miller v. Alabama131 
and Graham v. Florida132 have generated a growing body of interpretive case 
law in Florida and in other jurisdictions.133  In Mason v. State,134 the specific 
question the appellate court dealt with was if the application of Miller, which 
                                                 
121. See State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
122. 133 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
123. Id. at 507. 
124. Id.; see also State v. S.A., 96 So. 3d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2012), reh’g granted, 2013 Fla. Lexis 881 (Fla. 2013), quashed, 133 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 2014); State 
v. McFarland, 747 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
125. S.A., 133 So. 3d at 507. 
126. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3); S.A., 133 So. 3d at 507–08. 
127. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3); S.A., 133 So. 3d at 508. 
128. FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3). 
129. S.A., 133 So. 3d at 509. 
130. Id. 
131. No. 10-9646, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
132. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
133. See Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; 1 MICHAEL J. 
DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 5.03(13)(e)(iii) (2014). 
134. 134 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam). 
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had held that a sentencing law “requir[ing] a mandatory sentence of life in 
prison without . . . parole for a juvenile, [was violative of] the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”135  In the 
Mason case, the juvenile “negotiated [a] plea to second-degree murder . . . and 
received life in prison with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum as a [violent 
habitual] felony offender.”136  Because the statute under which the juvenile was 
punished did not contain a requirement of mandatory life in prison without 
parole, Miller did not apply, according to the appellate court.137  Although the 
court employed discretion at the trial level to impose a higher sentence than it 
could have, nothing indicated that the court did not take Mason’s youth into 
account when determining the sentence.138  The appellate court thus affirmed.139 
In Weiand v. State,140 the juvenile appealed an order denying his motion 
for post-conviction relief.141  Based upon the defendant’s pro se appeal, the 
intermediate appellate court held that the sentence of life in prison without 
parole on kidnapping and robbery convictions was illegal under Graham v. 
State.142  Applying Graham, the appellate court held that “the Supreme Court 
[of the United States] created a bright-line rule . . . that a defendant . . . under 
eighteen, when” he or she commits a “non-homicide offense [could not] be 
sentenced to life without parole.”143 
Lack of probable cause for an arrest of a juvenile for loitering, 
described in the M.J. case above, has arisen on several occasions in the 
appellate courts.144  Thus, in C.C. v. State,145 a juvenile “was adjudicated 
delinquent on charge[s] of loitering and prowling,” appealed the adjudication, 
and the appellate court reversed, finding there was a failure to establish a 
completed offense of loitering and prowling.146  The case arose when police 
officers in the City of Hollywood at about ten o’clock in the morning noticed a 
                                                 
135. Id. at 500; see also Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2; DALE ET AL., supra note 
133, at ¶ 5.03(13)(e)(iii). 
136. See Mason, 134 So. 3d at 500. 
137. Id.; see also Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2. 
138. See Mason, 134 So. 3d at 501. 
139. Id. 
140. 129 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
141. Id. at 434. 
142. Id. at 435; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
143. Weiand, 129 So. 3d at 435 (emphasis added); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 
82. 
144. See C.C. v. State, 137 So. 3d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review 
denied, No. SC14-960, 2014 WL 4291798 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2014); M.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 1151, 
1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2014); supra text 
accompanying notes 111–20. 
145. 137 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. SC14-960, 2014 
WL 4291798 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2014). 
146. Id. at 467. 
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juvenile who the officers believed should have been in school.147  “When the 
officers stopped their patrol car [the respondent] and two other[s] . . . dropped 
their backpacks in a bush and [tried to hide] behind a truck.”148  The officers 
arrested the respondent, searched his backpack, and found a four-way lug 
wrench and other tools.149  At trial, respondent moved to dismiss, which was 
denied, and the defense then rested.150  The appellate court held “that the items 
found . . . after [the] arrest should not have been admitted [as evidence] or 
considered by the trial court because the offense of loitering and prowling [was 
not] completed.”151  In fact, the appellate court held that, under the law, it must 
be found that the respondent was loitering and prowling at a place and in a 
manner not usual for law-abiding citizens, that loitering was under 
circumstances that warranted alarm or concern for the safety of others, and that 
these elements were completed prior to the arrest.152  Significantly, the appellate 
court held that it was unable to distinguish the C.C. case from M.J.153  
Recognizing the nearly identical facts, the court held that the State had failed to 
prove that the elements of the offense occurred in the officers’ presence.154  It 
thus reversed.155 
In a third similar case, G.T. v. State,156 the juvenile appealed from a 
conviction “for resisting an officer without violence when she refused to 
[provide] the arresting officer [with] her name and personal information after 
[she was] detained [on] suspicion of underage drinking and disorderly 
intoxication.”157  In order to detain someone, the “officer must have reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity by” that individual.158  In this case, the State was 
unable to demonstrate the facts that connected the child to an empty liquor 
bottle or to show that the police officer “had more than an inchoate hunch that 
this group of juveniles was the one [that] he had been dispatched to 
investigate.”159  The only information that the officer had was that the juveniles 
appeared to have “red [and] glossy eyes and slurred speech, [suggesting] to the 
                                                 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. C.C., 137 So. 3d at 467. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 468–69 (quoting E.F. v. State, 110 So. 3d 101, 104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App.), review denied, 121 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 2013)). 
153. Id. at 468; see also M.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 
App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2014). 
154. C.C., 137 So. 3d at 469. 
155. Id. at 469–70. 
156. 120 So. 3d 141 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
157. Id. at 142. 
158. Id. at 143. 
159. Id. 
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officer that they were intoxicated.”160  However, the officer observed this after 
he detained the juvenile.161  The court thus reversed.162 
The fourth lack of reasonable suspicion case is A.R. v. State.163  In this 
case, the act of delinquency alleged was resisting an officer without violence.164 
 “Boynton Beach police were ‘investigating a . . . crime that [may have] taken 
place’ in a public park.”165  When officers arrived, the appellant turned away 
and started to run.166  The officer yelled at the individual to stop a number of 
times, and the youth ultimately gave up and surrendered.167  The juvenile’s 
argument on appeal was that the police investigation of the crime could not be 
the basis to legally detain a person where there was no reasonable suspicion of 
probable cause as to that individual.168  Running away—the court held based on 
prior case law—“is not sufficient to establish [a] reasonable suspicion where 
there is no evidence to demonstrate that the flight took place in a high crime 
area.”169  Further, there was no showing that the flight obstructed the officers in 
the lawful execution of their duties.170  The court thus reversed.171 
Issues of detention, ranging from home detention through secure 
detention, appear regularly in the appellate case law.172  The issue in H.D. v. 
Shore173 was whether a child could be held in secure detention based upon a 
prior arrest for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft offenses, which by 
themselves did not score sufficiently on Florida’s Risk Assessment Instrument 
(“RAI”) for secure detention, but when the juvenile failed to go to school, the 
father reported the violation and the court then ordered secure detention.174  The 
appellate court ruled that Florida’s juvenile detention statute does not provide a 
court with the authority to order secure detention solely on the basis of a 
violation of a pre-adjudication home detention.175  The appellate court then 
explained that the remedy for such a violation was indirect contempt.176  
                                                 
160. Id. 
161. G.T., 120 So. 3d at 143. 
162. Id. at 143–44. 
163. 127 So. 3d 650, 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 652–53. 
168. A.R., 127 So. 3d at 653. 
169. Id. at 654. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 655. 
172. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 93; see, e.g., H.D. v. 
Shore, 134 So. 3d 1062, 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
173. 134 So. 3d 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
174. Id. at 1062–63. 
175. Id. at 1063; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.255 (2014). 
176. H.D., 134 So. 3d at 1063. 
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Therefore, the appellate court held that as the child did not score enough points 
under Florida’s RAI for secure detention, and there were no findings to depart 
from the RAI, secure detention was improper.177  The court thus granted the writ 
of habeas corpus.178  It should be noted that the court in H.D. disagreed with the 
court in K.T.E. v. Lofthiem,179 that section 985.265(1) of the Florida Statutes 
“provides an independent basis for ordering secure detention” under the facts in 
the H.D. case.180 
Evidentiary issues are not usually part of this juvenile survey as they 
are generic to any variety of litigation settings.181  However, a recent Fourth 
District Court of Appeal case, T.D.W. v. State182 is worthy of discussion as it 
deals with best evidence.183  The issue before the court was “whether [the] 
appellant was [properly] identified as one of the three boys who burgl[arized] a 
home.”184  His “identification was based in part on the [detective’s] 
testimony.”185  The detective testified that “she saw [the appellant] on a 
surveillance videotape [that] she [had] viewed outside the courtroom.”186  
However, the “identification did not appear on the copy of the surveillance 
video offered into evidence at trial.”187  Florida Rule of Evidence 90.952 
provides in relevant part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, an 
original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove the 
contents of the writing, recording, or photograph.”188  Known as the Best 
Evidence Rule, unless an exception may be shown, “‘the testimony of [the] 
witness . . . [regarding] the contents of the original is inadmissible.’”189  Finding 
that the error was not harmless, citing similar case law, the appellate court 
reversed.190 
The issue of whether Second Amendment constitutional rights apply to 
juveniles was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in L.S. v. State.191  A 
                                                 
177. Id. at 1064. 
178. Id. at 1062, 1064. 
179. 915 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
180. H.D., 134 So. 3d. at 1063–64; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.265(1); K.T.E., 915 
So. 2d at 769–70. 
181. See Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 84. 
182. 137 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
183. Id. at 575. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575. 
188. FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2014). 
189. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 576; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.952. 
190. T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577–78; see also McKeehan v. State, 838 So. 2d 1257, 
1261 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
191. 120 So. 3d 55, 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
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juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based upon “carrying a concealed firearm, 
grand theft of a firearm, improper exhibition of a firearm, [and] resisting arrest 
without violence [as well as] possession of a firearm by a minor.”192  The 
appellate court reversed as to all adjudications with the exception of carrying a 
concealed firearm.193  As to that adjudication, the minor argued that he had a 
right under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution to carry 
the firearm as there is no juvenile exception in the Amendment.194  The 
appellate court held that the constitutional rights of children are not equated 
with those of adults on the basis of the juvenile’s “inability to make decisions in 
an informed and mature manner.”195  Citing basic United States Constitutional 
law, the court held that while the Second Amendment does not mention 
juveniles, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized limitations on 
the right to bear arms.196  The court also commented that the constitutional 
rights of children under the Florida Constitution are not the same as adults, as 
well as under the laws of other states.197  The court therefore affirmed the 
adjudication of possession of firearms by a minor.198 
Florida provides that incompetency may be grounds under which a 
proceeding to determine delinquency may not proceed and that ultimately the 
charges under certain circumstances may be dismissed.199  The basis for 
incompetence may be age, immaturity, a mental illness, intellectual disability, 
or autism.200  The question before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in D.B. v. 
State,201 was whether dismissal of a delinquency petition was mandated as the 
juvenile had been declared incompetent more than three years earlier and 
remained incompetent.202  Under the Florida Statutes, and pursuant to due 
process principles, a juvenile may not be tried while incompetent.203  The 
statutes also provide a jurisdictional limit on how long the court may retain 
jurisdiction.204   Here, under the statute and as conceded by the State, dismissal 
was warranted.205 
                                                 
192. Id. at 56. 
193. Id. at 59. 
194. Id. at 58; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
195. L.S., 120 So. 3d at 58. 
196. U.S. CONST. amend. II.; but see In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla.), 
withdrawn, 1989 Lexis 1226 (Fla. 1989). 
197. L.S., 120 So. 3d at 59. 
198. Id. 
199. FLA. STAT. § 985.19(1), (5)(c) (2014). 
200. See id. § 985.19(2), (3)(a). 
201. 120 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
202. Id. at 72. 
203. Id. at 73; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.19(1). 
204. FLA. STAT. § 985.19(5)(c). 
205. D.B., 120 So. 3d at 72. 
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The issue of waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles is a very common 
issue that arises in the appellate courts all over the country.206  That issue was 
before the appellate court in J.X. v. State.207  In that case, a juvenile appealed the 
denial of his motion to suppress statements he provided to the police after being 
given his Miranda warnings, which he then waived.208  The juvenile was 
seventeen and was summoned to the police station with his mother.209  There 
was a suspicion that he had been involved in burglaries.210  As soon as he was 
advised that he had been asked to come to the police station because of the two 
residential burglaries, he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.211  The 
police officer “closed his case file and terminated the interview.”212  However, 
after the detective said he was going to speak to the juvenile’s brother, the 
mother encouraged the appellant to cooperate.213  After the juvenile reinitiated 
contact with the officer, the officer advised the juvenile again of his Miranda 
rights, giving him the form containing the full recitation and orally advising 
him.214  The juvenile then confessed.215  The appellate court held that when the 
juvenile reinstituted contact with the police—where there was no threat of 
coercion and where the juvenile did not ask for a lawyer—the waiver was free, 
voluntary, and knowing.216  It then affirmed the denial of the motion to 
suppress.217 
Florida’s delinquency statute provides a number of dispositional 
alternatives including probation, restitution, community service, revocation of 
driver’s licenses, and attendance at school.218  Restitution issues often come up 
before the appellate courts on proper application of the Florida Statute.219  In 
T.J.J. v. State,220 a juvenile appealed an order of disposition—including 
restitution—after he admitted to a burglary of a dwelling.221  The issue was that 
the restitution order included a payment for “items not listed in the original 
                                                 
206. E.g., J.X. v. State, 125 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also 
DALE ET AL., supra note 133, at ¶ 5.03(7). 
207. 125 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
208. Id. at 365. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. J.X., 125 So. 3d at 365. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 367. 
217. J.X., 125 So. 3d at 367. 
218. FLA. STAT. § 985.455(1)–(2) (2014). 
219. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 94. 
220. 121 So. 3d 635 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
221. Id. at 637. 
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charging document.”222  The amount of restitution was “$2718, or more than 
twice what the charging document,” set forth.223  The appeals court reversed for 
failure to comply with the statute, which provides that restitution is based upon 
the charging document.224 
In V.A.C. v. State,225 the issue involving an order of restitution dealt 
with a jurisdictional problem.226  In that case, the juvenile turned nineteen, and a 
notice of hearing to establish restitution was filed after the juvenile’s nineteenth 
birthday.227  As a result, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction.228  Having 
reserved jurisdiction on the issue of restitution prior to the juvenile’s nineteenth 
birthday, the trial court could have dealt with the matter.229  However, the “court 
erred in ordering restitution after it lost jurisdiction.”230 
If there is an allegation that a juvenile has violated probation, under 
Florida law, the state may file a petition for violation of probation.231  In S.M. v. 
State,232 the juvenile appealed the dispositional order which found her guilty of 
violation of probation on the grounds that the juvenile had been ordered to leave 
the courtroom to privately speak to her grandmother, and because the State 
presented only hearsay evidence by the juvenile’s probation officer to support 
the allegation.233  The appellate court held that “[w]hile ‘[h]earsay is admissible 
in a revocation hearing,’” it cannot be the sole basis for the finding; in the case 
at bar that was all the evidence.234  Thus, “there was insufficient evidence to 
revoke the . . . probation on the two allegations contained [in] the petition.”235  
Furthermore, “juveniles have a constitutional right to be present at all critical 
stages of the proceeding[],” unless waived by the child himself or herself.236  
Because “the juvenile did not personally waive her right to be present” and 
because events took place while the juvenile was out of the courtroom—only to 
be back to hear the disposition—the court also reversed.237 
                                                 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. 
225. 136 So. 3d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
226. Id. at 613. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. V.A.C., 136 So. 3d at 614. 
231. FLA. STAT. § 985.439(1)(b) (2014). 
232. 138 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
233. Id. at 1157, 1159. 
234. Id. at 1159 (quoting McNealy v. State, 479 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985)). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 1159–60 (quoting J.R. v. State, 953 So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2007) (per curiam)). 
237. S.M., 138 So. 3d at 1160. 
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Another dispositional issue that comes up on occasion is the question of 
the specifics of special conditions of juvenile probation.238  In T.J.J., in addition 
to ordering “restitution for items not [contained] in the . . . charging document, 
[t]he [trial] court also imposed [as] a special condition of . . . probation that the 
[respondent] not associate with persons under supervision, members of gangs, 
or whose contact [was] prohibited by the juvenile’s probation officer, parent or 
guardian.”239  The appellate court reversed as to this condition of probation 
finding that nothing in the Florida Statutes or the Rules of Juvenile Procedure 
contained a “blanket prohibition of willful contact” with certain individuals.240  
The rules’ “special condition [dealt with] prohibiting contact with the 
victim[s].”241  Furthermore, the appellate court held that “the condition must be 
related to the crime committed.”242  Finally, the appellate court held that “the 
condition [was] invalid for vagueness and overbreadth.”243 
Another example of police interaction with a juvenile during school 
hours and their handling of them is R.A.S. v. State.244  In that case, a juvenile 
appealed from a delinquency adjudication for “possession of marijuana and 
drug paraphernalia” having unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence.245  
A police officer was driving through the respondent’s neighborhood trying to 
find him because the youngster had been reported absent from school.246  When 
“[t]he deputy located [the student] and asked him to come over to talk to him,” 
the student said he was on his way to school.247  The deputy offered to give the 
student a ride to school, which the student accepted.248  The deputy then told the 
youngster to empty his pockets, indicating that he was doing a weapons pat-
down.249  In so doing, the officer—realizing the student failed to entirely empty 
his pockets—felt an item, which turned out to be a plastic bag of marijuana.250  
The appellate court held that ordering someone to empty his pockets under these 
circumstances was an unauthorized full search.251  “The deputy did not have . . . 
                                                 
238. T.J.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 635, 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also 
FLA. STAT. § 985.435 (2014). 
239. T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 637. 
240. Id. at 638–39; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.435; FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.947. 
241. T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 638; see also FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.947. 
242. T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 638 (citing Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734, 734–35 (Fla. 
1993)). 
243. Id. 
244. 141 So. 3d 687, 689 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. R.A.S., 141 So. 3d at 689. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
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reason to [believe] that [the youngster] was carrying a weapon or contraband.  
Thus, the initial search had no legal basis.”252  The court recognized that the 
police officer did have the right to conduct the pat-down for weapons.253  But 
when an officer takes a truant into custody, as here, “the only concern is for 
officer safety,” which means the concern is about a weapon.254  Thus, the 
appellate court reversed.255 
Florida law provides a form of amnesty or immunity for school students 
who divulge information related to the supplying of controlled substances if the 
events giving rise to the incident “occurred on property other than public school 
property.”256  In State v. E.M.,257 the State appealed the trial court’s granting of 
the respondent juvenile’s motion in limine to preclude statements to school 
officials.258  The case arose out of an internal suspension resulting from a 
violation of the school dress code.259  The student told the school security 
officials that he was out of dress code because “his uniform shirt was ‘messed 
up.’”260  When the security officer asked the youngster to show the officer the 
shirt and when the juvenile “opened his backpack to take out [his] shirt, [the] 
[s]ecurity [officials] smelled the odor of marijuana.”261  As a result, the juvenile 
admitted that he had the marijuana, which the security officer found in the 
backpack.262  The State alleged two counts—possession of marijuana with intent 
to deliver at the nearest school and marijuana subsequently found in the 
juvenile’s home.263  As a matter of statutory interpretation, the appellate court 
held that the immunity statute did not apply because the student did not fall 
within the category of one who “divulges information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of the person who supplied the controlled substance to him.”264  
Rather, the student fell into the second category which did not receive the same 
protection—which is to say inadmissibly of incriminating statements—as in the 
first category.265  The appellate court therefore reversed.266 
                                                 
252. Id. 
253. Id. at 690. 
254. R.A.S., 141 So. 3d at 690. 
255. Id. 
256. FLA. STAT. § 1006.09(2)(a) (2014). 
257. 141 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
258. Id. at 683. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. E.M., 141 So. 3d at 683. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 685 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1006.09(2)(a)(2014)). 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 686. 
65
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] 2014 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW 57 
VI. OTHER MATTERS 
The role of Florida’s well-funded GAL Program has been discussed in 
this law review on several occasions.267  In Turnier v. Stockman,268 the issue of 
whether a guardian ad litem could be appointed arose in the context of a chapter 
61 custody matter commenced as a paternity proceeding.269  The case 
transferred from St. Johns County to Miami-Dade County, involved with whom 
a deaf minor child should live, where both of the parents were deaf.270  The trial 
court considered appointing a GAL, but ultimately did not.271  The mother 
appealed, arguing that it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to appoint 
a GAL for the child.272  The appellate court held that there was no requirement 
to appoint a guardian in the proceeding below because the Florida Legislature 
in, chapter 61, did not make the appointment mandatory, but rather 
discretionary.273 
The question of liability of what are known in Florida as the lead 
agencies—the organizations to which the Department of Children and Families 
outsource the provision of foster care and related services—was before the First 
District Court of Appeal.274  The case—a wrongful death action arising out of 
the death of a child in foster care—was brought against Partnership for Strong 
Families, the community-based provider in several counties in the state.275  The 
appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the provider, finding it owed no 
duty to the child because the trial court had terminated protective supervision, 
and thus the “negligence could not be the proximate cause of” the child’s 
death.276  The death had occurred as a result of the action of the child’s father to 
whom the child had been returned.277  Finding that the alleged negligence was 
also unforeseeable, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the motion for 
summary judgment.278  Thus, Castello v. Partnership for Strong Families, 
                                                 
267. See, e.g., Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 323–32. 
268. 139 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014),. 
269. Id. at 398–400; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.401 (2014). 
270. Turnier, 139 So. 3d at 398. 
271. Id. at 399. 
272. Id. at 400. 
273. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.401. 
274. Castello v. P’ship for Strong Families, Inc., 117 So. 3d 62, 63–64 (Fla. 1st 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 139 So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. 
§ 39.0016(1)(b). 
275. Castello, 117 So. 3d at 63. 
276. Id. at 63–64. 
277. Id. at 63. 
278. Id. at 63–64. 
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Inc.279 mirrors the Supreme Court of the United States ruling in DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.280 
Domestic violence matters unrelated to dependency proceedings can 
also involve juveniles.281  Cannon v. Thomas282 is such a case.283  A student 
appealed from a trial court order “granting a permanent injunction for protection 
against repeat violence” arising out of the appellant child’s attack upon the 
appellee child.284  The injunction was granted based upon a factual 
determination that the appellant “brutally battered [a]ppellee’s daughter, 
slamming her head against a concrete wall” near a convenience store.285  The 
problem, according to the appellate court, is that the Florida statute requires two 
incidents of violence in order to protect the minor child.286  Thus, while 
recognizing the severity of the attack, as a matter of statutory construction, the 
appellate court was obligated to vacate the injunction for protection against the 
violence.287 
VII. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
This year’s legislative changes in juvenile law demonstrate a new 
emphasis on prevention and intervention,288 a commitment to utilizing trauma 
informed care,289 and revised standards for detention centers.290  The Legislature 
also increased protections for juvenile offenders by adding criminal penalties 
for willful neglect on the part of Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) 
employees.291  In dependency, the Legislature addressed a longstanding issue 
relating to termination of parental rights for prospective child abuse, reversing 
twenty years of case law that required a nexus between prior abuse and current 
risk.292  The Legislature has also created a right to counsel for special needs 
children in dependency actions.293  Other changes include new provisions for 
                                                 
279. 117 So. 3d 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 139 
So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2014). 
280. 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989); Castello, 117 So. 3d at 64. 
281. See FLA. STAT. § 784.046(2)(a) (2014). 
282. 133 So. 3d 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
283. Id. at 635. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. FLA. STAT. § 784.046(1)(b); Cannon, 133 So. 3d at 635, 640. 
287. Cannon, 133 So. 3d at 635, 640. 
288. FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a). 
289. Id. §§ 985.02(8), .03(52). 
290. Id. §§ 985.02(5), .03(44). 
291. Id. § 985.702(2)(a). 
292. See id. § 39.806(1)(f); Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 
So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991). 
293. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3). 
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addressing cases of medical neglect,294 and new provisions for reporting and 
addressing deaths of children in department care.295  The Legislature also 
extended the scope of the relative caregiver program to include non-relative 
caregivers.296  On a lighter note, the Legislature has mandated a program to help 
children in department care obtain their driver’s licenses.297 
A. Juvenile Delinquency Statutory Changes 
This year, the Legislature has introduced a shift in the declared purpose 
of the juvenile justice system by emphasizing the role of prevention, 
intervention, treatment, and the importance of children’s families and 
community support systems.298  To this end, the Legislature added section 
985.17 of the Florida Statutes, describing the need for prevention services to 
“decrease recidivism by addressing the needs of at-risk youth and their 
families.”299  The new statute directs the DJJ to “develop the capacity for local 
communities to serve their youth [through] engag[ing] faith and community 
based organizations to provide” various volunteer services such as “chaplaincy 
services, crisis intervention counseling, mentoring, and tutoring.”300  The statute 
directs the DJJ to provide services such as literacy and recreation programs 
targeted specifically at certain at-risk youth.301 
The Legislature has also added an emphasis on trauma informed care 
recognizing the role that trauma, such as “violence, physical or sexual abuse, 
neglect, [and] medical difficulties,” plays in the child’s life.302  The DJJ is 
directed to provide services to “be more supportive and avoid retraumatization, 
[through] trauma-specific interventions that are designed . . . to facilitate 
healing.”303 
The shift toward prevention through family and community 
involvement is also apparent in new guidelines for detention facilities.304  
Facilities are to be placed close to the home communities of children they serve 
to encourage family involvement.305  Further evidencing the transition to more 
                                                 
294. Id. § 39.3068. 
295. Id. § 39.201(3). 
296. Id. § 39.5085(1)(a), (2)(a)(3). 
297. Id. § 409.1454(1)–(2). 
298. See FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a), (e). 
299. Id. § 985.17(1). 
300. Id. § 985.17(2)–(2)(a). 
301. Id. § 985.17(3)(a). 
302. Id. § 985.03(52); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 985.02(8), .601(3)(a). 
303. FLA. STAT. § 985.02(8). 
304. Id. § 985.02(5). 
305. Id. § 985.02(5)(c). 
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individualized services is the reduction of the maximum number of beds 
allowed in facilities from 165 to 90.306 
Lastly, the Legislature has filled a significant gap in protection of 
juvenile offenders from harm at the hands of DJJ employees, volunteers, and 
interns.307  Although the Florida Statutes provided criminal penalties for sexual 
abuse of children within the juvenile justice system, there was no such provision 
for employees alleged to have neglected a youth in the department’s custody.308 
 Although such incidences are uncommon, one recent highly publicized event 
illustrated the need for legislative change.309  In 2011, an eighteen-year-old in 
the department’s custody died of a brain hemorrhage after “guards refused to 
call 911 for more than six hours” because they thought the young person was 
faking.310  Unfortunately, the guards could not be charged with child neglect 
because the person was eighteen and no longer legally a child.311  To address 
instances such as this, the Legislature amended section 985.701 of the Florida 
Statutes to define ‘“[j]uvenile offender’ [as a] person of any age . . . detained . . . 
or committed to the custody of the department,” and created section 985.702 
which makes “[w]illful and malicious neglect of a juvenile offender” a felony 
offense.312  In addition, violation of these provisions is grounds for dismissal 
and permanent disqualification from employment in the juvenile justice 
system.313  Section 985.702 also imposes a duty on DJJ employees to report 
instances of neglect and makes failure to do so a first-degree misdemeanor.314 
B. Dependency Statutory Changes 
Perhaps the most significant practical change in substantive dependency 
law was the legislative abrogation of the nexus test established by the Supreme 
Court of Florida in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative 
Services315 in 1991.316  The Padgett nexus test—which has been applied for over 
                                                 
306. FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 3 (Fla. 
2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.02(5)(c). 
307. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17–18, see also FLA. STAT. § 985.702. 
308. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17. 
309. Id.; Ana M. Valdes, Parents of Teen Who Died in Detention to Sue State, 
PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 14, 2012, at B1. 
310. Lisa Rab, DJJ Supervisor Thought Eric Perez Was “Faking” As He Died in 
Juvie Lockup, Officer Testifies, THE PULP (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://
blogs.browardpalmbeach.com/pulp/2012/03/djj_eric_perez_death_grand_jury_report.php; see 
also Valdes, supra note 309. 
311. Rab, supra note 310; see also FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17. 
312. FLA. STAT. §§ 985.701(1)(a)(1)(c), .702(2)(a)–(b). 
313. Id. § 985.702(2)(c). 
314. Id. § 985.702(3), (4)(a)–(b). 
315. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991). 
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two decades317— mandated that termination of parental rights (“TPR”) based 
upon the abuse of sibling or another child in the family must be predicated upon 
a showing of a nexus between the harm to the other child, and imminent risk of 
harm to the current child.318  The Legislature has eliminated this nexus 
requirement in part, amending section 39.806 of the Florida Statutes to specify 
that no proof of a nexus between prior conduct and potential harm to a sibling is 
required in cases of prior egregious conduct, or those related to homicide of a 
child or the other parent.319  Similarly, conviction of crime “that requires [a] 
parent to register as a sexual predator” has been added as a grounds for TPR.320 
Although several organizations provide attorney representation to 
dependent children in some parts of the state on a limited basis, the Legislature 
has recognized that children with special needs have a particular need for legal 
representation.321  For this reason, the Legislature has extended a right to legal 
representation for dependent children with certain special needs.322  
Specifically, an attorney shall be provided for a child who is subject to any 
proceeding under chapter 39 who resides or is being considered for placement 
in a skilled nursing home or residential treatment center, is prescribed but 
declines assent to psychotropic medication, has a developmental disability, or is 
a victim of human trafficking.323 
There is a series of serious infirmities in the new statute.324  First, it 
leaves unrepresented many children with equally serious needs, as well as the 
vast majority of the over twenty-eight thousand children who are before the 
dependency court.325  There are several constitutional reasons why all these 
other children are entitled to counsel.326  The fact that they are treated 
                                                                                                                   
316. Id. at 57; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f); Fla. Prof’l Staff of the Comm. 
On Appropriations, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666, Reg. Sess., at 19 (2014). 
317. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 85. 
318. Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571; Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 
58, at 85. 
319. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f), (h). 
320. Id. § 39.806(1)(n).  Research discloses no legislative history for these 
changes.  FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2013). 
321. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(1)(a)(2).  The legislation is a response to a 2012 
warning issued by the United States Department of Justice threatening a law suit against the State 
of Florida regarding Americans with Disabilities Act violations concerning severely disabled 
children housed in nursing homes throughout the state.  FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 
561, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 3 (2014). 
322. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3). 
323. Id. 
324. See id. § 39.01305(1)–(9). 
325. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311, 353; DCF Quick Facts, FLA. 
DEP’T OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, http://www.dcfstate.fl.us/general-information/quick-facts/cw 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014). 
326. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 350–53. 
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differently than those provided with lawyers raises a question of equal 
protection.327  The failure to provide counsel at all to most children in Florida in 
these cases may also be a denial of procedural due process.328 
Second, the new law appropriates five million dollars to pay for lawyers 
to represent the children.329  However, it says that, first, efforts must be made to 
find volunteer lawyers.330  This itself is a problem because volunteer lawyers 
have never been able to represent even a significant fraction of the children 
before the dependency court.331  The decision to provide lawyers for children is 
first made by the attorneys for the Department of Children and Families.332  The 
law thus creates an ethical issue for department lawyers.333  Pursuant to the 
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility, the decision of whether a party 
should be entitled to counsel is being made by a lawyer for another party.334  
Moreover, the system for locating and training lawyers to represent children is 
left to the GAL Program.335  This creates a similar ethical problem.336  Thus, one 
party is training and choosing those lawyers who will represent another party.337 
Third, the legislature never explained why the excess of thirty million 
dollars that it has expended to fund the GAL Program every year is not adequate 
to represent these children.338  Of course—as discussed in two articles by this 
author in the Nova Law Review339—the first part of the answer may be that the 
                                                 
327. Id. 
328. Id. at 311, 353. 
329. FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 561, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 4 (2014). 
330. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(4)(a) (2014). 
331. See U. FLA. LEVIN COLL. LAW CTR. ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES & FLA’S 
CHILDREN FIRST, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN 6 (2012).  The failure to fund 
volunteer lawyers to represent children is compounded by the influx of approximately 53,000 
undocumented children into the United States and the efforts of bar associations to fund lawyers 
for them.  Melvin Felix & Mike Clary, Deutsch Vows to Fight for Undocumented Kids, SUN 
SENTINEL (Dec. 18, 2014, 8:42 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-
undocumented-minors-folo-20141218-story.html; Mara Gay, As Child Immigrants Await Fate, a 
Race for Counsel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2014, at A19; Jan Pudlow, Florida Lawyers Stand with 
Unaccompanied Minors, FLA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1, 2014, at 1.  Legal Aid Societies are overwhelmed 
by need for pro bono lawyers to meet need of unaccompanied immigrant children.  Gay, supra 
note 331. 
332. FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(6); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 308 n.10. 
333. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 308 n.10, 352–53. 
334. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.14(b); see also Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 
15, at 311, 353. 
335. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 323. 
336. See id. at 308 n.10, 323. 
337. See id. 
338. Id. at 362.  The complete budget from all sources is actually higher.  See 
Michael Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright:  Every Child Should Have an 
Attorney in Child Welfare Proceedings in Florida, 36 NOVA. L. REV. 345, 356, (2012). 
339. See Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 338–39; Dale & 
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GAL Program in Florida does not represent the legal interests of children in 
dependency and termination of parental rights cases.340  The GAL Program is 
not the child’s lawyer.341  Rather, the GAL Program, a party to dependency and 
TPR cases in Florida, only represents the child’s best interests.342  The child, of 
course, is a separate party in Florida.343  So the GAL Program’s lawyers cannot 
ethically represent another party—the child.344  The second part of the answer 
may be that, while the GAL Program describes itself as guardian angels, it tries 
to be the child’s friend, has 145 lawyers on staff, and actually only represents 
the best interests of half the children before the court; it is legally, ethically, and 
structurally incapable of solving the complex legal problems of the children 
before the dependency court.345 
Until this year, chapter 39 did not contain any special provisions for 
dealing with cases of medical neglect or those involving children with complex 
medical needs.346  Because of this, “parents [could] be found . . . neglectful or 
abusive [where the] observed problems [were] related to insufficient services or 
a natural change in medical conditions.”347  To correct these shortcomings and 
to ensure children are maintained in a minimally restrictive and nurturing 
environment, provisions were added to ensure that reports of medical neglect 
will be investigated by persons with specialized training,348 and a child 
protective team investigating such a case must consult with a physician with 
experience treating children with the same condition.349  The goal of these 
changes is to use a family-centered approach to allow children to remain at 
home where the parents are willing and able to meet the child’s medical needs 
with services.350 
Although this survey can only address a limited number of statutory 
changes, there are several additional provisions that require mention.351  First, 
the legislature has created multiple procedures and protocols related to the 
                                                                                                                   
Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311. 
340. Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311; see also FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
PROGRAM, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/GAL-2009AnnualReport.pdf. 
341. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 310–11, 327. 
342. Id. at 311, 327. 
343. See id. at 311. 
344. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7(a)(2); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2014). 
345. See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 327, 330, 353. 
346. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(41)–(43); Fla. Prof’l Staff of the Comm. on 
Appropriation, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666, Reg. Sess., at 12 (2014). 
347. Fla. Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666 at 12. 
348. See FLA. STAT. § 39.3068(1). 
349. See id. § 39.303(1). 
350. Id. § 39.3068(2). 
351. See supra Part V. 
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investigation and reporting of deaths and other incidents, involving children 
either in the care of, or who have been investigated by, the department.352  The 
relative caregiver program—which provides financial assistance to family 
members willing to care for a dependent child—was extended to assist persons 
who are not related to the child by blood or marriage.353  A three-year pilot 
program was established to pay for the costs associated with obtaining a driver’s 
license—including insurance—for children in foster care.354  Finally, multiple 
provisions were added to increase the overall competence of child welfare 
personnel, with an emphasis on increasing the number of employees with 
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in social work.355 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Legislature made substantial changes in the juvenile delinquency 
and child welfare law.356  In the latter area, several of the changes contain major 
constitutional infirmities.357  The Supreme Court of Florida heard only one 
juvenile law case involving a statutory analysis of the speedy trial rule.358  And 
finally, the intermediate appellate courts contained their long-standing approach 
to significant oversight of trial court rulings in both delinquency and child 
welfare areas.359 
 
 
 
                                                 
352. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.2015 (1). 
353. Id. § 39.5085(2)(a)(3). 
354. Id. § 409.1454(2). 
355. Id. § 402.403(1)–(6). 
356. See supra Part I. 
357. See supra Part V. 
358. State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam). 
359. See, e.g., S.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 120 So. 3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the use of technology and social media websites rise every day, 
so do the number of people who fall victim to revenge pornography.1  Social 
media websites, like Instagram, which as of December 2013 had seventy-five 
million daily users and as of March 2014 approximately sixty million photos 
uploaded a day, can easily be used as a platform to post explicit photos of ex-
																																																								
*  Aysegul Harika is a J.D. candidate for May 2015 at Nova Southeastern 
University, Shepard Broad Law Center.  Aysegul would like to extend a special thanks to her 
friends on HLSA who mentioned the topic which encouraged her to pursue the research and 
writing for this article.  Aysegul would also like to thank the board members and her 
colleagues at the Nova Law Review for their hard work and dedication to improve and refine 
this article.  Lastly, she would like to thank her friends and family, especially her parents, 
Ayhan and Sevil Harika, who have continuously inspired her and supported her throughout 
her law school journey. 
1. Casey Martinez, An Argument for States to Outlaw ‘Revenge Porn’ and 
for Congress to Amend 47 U.S.C. § 230:  How Our Current Laws Do Little to Protect Victims, 
14 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 236, 237–38 (2014). 
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lovers.2  Even more troubling, is the startup of websites such as IsAnyoneUp, 
which allow people to submit explicit images, sometimes accompanied by 
the victim’s name, phone number, address, and links to their social media 
profiles.3  Some of these websites even charge the individuals fees in order to 
remove their images from the website. 4   Twenty-seven-year-old Kevin 
Christopher Bollaert started the website UGotPosted, which facilitated more 
than ten thousand explicit images of individuals without their consent, and 
charged each individual as much as three hundred and fifty dollars to remove 
the explicit content.5  State legislatures are slowly beginning to realize the 
need to outlaw the posting of explicit images on social media sites, as the 
resulting harm to victims can include years of harassment and shame.6 
Revenge pornography—which is also known as non-consensual 
pornography—is the “distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals 
without their consent.”7  Specifically, revenge pornography refers to “images 
originally obtained with consent . . . within the context of a private or 
confidential relationship, . . . [such as between] intimate partner[s], [which 
are] later distribute[d] . . . without consent.”8  “As of July 18, 2014, thirteen 
states—New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, Utah, Wisconsin, 
Virginia, Georgia, Arizona, Maryland, Colorado, and Hawaii—have passed 
laws that treat nonconsensual pornography as a crime in itself . . . .”9  This 
Comment aims to persuade readers that the Florida Legislature needs to 
																																																								
2. Craig Smith, By the Numbers:  100+ Interesting Instagram Statistics, 
DIGITAL MARKETING RAMBLINGS, http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/important-
instagram-stats/#.VBH8-vldWdR (last updated Dec. 14, 2014). 
3. Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 350–51 (2014); Martinez, supra note 1, at 238; Amanda 
Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & 
ENT. L. 422, 423–24 (2014); Lindsey Bever, Fighting Back Against ‘Revenge Porn,’ WASH. 
POST, (April 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/
04/28/fighting-back-against-revenge-porn.  IsAnyoneUp’s creator earned himself the title of 
“ʻthe most hated man on the Internet.’”  Bever, supra note 3; see also Levendowski supra 
note 3, at 423. 
4. California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn Operator, 
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW, Mar. 2014, at 22, 22. 
5. Id. at 22–23. 
6. See Martinez, supra note 1, at 239–244; Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing 
Revenge Porn:  Frequently Asked Questions, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 3 (unpublished 
working paper, Oct. 9, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2337998. 
7. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 346. 
8. Id.  Revenge pornography also includes images retrieved without consent, 
such as by hacking an individual’s phone or recording sexual acts by hidden cameras; but this 
Comment will only focus on images obtained with consent as it is the most prevalent type of 
revenge pornography.  See id.; infra Parts II–III. 
9. Franks, supra note 6, at 3. 
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follow the progression of the laws in these states, and enact its own laws to 
ban revenge pornography.10 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the rising trend of revenge 
pornography and the increase in use of the platforms it is found on today.11  
Part III of this Comment will examine what being a victim means for the 
lives of those who fall victim to the posting of their intimate photographs.12  
Part IV of this Comment will discuss the issues faced when proposing 
revenge porn legislation, and will then examine the text of three states which 
have enacted revenge porn statutes—New Jersey, California, and 
Maryland.13  Part V of this Comment will compare the language of the failed 
Florida bills—House Bill 475 and Senate Bill 532—to determine what could 
be changed in order to help enact statutes that will ban the posting of revenge 
porn in the state of Florida.14 
II. REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY:  A RISING TREND 
Revenge pornography has become more popular with the increased 
use of social media sites, new photo sharing applications for smart phones, 
and sexting.15  This Part of the Comment will be split into two parts.16  The 
first part will discuss the role that social media websites—such as Facebook 
and Instagram, and new photo and video applications for smartphones, like 
Snapchat—play in the popularity of revenge pornography.17  The second part 
discusses the popular trend among teens and young adults—sexting—which 
many times leads to the posting of revenge pornography.18 
A. Social Media Websites 
Adding to the sixty million photos uploaded onto Instagram 
everyday, Facebook users are uploading approximately three hundred million 
																																																								
10. See infra Part V. 
11. See infra Part II. 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2014); H.D. 43, 2014 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14–9 (West 2014); see also infra Part IV. 
14. H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Fla. 2014); see also infra Part V. 
15. Martinez, supra note 1, at 237; Nicole A. Poltash, Comment, Snapchat 
and Sexting:  A Snapshot of Baring Your Bare Essentials, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 4, 2013, 
at 1, 4–5, 11. 
16. See infra Part II.A–B. 
17. See infra II.A. 
18. See infra II.B. 
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photos to Facebook each day.19  Facebook alone has over 1.35 billion users.20  
With hundreds of millions of photos being uploaded every day, the potential 
for misuse heightens, and it becomes more and more unrealistic to expect 
website administrators to catch the inappropriate images being posted. 21  
Lawmakers have recently suggested that social media websites—like 
Facebook and Instagram—need to begin “establish[ing] the identity of 
people opening accounts to prevent . . . revenge porn[ography].”22  Although 
verifying the identity of each user on a social media website might not be the 
ultimate answer to ending the posting of non-consensual pornography, it is a 
step in the right direction.23  It is less likely that individuals will engage in 
unacceptable behavior if their identity is revealed, especially if they can be 
traced to the information posted, unlike if an individual posted 
anonymously.24  If allowed to post anonymously, individuals are less likely 
to feel guilt, and might have a false sense of security that they might not get 
into any trouble.25 
In addition to the common use of these social media sites comes 
Snapchat, “a mobile phone application that sends self-destructing 
messages.”26  Snapchat allows users to send photos and videos, which are 
deleted within seconds of the recipient viewing them.27  According to the 
company, “‘[t]he data is completely deleted and could not be recalled even if 
law enforcement came looking for [it].’”28  This description misguides users 
though, as further investigation into the company’s privacy policy reveals:  
“Although we attempt to delete image data as soon as possible after the 
message is received and opened by the recipient . . . we cannot guarantee that 
the message contents will be deleted in every case. . . .  Messages, therefore, 
are sent at the risk of the user.”29 
																																																								
19. Poltash, supra note 15, at 2; Smith, supra note 2. 
20. Craig Smith, By the Numbers:  200+ Amazing Facebook User & 
Demographic Statistics, DIGITAL MARKETING RAMBLINGS, http://expandedramblings.com/
index.php/by-the-numbers-17-amazing-facebook-stats/ (last updated Dec. 20, 2014). 
21. See Poltash, supra note 15, at 2; Julie Kay, “Revenge Porn” a Criminal 
Act?  Yes, If Groups Get Their Way, DAILY BUS. REV. (Aug. 6, 2014), https://
www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202666010714/Revenge-Porn-A-Criminal-Act-Yes-If-
Groups-Get-Their-Way?SLreturn=20140811130411; Andrew Whitaker, Revenge Porn Sites 
Must End Anonymity, THE SCOTSMAN, July 30, 2014, at 15. 
22. Whitaker, supra note 21. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. Poltash, supra note 15, at 2. 
27. Id. at 2–3, 7. 
28. Id. at 3 (alteration in original). 
29. Id. at 8–9 (alteration in original). 
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The loopholes do not end there.30  There is still a chance that the 
recipient may take a screenshot of the image—a photo of the image seen on 
the screen of a cellphone, which saves the received photo to their photo 
album. 31   Even though the application will notify the sender that the 
screenshot has been taken, once the photo is copied, the sender has little 
control over what the recipient will do with the image.32  “In 2012 alone, 
more than five billion messages were sent through Snapchat,” and its 
popularity has increased since then, making it “‘the second-most popular free 
photo and video app for the iPhone . . . just behind YouTube and ahead of 
Instagram’” in February 2013.33  This increased popularity of the application 
and the false sense of security that the images will disappear forever, make 
Snapchat “‘the greatest tool for sexting since the front-facing camera.’”34  
Snapchat’s use for sexting was apparent at its inception—“the application is 
rated for users twelve years of age and older due, in part, to ‘suggestive 
themes’ and ‘mild sexual content or nudity,’” but the start-up of websites 
such as Snapchat Sluts—“a website featuring photos of naked women that 
were taken using Snapchat”—has provided even more proof.35 
B. Sexting 
Minors and young adults are also exploring their sexuality in a more 
dangerous way by leaving permanent traces of the “fruits of their 
exploration” through sexting.36   Sexting is defined as “‘[t]he practice of 
sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, including 
nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular phones . . . or over the 
Internet.’”37  Most commonly, “a person takes a digital photo of himself or 
herself and sends it via mobile phone as a text message.”38  “ʻ[A]ccording to 
. . . the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, up to [eighty percent] of revenge porn 
victims belong to this category,’” meaning they initially sent their explicit 
images willingly.39  Recent surveys have shown that “ʻ[s]ending and posting 
																																																								
30. Id. at 9. 
31. See Poltash, supra note 15, at 9. 
32. See id. 
33. Id. at 9–10 (alteration in original). 
34. Id. at 8–9, 11. 
35. Id. at 11–12. 
36. Elizabeth M. Ryan, Sexting:  How the State Can Prevent a Moment of 
Indiscretion from Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young 
Adults, 96 IOWA L. REV. 357, 363 (2010). 
37. Poltash, supra note 15, at 4 (quoting Verified Complaint at 5, Miller v. 
Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009)) (alteration in original). 
38. Id. 
39. Martinez, supra note 1, at 242. 
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nude or semi-nude photos or videos starts at a young age and becomes even 
more frequent as teens become young adults.’”40  In a “2012 survey of over 
six hundred . . . high school students, . . . twenty percent . . . had sent a sext 
[from their] cell phone,” and almost forty percent had received a sext.41  
“More than a quarter had forwarded a sext that they had received to 
others.”42  Of the participants who had sent a sext, one third had sent the sext 
“ʻdespite believing that there could be serious consequences.’”43  The real 
consequence though, that teens and young adults need to keep in mind and 
remember before they engage in the new trend of sexting, is the fact that 
“once an individual transmits an image via cell phone or over the Internet, it 
is virtually impossible to remove it.”44 
Pictures received from sexting are the main source of explicit images 
posted on social media websites or revenge pornography websites.45  Many 
revenge porn websites were started to post these sext messages for the 
entertainment of others.46  In February 2013, the students at Cypress Bay 
High School in Weston, Florida, learned firsthand the dangers of teenage 
sexting.47  An anonymous web page filled with more than a dozen nude 
pictures—apparently received through sexting—appeared online.48  Students 
at Cypress Bay High identified many of the females as classmates, and some 
of the pictures even listed the females’ names.49  The photos went viral after 
the link was quickly shared through Twitter, with over four thousand 
students viewing the website while still in school.50  It is believed that the 
website was created by current Cypress Bay classmates.51 
Mentioned earlier in this Comment, the revenge pornography 
website, IsAnyoneUp, was one of the most successful—if not the most 
successful—of the hundreds of sketchy sites before it shut down in 2013.52  
																																																								
40. Poltash, supra note 15, at 5 (alteration in original). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Ryan, supra note 36, at 363. 
45. See Poltash, supra note 15, at 14. 
46. See id. at 12; California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge 
Porn Operator, supra note 4, at 22. 
47. See Michael Vasquez, Photos of Nude Teen Girls Linked to Cypress Bay 
High School, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:17 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/
incoming/article1947560.html. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Kelly Goff, Mother Vows to Make Revenge Pornography a Federal 
Crime, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULLETIN (Feb. 6, 2014), www.dailybulletin.com/general-
news/20140203/mother-vows-to-make-revenge-pornography-a-federal-crime. 
79
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 2014
2014] BANNING REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY:  FLORIDA 71 
IsAnyoneUp would have three hundred fifty thousand page views a day.53  
Hunter Moore, the website’s creator, would “post[] names, addresses, and 
work information about the victims and urged followers—strangers to the 
person posing—to taunt them.” 54   “Moore netted more than [thirteen 
thousand dollars] a month in advertising revenue” through IsAnyoneUp.55  
Hunter Moore decided to opt out of the website in 2013, after he learned that 
the FBI was investigating him.56  It took two years to investigate Moore and 
the website before any action was taken.57 
With the popularity of IsAnyoneUp, more and more revenge 
pornography websites began popping up. 58   One of these websites was 
UGotPosted, which was created in December 2012.59  This new revenge 
pornography website not only suggested, but “required that the poster 
include the subject’s full name, location, age, and Facebook profile link” 
next to their explicit image.60  Even worse, the website’s creator, Kevin 
Christopher Bollaert, would charge the victims “a fee ranging from $299.99 
to $350” to get their explicit images or videos removed from the site.61  
Bollaert created another website—ChangeMyReputation—to collect these 
fees. 62   When a revenge porn victim would contact UGotPosted with a 
request for their content to be removed, Bollaert would reply with a 
ChangeMyReputation email address, offer to remove them for a fee, and then 
the victim could pay using a PayPal account.63  Court documents obtained 
from Bollaert’s ChangeMyReputation PayPal account showed that he earned 
tens of thousands of dollars from the fees he charged the victims.64   Like 
Hunter Moore, Bollaert also made a significant amount of money from 
advertisers on his revenge porn site—nine hundred dollars a month to be 
exact.65 
																																																								
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Levendowski, supra note 3, at 423. 
56. Goff, supra note 52. 
57. See id. 
58. See California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn 
Operator, supra note 4, at 23; Goff, supra note 52. 
59. California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn Operator, 
supra note 4, at 23. 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn Operator, 
supra note 4, at 23. 
65. Id.; see also Levendowski, supra note 3 at 423. 
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III. REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY:  THE HARM 
Once an image is shared without consent, the victim becomes sexual 
entertainment for complete strangers.66  According to a survey from 2013, 
which “included 1182 online interviews amongst American adults ages 
[eighteen through fifty-four],” “one in ten former partners threaten to post 
sexually explicit images of their exes online.”67  About sixty percent of those 
scorned lovers follow through.68  If uploaded to the Internet, the explicit 
photograph can be viewed by thousands of people, continued to be shared on 
multiple other websites, or even emailed to the victim’s family, employers, 
or friends to further embarrass the victim.69  In some instances, the explicit 
“image[s] can dominate the first several pages of hits on the victim’s name in 
a search engine,” which has the potential to “destroy victims’ intimate 
relationships, as well as their educational and employment opportunities.”70  
In a “recent study, . . . colleges and universities [revealed that they] use 
social-networking websites—a medium that commonly features primary- and 
secondary-sexting images—to help evaluate applicants.”71  Explicit images 
can be just as detrimental to “careers and future job prospects.” 72  
“‘According to a recent survey by Microsoft, [seventy-five] percent of U.S. 
recruiters and human-resource professionals report that their companies 
require them to do online research about candidates, and many use a range of 
sites when scrutinizing applicants, including . . . photo- and video-sharing 
sites.’”73  More importantly, “‘[s]eventy percent of U.S. recruiters report that 
they have rejected candidates because of information found online,’”74 a sad 
reality for the victims who have images posted online without their consent 
or knowledge; especially because it is unrealistic to expect employers to 
“contact victims to see if they posted the nude photos of themselves or if 
someone else did in violation of their trust.”75  “The ‘simple but regrettable 
truth is that after consulting search results, employers [do not] call revenge 
porn victims to schedule’ interviews or to extend offers.”76 
																																																								
66. Franks, supra note 6, at 1. 
67. Levendowski, supra note 3, at 424, 424 n.7. 
68. Id. at 424. 
69. Franks, supra note 6, at 1. 
70. Id. 
71. Ryan, supra note 36, at 364. 
72. Poltash, supra note 15, at 16. 
73. Id. at 16–17 (alteration in original). 
74. Id. at 17 (alteration in original). 
75. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 352. 
76. Id. 
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For other revenge porn victims, the consequences are much worse.77  
Some victims endure stalking, harassment, bullying, psychological problems, 
and in dire cases, suicide.78  “According to a study conducted by the Cyber 
Civil Rights Initiative, over [eighty percent] of revenge porn victims 
experience severe emotional distress and anxiety.”79  Much of this anxiety 
comes from the fact that the victims’ explicit images are more often than not 
accompanied by their personal information when posted on revenge porn 
websites.80  “In a study of 1244 individuals, over [fifty percent] of victims 
reported that their naked photos appeared next to their full name and social 
network profile . . . .”81  Furthermore, “over [twenty percent] of [the] victims 
reported that their e-mail addresses and telephone numbers appeared next to 
their naked photos,” instilling a fear that strangers may confront the victims 
offline, especially since some of the online interactions include sexual 
demands.82 
For teenagers and young adults who are victims of revenge 
pornography, the consequences are more severe and tragic.83  From the onset, 
the moment an explicit image is shared with those who are not meant to see 
it, the continued existence of the idea of a permanent record of the image 
will haunt young teens or adults for years to come.84  “‘[I]t is the fear of 
exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret that seems to have the 
most profound emotional repercussions.’”85  Other times, the harassment and 
bullying once the image is shared is too much for teens and young adults to 
handle.86  Hope Witsell was only thirteen years old when she took a topless 
photograph of herself and sent it to a boy she liked.87  The boy then sent the 
photograph to others, who then also forwarded the picture to further 
recipients.88  This included students at her school and a nearby high school, 
who began bullying her in person and over the Internet.89  To deal with the 
harassment, Witsell began cutting herself. 90   In a heart-breaking turn of 
																																																								
77. See Franks, supra note 6, at 1. 
78. Id.; Citron & Franks, supra note 3 at 347; Ryan, supra note 36, at 359. 
79. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 351. 
80. Levendowski, supra note 3, at 424. 
81. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 350. 
82. Id. at 350–51. 
83. See Ryan, supra note 36, at 359. 
84. Poltash, supra note 15, at 19. 
85. Id. 
86. See Ryan, supra note 36, at 359. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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events, Hope Witsell took her own life.91  Eighteen-year-old Jessica Logan’s 
life also ended too soon when she took her own life after falling into 
depression over her shared nude image.92  Jessica sent her boyfriend a nude 
photograph of herself when she was on vacation with her friends.93  When 
their relationship ended, Jessica’s boyfriend shared her explicit photograph 
with others, and the photo was distributed among “students at four different 
high schools.”94  “Students at the four schools incessantly harassed Logan 
about the photo, calling her a slut, whore, and other names in person, over 
the phone, and over the Internet.”95 
IV. THE START OF BANNING REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY:  RECENT 
LEGISLATION 
The fourth part of this Comment will be split into two separate 
sections.96  The first section will explore the challenges faced when trying to 
enact revenge porn legislation, while the second section will review the fairly 
new revenge porn legislation passed in thirteen states. 97   While thirteen 
states—New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, Utah, Wisconsin, 
Virginia, Georgia, Arizona, Maryland, Colorado, and Hawaii—have passed 
legislation, the public’s lack of empathy for revenge pornography victims 
might be the reason why enacting legislation in many other states, including 
Florida, has not been as successful.98 
A. Issues With Enacting Legislation 
The main issue faced when trying to enact legislation to ban revenge 
pornography, is the matter of consent.99  The public’s perception of the issue 
seems to be one of the “victims ‘brought it upon themselves.’”100   This 
unfortunate lack of empathy towards revenge porn victims has been 
illustrated in both scholarly commentary and in comment sections of any 
																																																								
91. Ryan, supra note 36, at 359. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
97. Id. 
98. Franks, supra note 6, at 3; see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 250–51; 
infra Part V. 
99. See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 354; Martinez, supra note 1, at 251. 
100. Martinez, supra note 1, at 250; see also Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 
354. 
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article or post on the topic.101  When online news articles on revenge porn are 
posted—or when bloggers post about and discuss the topic—the comments 
section will most likely include derogatory comments towards the victims.102  
It is not uncommon to see comments stating that the victims are stupid or 
slutty.103  The biggest reason for this response from the public is the fact that 
the victims chose to take these photos and then willingly shared them with 
other individuals.104 
 
This disregard for harms undermining women’s 
autonomy is closely tied to idiosyncratic, dangerous views about 
consent with regard to sex.  Some argue that a woman’s 
consensual sharing of sexually explicit photos with a trusted 
confidant should be taken as wide-ranging permission to share 
them with the public.  Said another way, a victim’s consent in one 
context is taken as consent for other contexts. . . . While most 
people today would rightly recoil at the suggestion that a woman’s 
consent to sleep with one man can be taken as consent to sleep 
with all of his friends, this is the very logic of revenge porn 
apologists.105 
 
Unfortunately, the lack of public sympathy is mostly harming young 
girls.106  A recent study conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative found 
that “[ninety percent] of [the individuals] victimized by revenge 
porn[ography] were female.”107  The rise in popularity of sexting, has led to 
the peer pressuring of young women—by friends or boyfriends—
encouraging them to take and send these explicit images.108  Other young 
women believe that they need to participate in the trend to be cool.109  No 
matter the public’s opinion, one minor mistake—especially at an age where 
teenagers and young adults might not know any better—should not be a 
justification for the years of harassment that these individuals will be forced 
to endure.110 
																																																								
101. Martinez, supra note 1, at 250. 
102. Id. at 250–51. 
103. Id. 
104. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 354; Martinez, supra note 1, at 251. 
105. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 348. 
106. Martinez, supra note 1, at 251. 
107. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 353. 
108. See Martinez, supra note 1, at 251. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
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B. Current Legislation 
“‘People [do not] know where to start when they are a victim of 
revenge porn . . . .’”111  Since the trend of sexting is fairly new, many victims 
do not know whether they have any rights or any available remedies when 
the recipient of their image or video shares it with others, or posts it 
online. 112   “‘Having legislation that defines sexually explicit images and 
repercussions of posting images without permission and not removing them 
on request empowers the victim and hopefully leads to quick resolution in 
many of these cases.’”113  Sexting and the recent advances in technology—
which have made the startup of revenge pornography websites to post 
explicit content received through sexting incredibly simple for anybody who 
owns a computer—has brought on new challenges which our generation is 
only now beginning to tackle.114 
Revenge porn victims have only recently come forward to 
describe the grave harms they have suffered, including stalking, 
loss of professional and educational opportunities, and 
psychological damage.  As with domestic violence and sexual 
assault, victims of revenge porn suffer negative consequences for 
speaking out, including the risk of increased harm.  We are only 
now beginning to get a sense of how large the problem of revenge 
porn is now that brave, outspoken victims have opened a space for 
others to tell their stories.  The fact that nonconsensual porn so 
often involves the Internet and social media, the public, law 
enforcement, and the judiciary sometimes struggle to understand 
the mechanics of the conduct and the devastation it can cause.115 
In an effort to end the lifelong damaging outcomes suffered by the 
victims of revenge pornography, state legislatures are beginning to take 
innovative steps toward criminalizing the act.116  Currently, thirteen states—
New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, Utah, Wisconsin, Virginia, 
Georgia, Arizona, Maryland, Colorado, and Hawaii—have passed laws that 
																																																								
111. Revision Legal to Testify May 6 Before Michigan Senate Judiciary 
Committee on Issues, Recommendations for “Revenge Porn” Legislation, P.R. NEWSWIRE, 
(May 5, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/revision-legal-to-testify-may-6-
before-michigan-senate-judiciary-committee-on-issues-recommendations-for-revenge-porn-
legislation-258001681.html. 
112. See id. 
113. Id. (emphasis in original). 
114. See Franks, supra note 6, at 1. 
115. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 347. 
116. See Franks, supra note 6, at 3. 
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criminalize revenge pornography.117  Although experts in the field of cyber 
harassment admit that the laws may be flawed and may not provide enough 
protection—stating that “many of these laws suffer from narrow applicability 
and/or constitutional infirmities”—they are still groundbreaking and an 
improvement for victims who may not be able to receive any protection at 
all.118 
Revenge pornography is likely to violate state statutes for 
harassment or invasion of privacy in many states, but police officers will 
usually not act unless the explicit content posted involves a minor.119  When 
the image involves a minor, child pornography laws come into play, which 
are normally treated with more seriousness and urgency.120  Police tend to 
turn away many revenge pornography victims who are young adults or 
adults, because they cannot provide any evidence of physical harm. 121  
Sometimes police officers embarrass or harass the victims themselves.122  It 
is imperative that all revenge pornography victims receive protection because 
the harm of harassment, “lost jobs, lost relationships, lost friendships, and in 
extreme cases, physical harm,” is very real.123  The thirteen states that have 
passed legislation banning the posting of nonconsensual pornography have 
begun a groundbreaking movement that may take years to complete.124 
1. New Jersey 
New Jersey Code 2C:14-9 was passed in New Jersey in 2003.125  The 
statute “makes ‘it a felony to disclose a person’s nude or partially nude 
image without that person’s consent.’” 126   Subsection (c) of the statute 
specifically refers to the type of revenge pornography this Comment 
discusses—instances in which an individual willingly shares the content with 
one person they trust, but the content is then further distributed without their 
																																																								
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 1, 3; see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 240–41. 
119. Martinez, supra note 1, at 239. 
120. See Poltash, supra note 15, at 13. 
121. See Martinez, supra note 1, at 236–37 (illustrating the story of Annmarie 
Chiarini, whose boyfriend coerced her to take explicit photographs of herself).  After the 
relationship ended, Chiarini’s boyfriend distributed her explicit photographs to strangers, her 
friends, and her family.  Id.  She contacted the police, who “told her that no crime was 
committed and there was nothing [that] they could do.”  Id. at 236.  The second time she 
contacted the police, they “laughed [at her] and essentially blamed her for the incident.”  Id. at 
237. 
122. Id. at 237, 239. 
123. Martinez, supra note 1, at 251. 
124. Franks, supra note 6, at 3; see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 239–44. 
125. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2014). 
126. Martinez, supra note 1, at 239; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9. 
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consent—whereas the other sections of the statute describe instances where 
the individual engaging in the act is photographed or recorded without 
permission.127  The section specifically reads: 
 
c.  An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that 
he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses any 
photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other reproduction 
of the image of another person whose intimate parts are exposed or 
who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, 
unless that person has consented to such disclosure.  For purposes 
of this subsection, disclose means sell, manufacture, give, provide, 
lend, trade, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate, 
disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise or offer.  Notwithstanding 
the provisions of subsection b of [New Jersey Statute] 2C:43-3, a 
fine not to exceed $30,000 may be imposed for a violation of this 
subsection.128 
 
Subsection (d)(1) of the statute makes it “an affirmative defense to a 
crime under this section that:  [T]he actor posted or otherwise provided prior 
notice to the person of the actor’s intent to engage in the conduct specified in 
subsection a., b., or c.”129  Experts and lawmakers alike praise the “‘specific 
definitions and affirmative defenses’” outlined in the statute, as they “‘guard 
the statute against First Amendment overbreadth.’”130  The law has also been 
complimented for treating the conduct seriously even though it was enacted 
“well ahead of its time” and “years before any of the debate that surrounds 
such laws today” began.131  Making the posting of revenge pornography a 
felony also serves as a good deterrent for those who may not think that the 
act is a serious offense.132  “New Jersey ‘gave the law enough teeth to serve 
as a deterrent, threatening those convicted of posting lewd images or video of 
someone without license or privilege with a third-degree crime, punishable 
with a prison sentence of [three] to [five] years.’” 133   The lack of this 
deterrent effect in many of the other states that have proposed legislation 
may lead to the opinion that the legislation might not be effective, and 
therefore, the proposed bill may ultimately fail to pass as law.134 
																																																								
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9(1)(a)–(c). 
128. Id. § 2C:14-9(1)(c). 
129. Id. § 2C:14-9(1)(d)(1). 
130. Martinez, supra note 1, at 240–41. 
131. Id. at 241. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. See id. 
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2. California 
California’s Senate Bill 255, which is now codified as section 
647(j)(4) of the California Penal Code, became effective on October 1, 
2013.135  The law “makes it a misdemeanor to ‘publish images of another 
person without their consent “with the intent[] to cause . . . emotional 
distress.”’”136  The California law finds someone guilty of disorderly conduct 
if: 
Any person who photographs or records by any means the 
image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable 
person, under circumstances where the parties agree or understand 
that the image shall remain private, and the person subsequently 
distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause serious 
emotional distress, and the depicted person suffers serious 
emotional distress.137 
The initial issue with the California revenge pornography statute was 
that it did not protect victims who had taken the images themselves and then 
shared them with someone they trusted, who then shared them with third 
party recipients without the victims’ consent.138  As stated earlier in this 
Comment, “up to [eighty percent] of revenge porn[ography] victims belong 
to this category,” which is why it is the main focus of this Comment.139  The 
law, therefore, did not punish anybody except the person who made the 
recording.140  This meant that operators of revenge pornography websites and 
third party redistributors of the image—who many times encourage the 
posting of these images or engage in egging on viewers to harass the 
victims—could not be charged under the law.141   On February 21, 2014, the 
California Assembly Commission enrolled Bill 2643, which will expand the 
Civil Code by prohibiting a person from posting explicit images of another 
identifiable person that were intended to remain private. 142   This new 
addition to the law 
																																																								
135. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2014); Martinez, supra note 1, at 
241. 
136. Martinez supra note 1, at 241–42; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 
647(j)(4)(A). 
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A). 
138. Martinez, supra note 1, at 242–43; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 
647(j)(4)(A). 
139. Martinez, supra note 1, at 242; see also supra Parts I–II. 
140. Martinez, supra note 1, at 243. 
141. Id. 
142. Assemb. 2643, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014). 
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would create a private right of action against a person who 
intentionally distributes a photograph or recorded image of another 
that exposes the intimate body parts, as defined, of that person or 
him or her engaged in specified sexual acts, without his or her 
consent, knowing that the other person had a reasonable 
expectation that the material would remain private, if specified 
conditions are met.143 
Another major issue with California law still remains though; the 
criminal law requires that the defendant intended to cause the victim serious 
emotional distress.144  This creates a problem for prosecutors who then need 
to collect evidence to prove that victims have suffered emotional distress.145  
The sexual nature involved with sexting and becoming a victim of revenge 
pornography already makes victims reluctant to share their stories.146  Many 
victims are too humiliated or afraid to speak out and would rather just have 
the whole episode disappear, or at the very least remain anonymous.147  The 
California criminal statute is also quite tame in its punishment compared to 
other revenge porn statutes, which has a negative effect on its deterrent 
factor.148 
3. Maryland 
Scholars with an expertise in online cyber bullying and 
harassment—and have extensive knowledge of revenge pornography—were 
very excited about the proposed legislation aimed at criminalizing revenge 
pornography in Maryland.149  Proposed House Bill 43 originally intended to 
“bar[] the disclosure of a person’s sexually explicit or nude images ‘knowing 
that the other person has not consented to the disclosure.’”150  The original 
																																																								
143. Id. 
144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2014); Citron & Franks, supra 
note 3, at 374. 
145. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A); Martinez, supra note 1, at 243. 
146. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 358. 
147. See id. 
148. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)–(l); Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 374.  
The statute makes nonconsensual pornography a misdemeanor “punishable by up to six 
months in prison and a [one thousand dollar] fine, up to one year in prison and a [two 
thousand dollar] fine for a second offense,” whereas New Jersey’s revenge pornography 
statute—and many other newly proposed statutes—makes the act punishable as a felony 
imposed with greater jail time and heftier fines.  Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 374; 
Martinez, supra note 1, at 239–41. 
149. See Groundbreaking Revenge Porn Bill, THE ELM (Nov. 4, 2013), https://
elm.umaryland.edu/groundbreaking-internet-safety-bill/. 
150. Citron and Franks, supra note 3, at 372 (quoting H.D. 43, 2014 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 2014)). 
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legislative text of the bill was similar to New Jersey’s praised revenge 
pornography statute due to its specific definitions, broad scope, and its 
effective deterrent status in making the act of revenge pornography a 
felony.151  It was a positive move towards more states enacting effective 
legislation to criminalize revenge pornography.152  Unfortunately, before it 
was enacted on May 12, 2014, the legislative text of the bill was dramatically 
changed.153  The enacted law—effective October 1, 2014—now reads: 
(B)(1) This section does not apply to:  (I) lawful and common 
practices of law enforcement, the reporting of unlawful conduct, or 
legal proceedings; or (II) situations involving voluntary exposure 
in public or commercial settings.  An interactive computer service, 
as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), is not liable under this section 
for content provided by another person. 
(C) A person may not intentionally cause serious emotional 
distress to another by intentionally placing on the Internet a 
photograph, film, videotape, recording, or any other reproduction 
of the image of the other person that reveals the identity of the 
other person with his or her intimate parts exposed or while 
engaged in an act of sexual contact:  (1) knowing that the other 
person did not consent to the placement of the image on the 
Internet, and (2) under circumstances in which the other person 
had a reasonable expectation that the image would be kept private. 
(D) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor 
and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding [two] 
years or a fine not exceeding [five thousand dollars] or both.154 
 
The enacted bill now requires the intent of causing emotional 
distress to the victim—similar to the California revenge pornography 
																																																								
151. See Md. H.D. 43; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 372–74. 
152. See Citron & Franks, supra note 3 at 372–74. 
153. Md. H.D. 43; MD. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL & POLICY NOTE, H.D. 
43, Reg. Sess., at 5 (2014). 
154. Md. H.D. 43.  The original legislative attempt to pass Maryland revenge 
pornography legislation read:   
 For the purpose of prohibiting a person from intentionally disclosing a 
certain sexually explicit image of a certain other person, knowing that the other 
person has not consented to the disclosure; providing penalties for a violation of 
this Act; providing for the scope of this Act; providing that this Act does not affect 
any legal or equitable right or remedy otherwise provided by law; defining certain 
terms; and generally relating to the intentional disclosure of sexually explicit 
images. 
H.D. 64, 434th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014). 
90
Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/5
82 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
statute.155  The original attempt to pass revenge porn legislation only required 
that a person intentionally disclose an image, “knowing that the other person 
has not consented.”156  The enacted law has also lowered the severity of the 
crime.157  The original attempt to pass revenge porn legislation would have 
made the disclosure of sexually explicit images, without consent, a felony 
with a punishment of up to five years of jail time and a significant fine.158  
The enacted law lowered the degree of the crime to a misdemeanor.159  With 
the law being classified as a lower degree crime, it means that the punishable 
time of an offender must also be lowered.160  The Maryland law currently 
allows up to two years of jail time and, in the most serious offenses, up to a 
five thousand dollar maximum fine.161 
There is still reason for lawmakers, and the public alike, to be 
pleased with Maryland’s enacted revenge pornography statute. 162  
Lawmakers have commended the second section of the bill, which lists 
various exemptions of scenarios where the bill does not apply.163  Luckily for 
them, the second section of the statute stayed intact with only relatively 
minor changes.164  The statute provides that in certain scenarios—such as in 
any situation that involves “lawful and common practices of law 
enforcement, the reporting of unlawful conduct, or legal proceedings”—the 
statute does not apply and the act engaged in cannot be considered a criminal 
act.165  Scholars have argued that it is important for lawmakers to include 
clear exemptions like these so that the proposed statutes can avoid First 
Amendment overbreadth issues.166 
																																																								
155. Md. H.D. 43; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2014). 
156. Md. H.D. 64. 
157. Compare Md. H.D. 64, with Md. H.D. 43. 
158. Md. H.D. 64. 
159. Md. H.D. 43. 
160. See Md. H.D. 43; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 373–74 (discussing 
the different laws in states who have passed laws criminalizing revenge porn and the amount 
punishable under each statute). 
161. Md. H.D. 43. 
162. See id.; Pat Warren, Bill Signed Into Law Making Revenge Porn a 
Misdemeanor, CBS BALTIMORE LOCAL (May 15, 2014, 6:52 PM), http://Baltimore.
cbslocal.com/2014/05/15/bill-signed-into-law-making-revenge-porn-a-misdemeanor/. 
163. Md. H.D. 43; see also Warren, supra note 162. 
164. Md. H.D. 43. 
165. Id. 
166. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388. 
 Revenge porn bills should include exemptions that guard against the 
criminalization of disclosures concerning matters of public interest, such as the 
Maryland, New York, and Wisconsin bills do.  They should make clear that it is a 
crime to distribute someone’s sexually explicit images if and only if those images 
do not concern matters of public importance. . . . Such an exception would help 
reflect the state of First Amendment doctrine; it would not alleviate overbreadth 
problems. 
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V. BANNING REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY:  FLORIDA 
The fifth section of this Comment will specifically focus on the 
current state of revenge pornography legislation in Florida, and aim at 
convincing readers that revenge pornography should be criminalized in the 
state of Florida.167  Recently, both Florida House Bill 475 and Florida Senate 
Bill 532 failed to pass as law. 168   The proposed legislation aimed at 
“prohibiting an individual from disclosing a sexually explicit image of an 
identifiable person.”169  The first part of this section will outline both the 
Florida House Bill 475 and Florida Senate Bill 532.170  The second part of 
this section will discuss the suggestions of scholars who specialize in 
revenge pornography, as applied to Florida’s proposed legislation, to help 
legislative bodies draft new bills so the state can continue to move forward in 
its efforts to criminalize revenge pornography.171 
A. Proposed Legislation 
Legislation was proposed both in the Florida House of 
Representatives and the Florida Senate to criminalize revenge pornography 
in Florida.172  Unfortunately, both efforts failed.173  One issue—which will be 
discussed in the second section of this part of the Comment—is that both 
proposed bills required a showing of intent to harass the victim by posting 
the explicit images.174  The statutes do have significant differences though, 
which can be seen in the legislative text of the bills.175  Florida House Bill 
475—which died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on May 2, 2014—
reads: 
 
An act relating to the disclosure of sexually explicit 
images . . . prohibiting an individual from disclosing a sexually 
																																																																																																																																		
Id. (footnote omitted). 
167. See infra Part V.A–B. 
168. See H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Fla. 2014); CS/CS/SB 532:  Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images, FLORIDA SENATE, 
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/0532 (last visited Jan. 2, 2015); HB 475:  
Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images, FLORIDA SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/
Session/Bill/2014/0475 (last visited Jan. 2, 2015). 
169. Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
170. See infra Part V.A. 
171. See infra Part V.B. 
172. See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
173. Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; CS/CS/SB 532:  Disclosure of Sexually Explicit 
Images, supra note 168; HB 475:  Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images, supra note 168. 
174. Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; see infra Part V.B. 
175. See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
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explicit image of an identifiable person with the intent to harass 
such person if the individual knows or should have known such 
person did not consent to the disclosure. 
. . . . 
(2)  An individual may not intentionally and knowingly disclose . . 
. sexually explicit image of an identifiable person or that contains 
descriptive information in a form that conveys the personal 
identification information . . . of the person to a social networking 
service or a website, or by means of any other electronic medium, 
with the intent to harass such person, if the individual knows or 
should have known that the person depicted in . . . sexually explicit 
image did not consent to such disclosure. 
(3)(a)  Except as provided in paragraph (b), an individual who 
violates this section commits a felony of the third degree . . . . 
(b)  An individual who is [eighteen] years of age or older at the 
time he or she violates this section commits a felony of the second 
degree . . . if the violation involves a sexually explicit image of an 
individual who was younger than [sixteen] years of age at the time 
the sexually explicit image was created. 
. . . . 
(5)  This section does not apply to the disclosure of a sexually 
explicit image for: 
(a)  The reporting, investigation, and prosecution of an alleged 
crime for law enforcement purposes. 
(b)  Voluntary and consensual purposes in public or commercial 
settings.176 
 
Section (1) of the bill, which was omitted from the recopying of the 
statute into this Comment provided above, provides specific and detailed 
definitions for the terms used within the proposed statute, such as disclose, 
harass, identifiable person, and sexually explicit image.177  As stated in the 
text, the Florida House Bill makes the violation of the revenge pornography 
statute a felony.178 
Unlike the Florida House Bill, the Florida Senate Bill makes the 
offense of disclosing sexually explicit images a misdemeanor.179  Florida 
Senate Bill 532 reads: 
 
An act relating to the disclosure of sexually explicit 
images . . . prohibiting an individual from disclosing a sexually 
explicit image of an identifiable person with the intent to harass 
																																																								
176. Fla. H.R. 475 (emphasis added). 
177. Id. § 1(1)(a)–(d). 
178. Id. § 1(3)(a). 
179. Compare id., with Fla. S. 532 § 1(3)(a). 
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such person if the individual knows or should have known such 
person did not consent to the disclosure; providing criminal 
penalties . . . requiring a court to order that a person convicted of 
such offense be prohibited from having contact with the victim; 
providing criminal penalties for a violation of such order; 
providing that criminal penalties for certain offenses run 
consecutively with a sentence imposed for a violation of [specific 
provisions]. 
. . . . 
(3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), an individual who 
violates this section commits a second degree misdemeanor . . . . 
(b) An individual who is older than [eighteen] years of age at the 
time he or she violates this section commits a first degree 
misdemeanor . . . if the violation involves a sexually explicit image 
of an individual who was younger than [sixteen] years of age at the 
time the sexually explicit image was created.180 
 
The Senate-proposed bill provides specific definitions for the terms 
disclose, harass, identifiable person, and sexually explicit image as well.181  
Section 1 of the proposed legislation—intentionally left out of the recopying 
of the statute above—also specifically mentions, as the House Bill does, that 
“[a]n individual may not intentionally and knowingly disclose a sexually 
explicit image of an identifiable person to a social networking service or a 
website, or by means of any electronic medium.”182  This illustrates that both 
of the proposed statutes are trying to specifically target the rising trend of 
revenge pornography as it relates to posting these images on the Internet.183  
Unlike House of Representatives Bill 475, which placed a heftier punishment 
for violators of the statute, Senate Bill 532 provided that a violation of the 
statute would amount to a misdemeanor.184  In Florida, a misdemeanor of the 
first degree is punishable “by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding 
[one] year.”185  “A misdemeanor of the second degree [is punishable] by a 
definite term of imprisonment not exceeding [sixty] days.”186  For a felony in 
the second degree under House of Representatives Bill 475, one who 
committed the act of sharing an explicit image involving a minor without 
consent could have been punished “by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 
[fifteen] years.”187  Young adults and adults who fall in the category of 
																																																								
180. Fla. S. 532 (emphasis added). 
181. Id. § 1(1). 
182. Id. § 1(2); see also Fla. H.R. 475 § 1(2). 
183. See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
184. See Fla. H.R. 475 § 1(3); Fla. S. 532 § 1(3). 
185. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (2014). 
186. Id. § 775.082(4)(b). 
187. Id. § 775.082(3)(d); Fla. H.R. 475 § 1(3)(b). 
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violating a felony in the third degree, could have been punished “by a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding [five] years.”188  The fines that could have been 
imposed range from five thousand dollars to ten thousand dollars for the 
felonies, and five hundred dollars to one thousand dollars for the 
misdemeanors.189 
B. Scholar Suggestions 
Reviewing proposed legislation and analyzing the legislative text 
against expert advice might help legislative bodies determine why the law 
might have failed to pass. 190   At the very least, reading and analyzing 
scholars’ advice may help lawmakers draft more applicable legislation that 
has greater chances of being enacted into law, which is the ultimate goal.191  
The main problem with House of Representatives Bill 475 and Senate Bill 
532 was the malicious motive requirement.192  Both proposed bills required a 
showing of intent to harass the victim by posting the explicit images.193  
When evaluating the California revenge pornography statute—which also 
requires proof of a malicious motive that the defendants intended to inflict 
serious emotional distress upon the victim—scholars and lawmakers alike 
believed that it went too far:194 
 
Such requirements misunderstand the gravamen of the 
wrong—the disclosure of someone’s naked photographs 
without the person’s consent and in violation of their 
expectation that the image be kept private.  Whether the 
person making the disclosure is motivated by a desire to harm 
a particular person, as opposed to a desire to entertain or 
generate profit, should be irrelevant.  Malicious motive 
requirements are not demanded by the First Amendment and, 
in fact, create an unprincipled and indefensible hierarchy of 
perpetrators.  What is essential is a statute’s goal of protecting 
privacy, autonomy, and the fostering of private expression, 
which the Court has recognized as legitimate grounds for 
regulation.195 
																																																								
188. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(e), (9)(3)(d). 
189. Id. § 775.083(1)(b)–(e). 
190. See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 386–90. 
191. See id. at 386. 
192. See Fla. H.R. 475; S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); Citron & 
Franks, supra note 3, at 387. 
193. Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
194. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(4)(A) (West 2014); see also Citron & Franks, 
supra note 3, at 387. 
195. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 387. 
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Malicious motive requirements also make the case harder for 
prosecutors who must charge the offenders.196  As shown throughout this 
Comment—and through many other scholarly articles that reiterate the 
stories of victims—many are too ashamed to talk and are afraid to come 
forward with their story.197  Victims want to hide from the shame posts found 
online, not attribute their name further to the content.198 
The requirement of intent to harass the victim may also discourage 
law enforcement officers from acting when a revenge pornography victim 
comes forward.199  The issue of what constitutes harassment and when the 
violator passes the threshold to qualify the act as intending to harass, begins 
again.200  The definition of harass—provided in both House Bill 475 and 
Senate Bill 532—provides little help. 201   According to the proposed 
legislation, “‘harass’ means to engage in conduct directed at a specific 
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves 
no legitimate purpose.” 202   “Revenge porn statutes might have a better 
chance of withstanding overbreadth challenges if they require the state to 
prove that the victims suffered harm.”203  Although it might help the statute 
escape overbreadth challenges, the requirement of showing harm further 
frustrates the issue of having revenge porn victims come forward and speak 
out.204  Many victims are also afraid of what the person they are reporting 
might forward to others, and openly speak about what they have been 
through, as well as the harm that the offender has inflicted on them.205  It is 
scary for victims to come forward and openly speak about what they have 
been through as well as the harm that the offender has inflicted on them.206  
The proposed legislation did a good job of providing clear and specific 
definitions of key terms, though.207  Along with the important definitions of 
harass and sexually explicit image, Florida legislators also included a 
definition for the term disclose, which is very important in regards to revenge 
																																																								
196. Id. at 369–70; see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 243. 
197. See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 347, 358. 
198. See id. at 358. 
199. Martinez, supra note 1, at 237; see also H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Fla. 2014); S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014). 
200. See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
201. See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
202. Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
203. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388. 
204. See id. at 347. 
205. See id.; Martinez, supra note 1, at 236–37. 
206. Martinez, supra note 1, 236–37; see also Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 
367. 
207. See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
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pornography statutes.208  The legislative text defines disclose as “to publish, 
post, distribute, exhibit, advertise, offer, or transfer, or cause to be published, 
posted, distributed, exhibited, advertised, offered, or transferred.”209  This 
definition is excellent as it covers a wide range of scenarios that can 
constitute revenge pornography and does not limit the act to a specific 
transfer from one person to the other; it protects victims on a much larger 
scale. 210   The proposed legislation also contained an exemption section, 
similar to the praised section in Maryland’s revenge porn statute.211  Again, 
lawmakers favor this type of clear exemption section because it helps avoid 
First Amendment overbreadth issues.212 
Another issue the proposed legislation in Florida most likely faced is 
the extent of the penalty imposed upon violators.213 
 
 The ideal penalty for nonconsensual pornography is 
another contested issue.  If the conduct is categorized as a 
mere misdemeanor, it risks sending the message that the harm 
caused to victims is not that severe.  Such categorization also 
decreases incentives for law enforcement to dedicate the 
resources necessary to adequately investigate such conduct.  
At the same time, criminal laws that are more punitive will 
face stricter examination and possible public resistance.  
Although California’s categorization of revenge porn as a 
misdemeanor sends a weak message to would-be perpetrators 
and will be a less effective deterrent than a law like New 
Jersey’s, [which categorizes revenge porn as a felony], it may 
have aided the law’s passage.214 
 
Lawmakers need to find a median point in categorizing legislation.215  
The felony categorization of revenge pornography, with a penalty of 
anywhere between five to fifteen years of jail time—although a good 
deterrent—seems too extreme, and it casts a shadow of doubt that anybody 
would actually be charged under the statute.216  On the other hand, under the 
																																																								
208. Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388. 
209. Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
210. See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388–89. 
211. Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 372–73; see 
also MD. CODE ANN. Criminal Law § 3-809 (West 2014). 
212. See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388. 
213. See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532. 
214. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 389. 
215. See id. 
216. See id. at 389–90 (discussing the importance of penalty categorization of 
statutes, which can either make a proposed legislation successful, or be responsible for its 
death); Martinez, supra note 1, at 241. 
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proposed Senate Bill, it is possible for violators to get a sentence of up to one 
year in jail, which seems like a slap on the wrist compared to revenge porn 
statutes in other states.217  It is possible that legislators wondered if this law 
would even be worth passing, as it is not likely to deter actors, especially 
since police officers will probably not be willing to spend the needed time to 
investigate the act for such a small offense.218  Although Florida’s proposed 
legislation was a good starting point, it is clear that both bills were flawed.219 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Revenge pornography is a rising trend that today’s generation needs 
to face.220  Technological innovations have made it easier for individuals to 
share private information with others with a simple click of a button.221  For 
revenge porn victims, this private information is of the most sensitive kind—
sexually explicit images or videos of the individual.222  With the dramatic 
increase of the popularity of sexting, teenagers, and young adults are the 
main victims of revenge pornography.223  These young adults are haunted at 
a young age because of one mistake that will likely “result[] in lost jobs, lost 
relationships, lost friendships, and [possibly] physical harm.”224  Thirteen 
states have enacted revenge porn legislation and many have proposed bills in 
review.225  The efforts of Florida Legislators to enact revenge pornography 
have sadly failed, but lawmakers cannot stop trying.226  This Comment has 
proven the rise in the number of acts leading to revenge pornography, has 
shown the harms of revenge pornography faced by victims, and has analyzed 
legislation in other states which may be of help preparing the next set of 
proposed legislation. 227   The Florida Legislature’s attempts at enacting 
revenge pornography were commendable, and the state continues to move 
forward during this groundbreaking era in an effort to join other states in 
																																																								
217. Fla. S. 532; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (2014); Citron & Franks, 
supra note 3, at 389. 
218. See Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 361, 389. 
219. See H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); Fla. S. 532; Citron & 
Franks, supra note 3, at 387–91. 
220. See Martinez, supra note 1, at 237; Poltash, supra note 15, at 5–6, 19. 
221. See Martinez, supra note 1, at 237–38, 245. 
222. Id. at 245. 
223. Id. at 251. 
224. Id. 
225. Franks, supra note 6, at 3; see also Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 371. 
226. See H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Fla. 2014); Kay, supra note 21. 
227. See supra Parts II–V. 
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criminalizing this disgraceful act.228  “On July 30, 2014, the Miami Beach 
Commission unanimously voted to pass a resolution urging the Florida 
[L]egislature to enact legislation criminalizing . . . revenge 
porn[ography].”229  The resolution was passed with the aid of Miami-Dade 
Florida Association for Women Lawyers, whose main “mission [includes] 
mak[ing] Florida the next state on [the] list” of the thirteen states that have 
already passed revenge porn legislation.230   It is impossible to draft the 
perfect statute, but legislators could take the advice of experts and scholars in 
the field of cyber harassment to help enact better revenge pornography 
statutes that will provide victims with more protection, and will succeed at 
becoming law.231 
																																																								
228. Kay, supra note 21; see also Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, 
supra note 3, at 371. 
229. Press Release, Fla. Ass’n for Women Lawyers Miami-Dade Chapter, With 
the Help of Miami-Dade FAWL, Miami Beach Comm’n Unanimously Votes to Pass 
Resolution Urging Fla. Legislature to Criminalize “Revenge Porn” (July 30, 2014), available 
at http://mdfawl.org/miami-beach-revenge-porn-resolution/; see also Kay, supra note 21. 
230. Press Release, Fla. Ass’n for Women Lawyers Miami-Dade Chapter, 
supra note 229. 
231. See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 386, 390–91. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The digital after life1 has quickly become the brave new world of 
probate law and estate planning.2  The reason for this is because as recently 
as 2010, reports show that “[seventy-seven percent] of Americans use e-mail 
or the [I]nternet, at least occasionally.”3  Yet, a similar study now reveals 
that number has increased to show that eighty-seven percent of American 
adults are now using the Internet.4  More significantly, while nearly nine out 
of ten Americans from the ages of eighteen through forty-five use the 
Internet,5 ninety-seven percent of young adults ages eighteen through 
twenty-nine are regularly using the Internet.6  The Internet has become so 
prevalent in society that fifty-nine percent of young adults ages eighteen 
through twenty-nine cite the Internet as their primary source for news, both 
nationally and internationally.7  Furthermore, research shows that nearly 
eight out of ten young adults ages eighteen through twenty-four “have 
created their own social networking profile.”8  With this expanding 
popularity, words like selfie and social media have now been deeply 
ingrained in our language,9 and it seems like social networking, e-mail, and 
microblogging are here to stay;10 unfortunately, we are not.11  Therefore, this 
                                                     
1. Dana Parks, Digital After Life—Social Media and the Deceased, SAN 
DIEGO BURIAL AT SEA (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.sandiegoburialatsea.com/digital-after-life/. 
2. See Caitlin Dewey, What Happens to Your Facebook When You Die?, 
WASH. POST (May 7, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/
2014/05/07/what-happens-to-your-facebook-when-you-die/. 
3. PEW RES. CTR., MILLENNIALS:  CONFIDENT.  CONNECTED.  OPEN TO 
CHANGE., 27 (Paul Taylor & Scott Keeter eds., 2010), available at http:/
/www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-connected-open-to-change.pdf. 
4. PEW RES. CTR., THE WEB AT 25 IN THE U.S.: THE OVERALL VERDICT:  THE 
INTERNET HAS BEEN A PLUS FOR SOCIETY AND AN ESPECIALLY GOOD THING FOR INDIVIDUAL 
USERS 5 (2014), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/the-web-at-25-in-the-u-
s/. 
5. See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 3, at 19, 27. 
6. PEW RES.CTR., supra note 4, at 5. 
7. See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 3, at 35. 
8. Id. at 29. 
9. Selfie Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/selfie (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (selfie was first used in 2002 and 
emphasizes the recent impact social networking has had on our culture); Social Media 
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/socialmedia 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2014). 
10. See Dan Newman, 6 Reasons Social Media Is Your Secret Weapon in 
Customer Service, ENTREPRENEUR (May 5, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/233612. 
11. See Estate Planning:  Protecting Your Digital Assets, ALLY BANK (May 9, 
2014, 9:00 AM), http://community.ally.com/straight-talk/estate-planning-your-digital-assets/. 
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continually debated legal question still exists:  What happens to our digital 
assets when we die?12 
There is already an excellent foundation of legal discussion 
developed around how digital property should be managed,13 what should 
happen to an owner’s social media account when they die,14 as well as how a 
Uniform Act may help state legislatures address the disposition of digital 
property.15  This Comment will expand on this discussion by exploring how 
some states, the Uniform Act, and other legal scholars have attempted to 
address this legal issue in order to provide the groundwork for how the 
Florida Legislature can effectively and fairly govern digital estate planning, 
while staying ahead of the ever-increasing role that technology and social 
media plays in our lives.16  Part II of this Comment will provide a general 
overview of the types of digital assets and the problems that may arise when 
digital assets become things of value.17  Part III will outline the existing state 
legislative solutions and consider to what extent the Uniform Act provides 
for digital estate planning, and examine the possible issues that follow.18  
Part IV will discuss traditional estate planning in Florida and its silence in 
addressing the fiduciaries’ responsibilities to maintain and administer the 
decedent’s digital estate.19  Lastly, this Comment will conclude with 
recommendations on how the Florida Legislature can improve on the current 
legislative solutions and develop a sound foundation, keeping pace with the 
ever changing technological world, and the legal issues arising out of digital 
estate planning.20 
                                                     
12. Id. 
13. See James D. Lamm et al., The Digital Death Conundrum:  How Federal 
and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries from Managing Digital Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
385, 391–396 (2014). 
14. Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1644 (2012); 
Damien McCallig, Note, Facebook After Death:  An Evolving Policy in a Social Network, 22 
INT’L. J.L. & INFO. TECH. 107, 108 (2014); Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our 
Facebook Accounts When We Die?:  Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media 
Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 186 (2012). 
15. Samantha D. Haworth, Note, Laying Your Online Self to Rest:  Evaluating 
the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 535, 542 (2014). 
16. See discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
17. See discussion infra Part II. 
18. See discussion infra Part III. 
19. See discussion infra Part IV. 
20. See discussion infra Part V. 
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II. HOW SOCIAL MEDIA BECOMES A DIGITAL ASSET 
Seeing how the use of social media, online banking, e-mail, gaming, 
and blogging accounts are growing at an astounding rate,21 there should not 
be any surprise in the contemporaneous rise in legal questions.22  Some 
reports estimate that by 2018, social networking accounts will increase from 
3.6 billion to over 5.2 billion.23  One of the first social media platforms that 
turned online sharing into a big business for its creative users and its 
advertisers was YouTube.24  Some of YouTube’s most popular user accounts 
boast upwards of one million dollars in revenue a year and over a billion 
views worldwide.25 
While the popularity of these sites and accounts rise, so does its 
value to their users.26  One such social media platform, Vine, is also a social 
media website that allows “millions of people [to] post [six]-second clips and 
share them with the community.”27  Although Vine is only a year old, the 
platform has generated enormous popularity with teens, young adults, and 
advertisers.28  There are several Vine Stars29 that have gained millions of 
followers.30  These social media celebrities use their pages as substantial 
sources of income and in some cases can make upwards of two thousand 
                                                     
21. Computer & Internet Trends in America, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 3, 
2014), http://www.census.gov/library/infographics/computer_2014.html; Internet Usage and 
Population Growth, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/us.htm 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2014); e.g., Facebook Reports Second Quarter 2014 Results, FACEBOOK 
(July 23, 2014), http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=861599.  Facebook 
reported over 1.32 billion monthly active users, “an increase of [fourteen percent] year-over-
year.”  Id. 
22. Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 387; Sherry, supra note 14, at 187. 
23. THE RADICATI GRP., INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2014–2018 4 (Sara 
Radicati ed., 2014). 
24. See About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2014). 
25. Harrison Jacobs, We Ranked YouTube’s Biggest Stars by How Much 
Money They Make, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 10, 2014, 9:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
richest-youtube-stars-2014-3?op=1. 
26. See Alyson Shontell, Meet the Stars of Vine:  These Kids Have Millions of 
Followers and Make Eye-Popping Amounts of Money, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2014, 11:48 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/vine-stars-2014-3. 
27. Id. 
28. See id. 
29. Id. 
30. Jeff Beer, Vine Star Logan Paul Brings His Six-Second Creativity to New 
Hanes Campaign, FAST COMPANY (July 20, 2014, 8:14 PM), http://www.fastcocreate.com/
3033265/vine-star-logan-paul-brings-his-six-second-creativity-to-new-hanes-campaign; 
Shontell, supra note 26. 
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dollars per re-Vine.31  Therefore, social media accounts can become so 
popular that they generate businesses within themselves, drive revenue, and 
become digital assets of their own.32 
Surprisingly, on average, an everyday individual’s digital assets are 
worth thirty-five thousand dollars to fifty-five thousand dollars.33  There is 
no doubt that a digital asset can have real value.34  There are several 
examples where digital assets can hold intellectual property rights, earn 
revenue from advertisers, and even put a price on digital avatars in video 
games.35  World of Warcraft is a gaming platform that has users purchase 
online weapons, virtual resorts, and gaming currency through the digital 
realm with real money.36  Several of World of Warcraft users have accounts 
with avatars that are part of an online gaming community and worth 
thousands of dollars.37 
Furthermore, no one will deny the sentimental value that certain 
digital media can have.38  Photos, e-mails, instant messages, and other 
personal information could be some of the most important assets a family 
will have after their loved one passes.39  This is becoming increasingly 
noteworthy because more and more memorabilia are uploaded to a computer 
or digital archive rather than physically placed in a photobook.40  Thus, 
digital property can be important to protect and plan for, even if there is no 
financial value.41 
Undoubtedly, the first step would require us to properly define 
digital assets and their characteristics.42 
 
                                                     
31. Shontell, supra note 26.  A re-Vine is where a user shares a sponsor’s 
video simply by pressing the re-Vine button, and the user would be compensated for sharing 
that video with his or her followers.  See id. 
32. See Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 389–90; Shontell, supra note 26. 
33. Ashley Watkins, Comment, Digital Properties and Death:  What Will 
Your Heirs Have Access to After You Die?, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 193, 195, (2014); Evan Carroll, 
How Much Are Your Digital Assets Worth? About $35,000, DIGITAL BEYOND (July 24, 2014), 
http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2014/07/how-much-are-your-digital-assets-worth-about-
35000/. 
34. See Watkins, supra note 33, at 194–95. 
35. Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 389–90. 
36. See id. at 390. 
37. See id.; Watkins, supra note 33, at 195. 
38. Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 390–91. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 391. 
41. Id. 
42. See John Romano, A Working Definition of Digital Assets, DIGITAL 
BEYOND (Sept. 1, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2011/09/a-working-
definition-of-digital-assets/. 
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[While] [t]he phrase digital asset is being used . . . we have yet to 
come to a legally-accepted definition.  A simple definition is that a 
digital asset is content owned by an individual that is stored in 
digital form.  But this may not be broad enough to encompass all 
the digital elements of an estate that have value.  An expanded 
definition includes online accounts. 
So a more inclusive definition is that a digital asset is 
digitally stored content or an online account owned by an 
individual.43 
 
Thus, when considering whether the account or its content is a 
digital asset, we have to determine its “value . . . in the connections to other 
online accounts or the money making potential.”44  The digital content, 
which could be categorized as a digital asset, includes “images, photos, 
videos, and text files.”45  Digital assets could be stored locally on the 
individual’s computer or can be accessed through the cloud.46  Furthermore, 
“[s]ome online accounts can be considered assets in and of themselves and 
have value to [the] estate;” these include the aforementioned social media 
profiles and e-mail accounts.47  While there are several different types of 
digital files, each may be considered “intangible, personal property, as long 
as they stay digital.”48 
Generally, property can be separated into two categories:  Real 
property and personal property.49  The significance of whether or not they 
stay digital can be an important distinction, because once a digital file such 
as a photo is printed, it becomes tangible personal property.50  Interestingly, 
over ninety-three percent of Americans are misinformed about what will 
happen to their digital assets when they die.51  For this reason, it would be 
helpful to briefly discuss the different types of digital assets.52 
                                                     
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Romano, supra note 42. 
48. Id. 
49. Nathan J. Dosch & Joseph W. Boucher, E-Legacy:  Who Inherits Your 
Digital Assets?, WIS. LAW., Dec. 2010, available at http://www.wisbar.org/
newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?volume=83&issue=12&articleid=1907. 
50. See Romano, supra note 42. 
51. Evan Carroll, 93 Percent of Americans Unaware or Misinformed About 
Digital Assets, DIGITAL BEYOND (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:54 PM), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/
2014/04/93-percent-of-americans-unaware-or-misinformed-about-digital-assets/. 
52. Sherry, supra note 14, at 193–96; see also discussion infra Part II.A. 
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A. Pick Your Poison:  The Types of Digital Assets and Digital Accounts 
The reason for categorizing digital assets and digital accounts is 
because each shares—at least on some level—an interconnectedness that is 
unparalleled in respect to other types of property.53  It is important, however, 
to note that there are differences between digital assets and digital accounts, 
because the overlaps between the two often cause them to be used 
interchangeably.54  Although the two blend together in discussion, they may 
be treated differently under the law.55  Most, if not all, social media accounts 
require an e-mail account to act as a backup for password changes and direct 
communication to the user.56  Thus, e-mail is a fundamental piece to this 
digital asset issue, as most users access most of their other accounts through 
this service as well.57 
Evan Carroll, co-founder of the Digital Beyond Blog—which 
heavily influences this article and is a leading online resource for legal 
discussion dealing with one’s digital estate—identifies “at least five types of 
digital assets.”58  While this Comment will include the five digital assets 
defined by Carroll, there are some other types of assets that would be helpful 
if briefly discussed as well.59  The first is devices and data, which is the 
decedent’s actual computer as well as what can be stored on it.60  The second 
is e-mail, which includes continued access to the account and the messages 
stored within them.61  Digital media accounts are third, and are an important 
distinction from e-mail accounts because these are an expanding field of 
digital assets, which include music, eBooks, apps, movies, and other forms 
of digital media.62  The fourth type is cloud storage accounts, which are 
online databases that store digital assets online.63  The fifth type, financial 
                                                     
53. See Sherry, supra note 14, at 193–94. 
54. Watkins, supra note 33, at 198–99.  This Comment also uses the term 
digital asset interchangeably with digital account for the purpose of simplicity, but does 
recognize the importance of distinguishing between the two.  Id. at 199. 
55. Id. at 199. 
56. Sherry, supra note 14, at 196. 
57. See id. 
58. Id. at 194 (emphasis in original); see also Evan E. Carroll et al., Helping 
Clients Reach Their Great Digital Beyond, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Sept. 1, 2011), http://
www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/helping-clients-reach-their-great-digital-
beyond-0. 
59. Sherry, supra note 14, at 194–96; see also Watkins, supra note 33, at 198–
200; infra Parts A.1–7. 
60. Sherry, supra note 14, at 194–95. 
61. Id. at 195. 
62. Watkins, supra note 33, at 206. 
63. Id. at 211. 
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accounts, includes online banking, retirement, and insurance policies.64  
Another to consider are business accounts.65  While these assets are a type of 
online account, some personal businesses are run through accounts, like 
eBay, and present separate difficulties of their own.66  Lastly, the final type 
of accounts to be discussed are social media accounts and, while they are a 
type of online account, they are a central focus to this Comment and require 
a more in-depth analysis.67 
1. Devices and Data 
Devices are easily recognized as the physical computer or other 
tangible property—such as an external hard drive or flash drive—where 
several digital files can be stored.68  These devices can and are normally 
“‘distributed as part of the estate.’”69  Therefore, what separates digital assets 
from the devices and data discussion is that e-mail, social media, business, 
and financial accounts are “stored beyond [the] individual’s personal 
devices.”70 
2. E-mail 
E-mail has been referred to as the “crossover between local and 
cloud-based storage” systems.71  The service is used for a variety of reasons 
including business and personal communication with people all over the 
world.72  Oftentimes, important aspects of the decedent’s life can be found in 
his or her e-mail—including bills and other personal information—which 
stresses the importance of having continued access to these accounts.73  
Although content in e-mail ranges from personal photos and financial 
records to intimate private conversations, it represents a real value and 
deserves to be protected and managed like any other property.74 
                                                     
64. Id. at 200. 
65. Id. at 212–13. 
66. Id. 
67. See Sherry, supra note 14, at 198; infra Part II.A.7. 
68. Sherry, supra note 14, at 197. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See Watkins, supra note 33, at 202. 
73. See Justin Atwater, Who Owns E-Mail?  Do You Have the Right to Decide 
the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 397, 399. 
74. See id. at 399–401. 
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3. Digital Media 
A decedent’s digital media collection can include a wide variety of 
things.75  A common example would be a decedent’s iTunes account or 
Amazon Kindle.76  Worth noting, however, iTunes only provides the user a 
license for its product and is generally nontransferable.77  The first sale 
doctrine in copyright law permits a lawful owner of a CD or book to sell this 
material item.78  While this applies for a material copy, the digital copies of 
those same songs or books may not be so easily disposed of.79  Even with 
this restriction, there are other examples of digital media accounts—like 
ReDigi—that allow digital songs and media to be sold or transferred on their 
marketplace.80  There has recently been a movement by larger companies to 
follow suit and join the selling and transfer of digital media, including iTunes 
and Amazon.81  This area of digital assets is growing, and with the transition 
from license to a digital media market, the future of these accounts becomes 
more uncertain.82 
4. Cloud Storage Accounts 
There are several new online accounts that offer storage in the 
cloud.83  The appeal to storing media, documents, and other files in the cloud 
is because these files can be accessed by several different devices, as long as 
there is an internet connection.84  More popular examples of these types of 
accounts include, “DropBox, SkyDrive, iCloud, or the Amazon Cloud 
Drive.”85  Cloud storage accounts create similar problems as other digital 
accounts for fiduciaries, including their ability to find these accounts and 
these accounts limiting the accounts’ access and transferability in their terms 
of service (“TOS”).86  As one scholar notes, “iCloud actually addresses death 
specifically with a ‘No Right of Survivorship’ clause.  This clause states that 
‘[y]ou agree that your [a]ccount is non-transferable . . . .  Upon receipt of a 
                                                     
75. Watkins, supra note 33, at 206. 
76. See Jim Lamm, What Happens to Your Apple iTunes Music, Videos, and 
eBooks When You Die?, DIGITAL PASSING (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.digitalpassing.com/
2012/09/04/apple-itunes-music-videos-ebooks-die/. 
77. Id. at 207; see also Watkins, supra note 33, at 207. 
78. Lamm, supra note 76. 
79. See Watkins, supra note 33, at 206–07. 
80. Id. at 208. 
81. See id. at 209. 
82. Id. at 210. 
83. See id. at 211. 
84. See Watkins, supra note 33, at 211. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
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copy of a death certificate your [a]ccount may be terminated and all [c]ontent 
within your [a]ccount deleted.’”87  Depending on the account, it seems like 
these storage accounts—which may hold very important data such as 
unpublished works, or personal communications—may not be able to be 
accessed by the fiduciary or passed on to the decedent’s heirs.88 
5. Financial Accounts 
Seemingly more familiar types of accounts are banking and 
retirement accounts, which fall under the umbrella of financial accounts.89  
Historically, these did not pose much of a problem because being able to 
identify and access these accounts would mean waiting for the decedent’s 
mail to come:  1) showing that the account exists and where to find it; and 2) 
making it less difficult to get a court order to access the account.90  However, 
recently more and more banking has gone paperless and the new age of 
online banking makes managing expenses more convenient for the user, but 
can cause a major problem for their heirs.91  Aside from being able to locate 
these accounts, accessing them can be near impossible without having the 
passwords or identification numbers.92  One benefit to a financial banking 
account is that it is governed by the state law where the decedent lived, and 
legislation may help with accessing the account from the bank or business, 
which maintains the account.93 
6. Business Accounts 
Certain accounts, such as eBay, PayPal, Amazon, and many of the 
previously mentioned digital accounts, can be part of a decedent’s business.94  
Some individuals may have developed and established a trusted eBay 
account.95  Some lawyers may even keep client files in a Dropbox-type 
service for their ease of sharing with partners.96  Even a domain name may 
                                                     
87. Id.; iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/
icloud/en/terms.html (last updated Oct. 20, 2014). 
88. See Watkins, supra note 33, at 211. 
89. Id. at 200. 
90. See id. at 200–01. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 201. 
93. Watkins, supra note 33, at 201–02. 
94. See id. at 213. 
95. Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-line, PROBATE & PROPERTY, July–Aug. 
2011, at 36, 37. 
96. Id. 
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be considered a business account that would qualify as a digital asset.97  
While the same problems could potentially arise if a decedent used these 
accounts for personal use, the fact that it is a business account creates a 
different set of possible issues for the decedent’s heirs and fiduciary.98  For 
example, under Florida law, it is the personal representative’s fiduciary 
responsibility to maintain and efficiently manage the decedent’s estate.99  
Therefore, the fiduciary would have to ensure that the business is maintained, 
and the only way this would be possible is if the personal representative of 
the estate knew about the business account and was able to access it.100 
7. Social Media Accounts 
The popularity of social media accounts is uncontested.101  Billions 
of people are utilizing websites, like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Myspace, 
Pinterest, and countless others, to post the most intimate details of their 
personal lives on the internet.102  These websites allow users to create 
accounts and develop personal profiles tailored just for them.103  The ability 
to then share these profiles with friends, family, and your fifth grade science 
teacher gives social media a defining feature.104  Social media has become so 
popular that a recent study has shown that ninety-two percent of children in 
the United States have an online presence by the age of two.105  On average, 
a social media user at age thirty already has a digital fingerprint that can span 
back fifteen years.106  One of the most important aspects of social media is 
that it is increasingly popular amongst teens and young adults.107  This is a 
considerable fact because most young adults may not draft a will in time to 
properly plan for their estate.108  The fact that so many young adults are 
                                                     
97. Id. 
98. Watkins, supra note 33, at 212–13. 
99. FLA. STAT. § 733.602(1) (2014). 
100. See Watkins, supra note 33, at 212–13. 
101. See Sherry, supra note 14, at 199–200; Watkins, supra note 33, at 203. 
102. Watkins, supra note 33, at 203–04. 
103. See Sherry, supra note 14, at 199–200. 
104. See Watkins, supra note 33, at 204. 
105. Jeff Bertolucci, Nine of Ten U.S. Kids Have Online Presence by Age Two, 
Study Says, PC WORLD (Oct. 7, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/207225/
nine_of_ten_us_kids_have_online_presence_by_age_two_study.html. 
106. Id. (“[T]he vast majority of children today will have online presence by 
the time they are two-years-old—a presence that will continue to build throughout their whole 
lives.”). 
107. See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 3, at 29. 
108. See Assoc. Press, Dealing with the Digital Afterlife, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH (July 17, 2014, 8:25AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/business/dealing-with-the-
digital-afterlife/article_773fa594-0dad-11e4-af88-001a4bcf6878.html. 
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accumulating vast digital estates and are not properly planning for their 
future is what creates so much confusion for their heirs, their fiduciary, and 
the law once they die.109 
As it may already be apparent, and although this Comment will later 
discuss the subject, the distinction between personal and intangible property 
can make a substantial difference because, “[d]epending upon the law in 
your jurisdiction, this distinction . . . may have significant implications on 
how clients grant executors access to these assets, what control the executor 
has over these assets, and over the probate process itself.”110  As briefly 
mentioned earlier, a major problem to consider is the need for the fiduciary 
to identify, locate, and access assets that are only available through digital 
means such as e-mail or other online servers.111  Other potential obstacles to 
consider mentioned earlier—although slightly outside the scope of this 
Comment—are copyright concerns.112  More importantly, if a fiduciary is 
successful in accessing a particular digital asset, the fiduciary could come 
across a host of other legal problems attempting to transfer the digital 
asset.113 
B. Terms of Service:  The Social Media Contract 
The access and transferability of a digital asset incorporates different 
aspects of property, contract, and probate law.114  An agreement between 
online services and their users is “almost always governed by a contract of 
adhesion.”115  The issues derive from the contractual agreement between the 
user and the Internet service provider (“ISP”).116  Normally, for the user to 
acquire a license for the service provided by the ISP, the user must adhere to 
                                                     
109. See Jessica Hopper, Digital Afterlife:  What Happens to Your Online 
Accounts When You Die?, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2012, 7:53 AM), http://
rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/01/11995859-digital-afterlife-what-happens-to-your-
online-accounts-when-you-die?lite.  Cahn explains: 
‘When somebody dies, the person who is responsible for taking care of 
the individual’s asset is supposed to be complying with what the individual wanted 
and protecting the individual,’ Cahn said.  ‘Because so many people have not 
thought about this, we don’t know what the person actually wanted . . . we can all 
imagine what’s in internet accounts.  There may certainly be cases where the person 
who died would not have wanted anyone to get anywhere near the person’s 
account.’ 
Id. (alteration in original). 
110. Romano, supra note 42; see also infra Part III. 
111. Romano, supra note 42; see also supra Part II.A.6. 
112. Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; see also supra Part II.A.3. 
113. Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49. 
114. Id. 
115. Sherry, supra note 14, at 204. 
116. Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49. 
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the TOS.117  In many instances, the TOS do not specify what will happen to 
the account upon the user’s death.118  Additionally, TOS often include 
language that makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to allow the user to 
transfer their account to someone else, or even allow another person to 
access their account.119  Therefore, the TOS may prevent a fiduciary from 
being able to transfer or access the account.120  Herein lies the primary 
question surrounding how a fiduciary can access a legitimate digital asset of 
a decedent when the contract that the decedent originally agreed to did not 
grant fiduciary access.121 
More often than not, the user typically scans through “several 
screens worth of legalese, and then registers by clicking [on] a box and 
agreeing to the terms therein.”122  These terms—although they qualify as a 
contract of adhesion—are routinely held up by the courts and are 
enforceable.123  The TOS often dictate the law that is binding to the 
agreement, but the question of which law would supersede the other is 
unclear.124 
While there is opportunity throughout social media, some platforms 
have recently come across controversy in regard to who owns the rights to 
the videos and pictures users post.125  The language in the TOS agreement on 
Instagram raised many questions in regard to what license Instagram had 
with its users’ pictures.126  The platform updated its TOS the very next 
                                                     
117. Id.; see also Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last updated Nov. 15, 2013). 
118. Sherry, supra note 14, at 204. 
119. Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; see also Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, supra note 117. 
120. Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; see also Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, supra note 117. 
121. Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; see also Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, supra note 117. 
122. Sherry, supra note 14, at 204–05. 
123. Id. at 205. 
124. See id. (“Given that not all users are situated in California, then, ‘[i]t’s 
questionable whether the estate laws of a decedent’s resident state would supersede the 
contractual agreements with the various online services,’ irrespective of legislation 
specifically addressing social-media assets.”); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra 
note 117. 
125. See Declan McCullagh, Instagram Says It Now Has the Right to Sell Your 
Photos, CNET (Dec. 17, 2012, 9:54 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/instagram-says-it-now-
has-the-right-to-sell-your-photos/. 
126. See Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ 
before–January-14-2013 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).  The TOS which caused the controversy 
state: 
 Instagram does not claim any ownership rights in the text, files, images, 
photos, video, sounds, musical works, works of authorship, applications, or any 
other materials—collectively, Content—that you post on or through the Instagram 
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day.127  The new TOS give Instagram the license to use a user’s content 
“[s]ubject to your profile and privacy settings, [therefore], any User Content 
that you make public [and] searchable by [another] User[] [is] subject to use 
under . . . Instagram API.”128  Instagram’s TOS also “reserve the right to 
refuse access to the [s]ervice to anyone for any reason at any time,”129 
leading to a host of other potential legal questions.130 
Facebook purchased Instagram for a cool one billion dollars in 
2012.131  Facebook is by far the most popular social media platform on the 
Internet, boasting an average of over 829 million daily active users.132  Even 
with such a position, Facebook is another social media platform that has 
shared in some controversy over their TOS.133  One recent feature, in 
particular, that has aroused some serious questions is how an individual’s 
account will be managed, if at all, after death.134  This feature, called 
memorializing, is supposed to lock a deceased person’s account and keep 
anyone from logging into it.135  Although Facebook maintains this is to 
                                                                                                                             
Services.  By displaying or publishing—posting—any Content on or through the 
Instagram Services, you hereby grant to Instagram a non-exclusive, fully paid and 
royalty-free, worldwide, limited license to use, modify, delete from, add to, 
publicly perform, publicly display, reproduce and translate such Content, including 
without limitation distributing part or all of the Site in any media formats through 
any media channels, except Content not shared publicly—private—will not be 
distributed outside the Instagram Services. 
Id. 
127. See McCullagh, supra note 125; Alia Papageorgiou, Instagram Will Own 
Your Photos Starting Jan. 16 2013, NEW EUROPE (Dec. 19, 2012, 18:16), 
http://www.neurope.eu/article/instagram-will-own-your-photos-starting-jan-16-2013; Kevin 
Systrom, Updated Terms of Service Based on Your Feedback, INSTAGRAM, 
http://blog.instagram.com/post/38421250999/updated-terms-of-service-based-on-your-
feedback (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
128. Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/ 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
129. Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
130. See Lamm et. al., supra note 13, at 386–87. 
131. Evelyn M. Rusli, Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 9, 2012, 2:02 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/facebook-buys-instagram-
for-1-billion/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
132. Facebook Reports Second Quarter 2014 Results, supra note 21. 
133. Sherry, supra note 14, at 204–05. 
134. See Hopper, supra note 109; How Do I Report a Deceased Person or an 
Account That Needs to be Memorialized?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/150486848354038 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). 
135. How Do I Report a Deceased Person or an Account that Needs to be 
Memorialized?, supra note 134. 
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protect the privacy of the deceased and their family and friends, there have 
been some setbacks.136 
Facebook has also been involved in litigation as a result of its 
TOS.137  After the suicide of Benjamin, Helen and Jay Stassen, the parents of 
the departed, began intense litigation to gain access to their son’s Facebook 
and e-mail accounts.138  Because of its policy, Facebook maintains that it will 
not allow access by giving out the password to a dead person’s account.139  
Although a local judge ordered Facebook to allow the parents of the 
decedent access to his account, Facebook currently has not complied and 
legally can appeal the decision.140  Facebook’s TOS restricts its users from 
sharing their password with anyone else.141  Facebook’s TOS also restricts 
the user from transferring their account to anyone without explicitly getting 
permission in writing.142  If there is any violation of “the letter or spirit of 
this [s]tatement, . . . we can stop providing all or part of Facebook to you.”143 
One of the biggest concerns facing the loved ones left behind is often 
trying to figure out what the deceased wanted to do with their social media 
accounts.144  In most cases, “people [do not even] think about what will 
happen to their online accounts when they die.”145  Internet companies also 
take the position that users have a certain expectation of privacy and craft 
their TOS to represent this.146  Unlike other online banking accounts that 
users expect to be passed on when they die, social media accounts are 
expected to be memorialized or deleted.147 
While social media is in the midst of growing pains that are posing 
their own set of problems, other types of online assets have had a chance to 
grow out of their infancy.148  Google provides an e-mail service called 
Gmail, whose TOS states that it will, in certain circumstances, release 
                                                     
136. See Evan Carroll, Deceased Man Returns on Facebook, DIGITAL BEYOND 
(July 21, 2014), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2014/07/deceased-man-returns-on-
facebook/; Hopper, supra note 109; How Do I Report a Deceased Person or an Account that 
Needs to be Memorialized?, supra note 134. 
137. Hopper, supra note 109. 
138. Id. 
139. See id. 
140. Id. 
141. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 117. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Hopper, supra note 109. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. See id. (“According to Google’s web site [sic], in rare cases, they may 
provide the content of a deceased person’s account to an authorized representative of the 
person.”). 
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information through the “legal process or enforceable governmental 
request.”149  Yahoo, on the other hand, has recently changed its policy to 
align similarly with other e-mail service providers due to one of the most 
discussed and often cited cases of digital assets and ownership rights.150 
Justin Ellsworth, a trained demolition expert for the United States 
Marines, was killed in Al Anbar, Iraq while inspecting a roadside bomb.151  
Justin utilized e-mail as a primary means to communicate with his friends 
and family.152  However, Justin died intestate with no spouse or child, 
leaving his parents as next of kin.153  Justin’s father, John, then attempted to 
retrieve Justin’s e-mails from Yahoo, but the ISP initially refused to comply 
with his request.154  At the time, Yahoo’s TOS did not allow the company to 
provide “e-mail passwords to anyone [except] for the account holder.”155  
John argued under the theory that e-mail accounts are personal property and 
should pass just like other property through intestacy laws.156  Yahoo would 
eventually concede, but not before conditioning their compliance with a 
court order that would require them to provide Justin’s father with the e-
mails.157  Yahoo delivered the contents of Justin’s e-mail to his father John in 
a CD despite the fact that Yahoo refused to change its policy prohibiting the 
ISP from disclosing their users’ e-mails.158 
This case highlights the difficulty and uncertainty surrounding 
digital assets of the deceased and the TOS of the service providers.159  Some 
experts suggest that the real legal battle will be between the “[TOS] 
declaring that users have no right of survivorship, and newly enacted state 
laws like Oklahoma’s, declaring that social-media accounts may pass like 
tangible property to beneficiaries and heirs.”160  This conflict, as previously 
discussed, touches on several issues with state laws and the TOS which 
                                                     
149. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/
www.google.com/en/us/intl/en/policies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en.pdf (last updated 
Dec. 19, 2014). 
150. Sherry, supra note 14, at 198; see also Privacy Policy, YAHOO, https://
info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/ (last updated Sept. 25, 2014). 
151. Sherry, supra note 14, at 214. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id.; Stefanie Olsen, Yahoo Releases E-mail of Deceased Marine, CNET 
(Apr. 21, 2005, 12:39 PM), http://news.cnet.com/yahoo-releases-e-mail-of-deceased-
marine/2100-1038_3-5680025.html. 
155. Olsen, supra note 154. 
156. Sherry, supra note 14, at 214. 
157. Id. 
158. Olsen, supra note 154. 
159. See id. 
160. Sherry, supra note 14, at 215 (referencing a February 1, 2012 telephone 
interview with Evan Carroll, Co-founder of The Digital Beyond blog). 
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dictate what law governs their terms.161  Couple this with the fact that there is 
little to no case law to help structure these new legislative attempts to remedy 
the digital asset uncertainty creates more questions than answers for the 
decedents’ families.162 
III. HITS AND MISSES:  HOW SOME LEGISLATURES FELL BEHIND THE 
TECHNOLOGY 
There are currently seven states that have enacted laws specifically 
designed to help fiduciaries manage online accounts.163  Several other states, 
including Florida, are currently in the process of introducing legislation that 
will consider and address fiduciary access to digital access.164  While these 
are the first attempts at state legislatures creating answers for the digital asset 
uncertainty, experts believe that several states’ digital asset “laws are too 
limited in scope.”165  On July 16, 2014, the Uniform Law Commission 
(“ULC”) passed the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act 
(“UFADAA”).166  This was the result of an ongoing effort to help guide 
fiduciaries and provide access to digital assets so that they can properly 
administer the decedent’s estate “while respecting the privacy and intent of 
the account holder.”167  The following discussion of the current state laws 
governing fiduciary access will include:  Connecticut,168 Idaho,169 Indiana,170 
Nevada,171 Oklahoma,172 Rhode Island,173 and Virginia.174 
                                                     
161. Id. at 215–16. 
162. See id. 
163. Jim Lamm, August 2013 List of State Laws and Proposals Regarding 
Fiduciary Access to Digital Property During Incapacity or After Death, DIGITAL PASSING 
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2013/08/30/august-2013-list-state-laws-
proposals-fiduciary-access-digital-property-incapacity-death/. 
164. Id. 
165. See id. 
166. Jim Lamm, Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (UFADAA), 
DIGITAL PASSING (July 16, 2014), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2014/07/16/uniform-
fiduciary-access-digital-assets-act-ufadaa/. 
167. Id. 
168. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2014). 
169. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715 (2014). 
170. IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2014). 
171. NEV. REV. STAT. § 143.188 (2014). 
172. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2014). 
173. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2014). 
174. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110 (2014). 
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A. The States 
As previously mentioned, several states have created legislation that 
is intended to help fiduciaries and their heirs deal with digital assets.175  
While state legislatures draft and implement these new laws, they must take 
into account several factors “including:  (1) passwords; (2) encryption; (3) 
federal and state criminal laws that penalize unauthorized access to 
computers and data—including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—and; 
(4) federal and state data privacy laws, including the Stored Communications 
Act.”176 
1. Connecticut 
Connecticut’s statute begins by defining an e-mail service provider 
as any person who is an intermediary between the sending and receiving of 
e-mail between users.177  The statute further defines an e-mail account as all 
electronic information that is recorded and stored as it relates to the user and 
the service provider.178  Connecticut then requires the e-mail service provider 
to provide copies of the content in the deceased user’s e-mail account so long 
as the executor of the estate can provide:  A written request for copies of the 
e-mail content, a death certificate, and “a certified copy of the certificate of 
appointment as executor or administrator;” or an order from the court of 
probate ruling that the court has jurisdiction over the estate of the 
deceased.179  The statute ends with a catch–all stating that this section will 
not require an ISP to disclose information that would conflict with applicable 
federal law.180  The most obvious restriction to this statute is that it only 
applies to e-mail and gives the fiduciary no control or instruction in regard to 
social media accounts or other types of digital assets.181  The statute is too 
limited in scope, and would need to be expanded to include assets, including 
social media.182 
                                                     
175. Lamm, supra note 163. 
176. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 2701 (2012). 
177. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a(a)(1) (2014). 
178. Id. § 45a-334a(a)(2). 
179. Id. § 45a-334a(b). 
180. Id. § 45a-334a(c). 
181. See id. § 45a-344a(a)–(c). 
182. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a(a)–(c); Lamm, supra note 163. 
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2. Idaho 
Idaho was one of the earliest states to enact legislation that grants a 
personal representative authority over digital assets.183  The Idaho statute is 
titled “Transactions Authorized for Personal Representatives: Exceptions”, 
and the only relevant language to digital assets states that the personal 
representative may “[t]ake control of, conduct, continue or terminate any 
accounts of the decedent on any social networking website, any 
microblogging or short message service website or any e-mail service 
website.”184  The statute uses clear and concise language to include several 
types of digital assets, but grants the personal representative the right to 
continue a decedent’s social networking website, which may be in direct 
conflict with certain social media accounts’ TOS.185 
3. Indiana 
Under the Indiana statute, titled “Electronically Stored Documents of 
Deceased”,186 the custodian, or individual that stores electronic documents of 
another, shall provide any information or copies of any documents upon 
written request or a certified order of the court.187  More interestingly, the 
statute also prohibits the custodian from disposing of the stored documents 
for two years after receiving the written request.188  This subsection of the 
statute may also directly conflict with the TOS of the decedent’s service 
providers.189  While the Indiana statute attempts to give broad power to the 
fiduciary’s control over the decedent’s e-mail, it does not mention social 
media or other digital assets.190 
4. Nevada 
Nevada’s statute is one of the newer legislative attempts to reign in 
the digital asset dilemma.191  Interestingly, this piece of legislation does not 
                                                     
183. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715 (2014); Sherry, supra note 14, at 216–
17. 
184. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28). 
185. See id.; e.g., iCloud Terms and Conditions, supra note 87. 
186. IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2014). 
187. Id. § 29-1-13-1.1(b)(1)–(2). 
188. Id. § 29-1-13-1.1(c). 
189. See id.; e.g., iCloud Terms and Conditions, supra note 87. 
190. See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1. 
191. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 143.188 (2014); Lamm, supra note 163. 
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attempt to grant the personal representative access to the digital asset.192  The 
statute states the following: 
[A] personal representative has the power to direct the termination 
of any account of the decedent, including, without limitation:  (a) 
[a]n account on any:  (1) [s]ocial networking Internet website; (2) 
[w]eb log service Internet website; (3) [m]icroblog service Internet 
website; [or] (4) [s]hort message service Internet website; or (5) 
[e]lectronic mail service Internet website; or (b) [a]ny similar 
electronic or digital asset of the decedent.193 
The statute, however, does not grant the personal representative 
authority to terminate a bank account.194  Lastly, the final subsection to the 
statute declares that the personal representative’s termination of the digital 
assets does not violate the TOS or contractual obligations of the decedent 
and the ISP.195 
5. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma was the first state to enact any legislation that was 
specifically designed to handle social media and the decedent’s digital assets 
in regard to estate planning and probate.196  The statute currently reads, “[t]he 
executor or administrator of an estate shall have the power, where otherwise 
authorized, to take control of, conduct, continue, or terminate any accounts 
of a deceased person on any social networking website, any microblogging 
or short message service website or any e-mail service websites.”197  While 
this has been in effect since 2010, there have not been any cases that would 
require the court to interpret the statute.198 
6. Rhode Island 
Rhode Island’s statute is very similar to Connecticut’s in that it only 
requires the ISP to provide copies of the digitally stored documents.199  
While Rhode Island’s language allows the personal representative to possibly 
                                                     
192. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 143.188. 
193. Id. § 143.188(1). 
194. Id. § 143.188(2). 
195. Id. § 143.188(3). 
196. See Sherry, supra note 14, at 216. 
197. OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2014). 
198. Sherry, supra note 14, at 216. 
199. See Watkins, supra note 33, at 221.  Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 
(2014), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2014). 
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gain access to the decedent’s e-mail, it as well is too limited in scope because 
it does not incorporate social media or any other type of digital asset.200 
7. Virginia 
Currently, Virginia’s statute has the most unique take on addressing 
the digital estate of the decedent because this statute only grants the 
“personal representative of a deceased minor[]” power to control the TOS of 
an online account.201  The Virginia statute never mentions an adult decedent, 
which will lead the court to conclude the legislative intent was only to 
address a minor’s digital estate.202  While the statute grants the personal 
representative “the power to assume the minor’s [TOS] agreement for an 
online account,” it is solely for the purpose of disclosing the contents of the 
minor’s communication pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702.203 
B. The Answer?  The Uniform Fiduciary Access To Digital Assets Act 
Fiduciaries play a vital, often unglamorous, role in probate, acting on 
behalf of deceased individuals.204  In most instances, “[f]iduciaries generally 
have the same power over assets that an absolute owner would have,” 
essentially stepping in the shoes of the decedent, even when dealing with his 
or her digital assets.205  The UFADAA is the ULC’s attempt to address 
several of the obstacles that arise for the fiduciary regarding digital assets; it 
addresses four major types of fiduciaries, and provides these fiduciaries the 
power to overcome obstacles that arise with digital estates.206  The Uniform 
Act, although complete, will need to be refined before states can begin 
considering incorporating it into their legislation.207  The question soon 
becomes:  What exactly would states be considering with this Act?208 
The Uniform Act is intended to provide a “consistent . . . framework 
to resolve conflict[] with state criminal laws, as well as supplementing 
federal criminal and civil laws.”209  The first step of the UFADAA was 
                                                     
200. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3. 
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110(A) (2014); Lamm, supra note 163. 
202. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110. 
203. Lamm, supra note 163; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 64.2-110. 
204. See Lamm, supra note 166. 
205. Id. 
206. See id. 
207. See id. 
208. See id. 
209. Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 414. 
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simply defining a digital asset as a record that is electronic.210  This broad 
definition is intended to include anything that can be stored digitally.211  
Section 4 of the Act, titled “Access by Personal Representative to Digital 
Assets of Decedent,” lays out the groundwork for the personal representative 
to have authority to access the stored electronic communication of the 
decedent; it also grants the personal representative access to “any other 
digital asset in which at death the decedent had a right or interest.”212  
Therefore, the Act is intending to permit the personal representative access to 
all of the digital assets of the decedent, unless it would be prohibited by 
applicable law.213 
In the following sections, sections 5 through 7, the UFADAA 
provides agents, conservators, and trustees the authority to manage and 
access their principal’s, protected person’s, or successor’s digital assets.214  
Section 5 is intended to establish that so long as the conservator is authorized 
by the court, he may access the protected person’s digital assets.215  Section 5 
is similar to section 4, as it also addresses the concerns of the ISP and is 
structured so that it could incorporate all forms of digital assets.216  Section 6 
establishes that unless otherwise explicitly stated in the power of attorney, 
the agent has authority over all of the principal’s digital assets.217  Following 
basic agency principles, there should not be any question as to the authority 
granted by the principal to the agent.218  Section 7 of the UFADAA deals 
with inter vivos transfers of digital assets, as well as testamentary transfers of 
digital assets, and grants authority to the trustee to access and manage the 
successor’s digital assets.219 
Section 8 is potentially the most important provision in the 
UFADAA because it provides specific authority to the fiduciary.220  In fact, 
section 8(b) nullifies several of the issues previously brought up in this 
comment regarding TOS.221  The language of section 8(b) reads:   
 
(b) Unless an account holder, after [the effective date of 
this [act]], agrees to a provision in a terms-of-service agreement 
                                                     
210. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 2(9) (2014). 
211. See id. 
212. Id. § 4(1), (3). 
213. See id. § 4. 
214. Id. §§ 5–7. 
215. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 5. 
216. See id. §§ 4–5. 
217. Id. § 6(b)(2). 
218. See id. § 6. 
219. Id. § 7. 
220. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 8. 
221. See id. § 8(b). 
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limits a fiduciary’s access to a digital asset of the account holder 
by an affirmative act separate from the account holder’s assent to 
other provisions of the agreement: 
(1) the provision is void as against the strong public policy of this 
state.222 
 
As this reads, the statute would trump any TOS agreements in light 
of the strong public policy behind enforcing the statute.223  Section 8 has 
another provision, which may be interesting if an ISP decides to enforce their 
agreed upon TOS.224  Section 8(c) provides that the “choice-of-law provision 
in a [TOS] agreement is unenforceable against a fiduciary acting under this 
[act].”225  This portion of the UFADAA is intended to follow basic probate 
law by recognizing the personal representative or other fiduciary stepping 
into the shoes of the decedent and thus, would have the “same authority as 
the account holder if the account holder were the one exercising the 
authority.”226  Although section 8 is intended to authorize fiduciary authority, 
it is carefully drafted so that it would not be in conflict with applicable law, 
such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.227 
Section 9 of the UFADAA enumerates how the fiduciary must 
properly request access to the digital assets and that compliance is necessary 
for access to digital property.228  It is important to note that section 9 is 
reinforcing the premise that the personal representative’s power is limited to 
what the original account holder would have if he still accessed the 
account.229  Section 10 absolves the potential civil liability put on ISP for 
complying with this Act; thus, section 10 provides immunity for them.230 
Ultimately, this Act, if uniformly adopted, could clear up some of 
the legal issues revolving around ISPs and their TOS.231  This Act can 
potentially relieve ISP’s need to protect themselves through their TOS by 
removing the risk involved with disclosing personal information through 
lawful requests by fiduciaries.232  Furthermore, this Act could help secure 
                                                     
222. Id. (alteration in original). 
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); see also UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL 
ASSETS ACT § 8(b). 
224. See UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 8(c). 
225. Id. (second alteration in original). 
226. Id. § 8 cmt. 
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030; UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 
8 cmt. 
228. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 9. 
229. Id. § 9 cmt. 
230. Id. § 10. 
231. Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 416. 
232. See id. 
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fiduciaries’ access to decedent’s personal information, while ensuring that 
the decedent’s privacy and final wishes are protected.233 
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP:  WHY FLORIDA NEEDS TO ADDRESS THE 
DIGITAL ASSET QUESTION 
The current Florida Probate Code grows from a legacy of legal 
debate and discussion that has been ongoing since its inception.234  Florida 
probate proceedings are entirely governed by statute, and the administration 
of estates is governed by chapter 733, beginning with the venue for probate 
proceedings235 and ending with the closing of estates.236  Under chapter 733, 
Florida requires that a personal representative be appointed to administer the 
decedent’s estate.237  Furthermore, the personal representative typically must 
be a Florida resident, unless they are a lineal descendant or spouse.238  The 
personal representative must not have been convicted of a felony, cannot be 
under eighteen years of age, and must be mentally capable of performing 
their duties.239 
The personal representative in Florida is considered a fiduciary and 
held to a certain standard of care.240  “A personal representative [must] settle 
and [administer] the estate . . . accord[ing] [to] the terms of the decedent[]” 
and must use the authority granted to him “for the best interests of interested 
persons.”241  To help ensure the personal representative is acting in the best 
interest of the parties, as long as the actions of the personal representative are 
in accordance with administering the estate properly, he or she will not be 
liable for those acts.242 
Thus, the Florida Probate Code grants certain powers to the personal 
representative,243 so they can adequately and efficiently administer the estate, 
including the fiduciary duty to maintain the assets of the estate.244  The first 
issue regarding digital assets can be found in the language of Florida Probate 
Code chapter 733, which states: 
                                                     
233. See UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT, Prefatory Note. 
234. See Henry A. Fenn & Edward F. Koren, The 1974 Florida Probate 
Code—A Marriage of Convenience, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 615, 616–18 (1975). 
235. FLA. STAT. § 733.101 (2014). 
236. See id. § 733.903. 
237. Id. § 733.301(1)(a)(1). 
238. Id. § 733.304(2)–(3). 
239. Id. § 733.303(1)(a)–(c). 
240. FLA. STAT. § 733.602(1). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. § 733.602(2). 
243. Id. § 733.608. 
244. Id. §§ 733.608, .609(1). 
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(1) All real and personal property of the decedent, except the 
protected homestead, within [the] state and the rents, income, 
issues, and profits from it shall be assets in the hands of the 
personal representative: 
(a) [f]or the payment of devises, family allowance, elective share, 
estate and inheritance taxes, claims, charges, and expenses of the 
administration and obligations of the decedent’s estate; 
(b) [t]o enforce contribution and equalize advancement; [and]  
(c) [f]or distribution.245 
The language of the code does not mention intangible property.246  
Furthermore, there is not a single mention of a digital asset.247  The silence in 
the statute represents some of the problems that arise between a fiduciary’s 
attempt to gain access and control of digital assets that would clearly violate 
an ISP, such as Facebook’s TOS.248  The bulk of the previous discussion 
regarding digital assets and the problems that arise in states with 
fiduciaries—and how some states have attempted to address this issue—shed 
light on the fact that the Florida Probate Code provides no protection to a 
decedent’s digital estate, because through the language of the statute, digital 
assets do not exist.249  Furthermore, the Florida Probate Code does not 
currently authorize the fiduciary to access or control e-mail or other forms of 
electronic communication.250  Having shown that digital property can hold 
extraordinary sentimental value, and in some cases substantial financial 
value,251 there is clearly a need for the Florida Probate Code to recognize 
digital assets and provide a consistent framework for fiduciaries to access 
these accounts and administer them accordingly.252 
V. CONCLUSION 
It takes some time for legislatures to hammer out a permanent 
solution to the issues that arise with digital estate planning and fiduciary 
                                                     
245. FLA. STAT. § 733.608(1). 
246. See id. 
247. See id. 
248. See id.; supra notes 114–21 and accompanying text. 
249. See FLA. STAT. § 733.608; Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; discussion 
supra Part III. 
250. See FLA. STAT. § 733.608. 
251. Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 390–91. 
252. See supra Part IV. 
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management.253  Legal scholars have presented several suggestions on how 
to properly plan for a digital estate, including taking an inventory of all 
accounts and listing all relevant user names and passwords.254  Other 
suggestions include regularly backing up and expressly authorizing ISP to 
disclose their information to their fiduciaries.255  This is, of course, when an 
account holder has planned out his digital estate; however, when no plan 
exists, a fiduciary should consult an attorney and so long as there is not a 
criminal investigation, request and create copies of the content of the digital 
property.256 
While these suggestions are currently necessary in Florida, they 
would not be if Florida would enact the UFADAA, at least in part.257  Florida 
should establish a digital assets statute that gives direct access to the 
decedents’ or incapacitated individuals’ guardian to electronic e-mail 
communications, as well as any and all other digital assets, including social 
media accounts.258  To help ensure there is not subsequent litigation, Florida 
should adopt section 9 of the UFADAA, to ensure ISPs do not fear 
subsequent civil litigation.259  Furthermore, Florida legislators should take 
note of the prior states’ attempt at addressing the digital assets issues and 
refrain from making theirs too limited in scope.260  Incorporating all digital 
assets, including social media, would help ensure they do not end up with the 
same latent ambiguity as Rhode Island, Virginia, and Connecticut.261  Lastly, 
Florida legislators should strongly consider section 8 of the UFADAA.262  
This section develops strong fiduciary authority while maintaining the 
necessary responsibilities to ensure the decedent’s privacy is maintained and 
their final wishes are respected.263 
                                                     
253. See Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 416. 
254. Id. at 416–18. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. See UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT, Prefatory Note 
(2014). 
258. See id. § 4 (2014). 
259. See id. § 9. 
260. See id. Prefatory Note. 
261. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2014); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110 (2014); UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT, 
Prefatory Note. 
262. See UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 8. 
263. See id. § 8(b). 
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